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Abstract
This thesis investigates the design of appropriate institutions to ensure the good conduct of
fiscal and monetary policy. The three chapters develop theoretical frameworks to address the
time-inconsistency of policy plans or prevent the occurrence of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Time-inconsistency refers to a situation where preferences over policy change over time. Opti-
mal policy plans are not credible, since agents anticipate the implementation of another policy in
the future. This issue is particularly pervasive to monetary policy, since nominal quantities (price
level, interest rates, etc.) are very sensitive to expected policies, but predetermined to actual policy
choices.
The first chapter investigates how fiscal policy can mitigate the inflation bias of monetary
policy in an economy with heterogeneous agents. Whenever there is a desire for redistribution,
progressive fiscal helps to implement a policy mix less biased toward inflation. Importantly, even
the richest supports some fiscal progressivity, since over their life cycle, they benefit from a more
balanced policy-mix.
A self-fulfilling prophecy, or coordination failure, refers to a situation where a more desirable
economic outcome could be reached, but fail to be, by the only effect of pessimistic expectations.
Self-fulfilling debt crises are a classical example: pessimistic investors bid down the price of debt,
which increases the likelihood of default, which in turn justifies the initial decrease in price.
The second chapter, co-authored with Russell Cooper, asks whether monetary policy can deter
self-fulfilling debt crises. The analysis shows how a counter-cyclical inflation policy with commit-
ment is effective in doing so. Importantly, it can be implemented without endangering the primary
objective of monetary policy, to deliver an inflation target for instance.
The third chapter, co-authored with Andrew Gimber, revisits the classic Laffer curve coordi-
nation failure: taxes could be low, but they are high because agents anticipate high tax rates.
In a dynamic environment with debt issuance, the multiplicity of equilibria critically depends on
inherited debt. At high levels of public debt, fiscal policy is pro-cyclical: taxes increase when
output decreases, and self-fulfilling fiscal crisis can occur. Overall, this chapter sheds light on the
perils of high level of public debt.
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Preface
This thesis investigates the design of appropriate institutions to ensure the good conduct of fiscal
and monetary policy. The three chapters develop theoretical frameworks to study and address the
time-inconsistency of optimal policy plans or prevent the occurrence of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Time-inconsistency refers to a situation where preferences over policy plans change over time.
Optimal policy plans are not credible, since agents anticipate the implementation of another policy
in the future. This issue is particularly pervasive to monetary policy, since nominal quantities
(price level, interest rates, etc.) are very sensitive to expected policies, but predetermined to
actual policy choices. A self-fulfilling prophecy, or a coordination failure, refers to a situation
where a more desirable economic outcome could be reached, but fail to be, by the only effect of
pessimistic expectations. A classic example is self-fulfilling debt crisis: pessimistic investors bid
down the price of debt, which increases the likelihood of default, which in turn justifies the initial
decrease in price.
The thesis consists in three chapters, related to fiscal and monetary policy, each asking a specific
research questions: can fiscal policy contribute to mitigate the time-inconsistency of monetary
policy? Can central bank interventions deter self-fulfilling debt crisis? Can fiscal crisis be avoided
with active debt policy?
Sequential monetary policy is biased toward inflation since nominal quantities are pre-determined
to policy decisions. In equilibrium, welfare losses stem from the anticipation of the inflation bias.
This issue has long been studied but none of the proposed solutions, as for instance appointing a
conservative central banker, is fully satisfactory.
The first chapter investigates how fiscal policy can address the time-inconsistency of monetary
policy. The model considers an environment where agents differ in ability, hence in income level,
and a public good must be financed by resorting to a mix of money seignorage and labor income
tax. I introduce the possibility for fiscal policy to be progressive, where agents with higher income
face higher marginal tax rates. Importantly, I allow the policymaker to determine the progressivity
of the tax schedule one period in advance, so that it is predetermined to monetary policy choices.
Then, the desirability of redistribution from rich to poor agents implements a policy-mix less biased
toward inflation.
The analysis reveals the following elements. First, in the case where the policymaker does
not value redistribution across the population, progressivity is not part of the policy mix, for it
strengthens the welfare costs associated with labor taxation. The outcome is the most extreme
form of inflation bias.
To analyze whether progressivity in conjunction with redistributive concerns is effective to
mitigate the inflation bias, I design a two-stage political game. In the second stage, individuals
vote over the policy mix given the progressivity of the tax schedule and predetermined money
holding. Individual preferences reveal strategic choices: on the one hand, every agent weighs the
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cost of distortionary taxation on their current labor supply decision; on the other hand, they
consider how progressivity shifts the burden of labor taxation to richer agents. Poorer agents favor
then lower inflation and higher labor taxes. The outcome of the vote is that the inflation bias is
reduced, and so whenever the fiscal tax schedule displays some progressivity.
Next, I consider the first stage of the game, where progressivity is determined before agents
form their saving decision. At this stage, individual demand for money is sensitive to expected
inflation. The analysis reveals then that all agents, rich or poor, support some level of progressivity.
Indeed, by reducing the inflation bias, progressivity helps to implement a more balanced policy
mix.
Finally, I show using numerical simulations how the welfare properties of this economy depend
on inequalities, understood here as the dispersion of individual abilities. Essentially, the capacity of
fiscal progressivity to curb welfare losses from the inflation bias is strengthen by a larger dispersion
of productivity.
The second chapter, co-authored with Russell Cooper, considers an environment with debt
fragility, namely sovereign default driven by coordination failure among investors: negative in-
vestors’ sentiment results in an increase in borrowing costs, leaving the government with a higher
debt burden and a higher probability of default.
Our environment features a central bank that prints money and transfer seignorage revenue to
the treasury. The fiscal authority chooses to raise complementary labor taxes and repay its debt or
default on its nominal obligations. The monetary intervention has several influences. The inflation
tax provides real resources to the government, thus reducing required labor taxes to service debt.
Also, the realized value of inflation alters the real value of debt and consequently the debt burden
left to the fiscal authority. Finally, expectations of future inflation and thus the tax base for
seignorage are determined by the monetary regime.
Do monetary interventions deter self-fulfilling debt crisis? The answer depends critically on
the monetary policy regime. Under strict inflation targeting, nominal debt is de facto a real non
contingent asset and debt fragility persists. Whenever the central bank commits to provide as
much resources as necessary to repay debt, private agents anticipate the monetary bailout, price
an inflation premium into nominal interest rates and reduce their demand for money. In effect,
they neutralize the capacity of the central bank to intervene and debt fragility persists.
Finally, we derive a monetary policy rule that both anchors inflation expectations and deters
self-fulfilling debt crisis. This policy is reminiscent of the commitment of the European Central
Bank to undertake ”whatever it takes” to counter pessimistic self-fulfilling expectations in the
Eurozone. Under this rule, no actual intervention is required and debt is uniquely valued. More-
over, this policy does not endanger the primary objective of the central bank, to anchor inflation
expectations around an inflation target.
The third chapter, joint with Andrew Gimber, investigates the role of public debt in fiscal crisis.
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We consider an environment with a potential Laffer curve coordination failure: in the ”good”
equilibrium, labor supply is high because workers anticipate a low tax rate, and the government
chooses a low tax rate because output is high. In the ”bad” equilibrium, labelled fiscal trap, workers
restrict their labor supply in anticipation of a high tax rate, and the resulting low output induces
the government to fulfill their pessimistic expectations with high taxes.
In a dynamic environment with debt issuance, the multiplicity of equilibria critically depends
on the intertemporal liabilities of the government. The analysis isolates inherited debt as a special
element of the government budget constraint, since it is generally predetermined to any fiscal
decision program (income, expenses, debt issuance or default). We show that there is a threshold
level of debt above which the economy is vulnerable to self-fulfilling fiscal traps.
Two countervailing effects drive fiscal choices: on the one hand, a decrease in output induces
the government to decrease taxes and preserve current consumption; on the other hand, to ensure
the solvency of its debt position, the government wishes to raise taxes. When the inherited stock of
public debt is low, the former effect dominates and fiscal policy is countercyclical. The economy is
characterized by a unique equilibrium. When the inherited level of public debt is high, the second
effect dominates. Optimal fiscal policy then becomes pro-cyclical, because deferring tax increases
when output is low would impose an unacceptable burden on future consumption.
In this case, the country is vulnerable to self-fulfilling fiscal crisis, stemming from private agents
coordination failure. In this case, a ”bad” equilibrium can arise, where workers restrict their labor
supply in anticipation of a high tax rate, and the resulting low output induces the government
optimally to fulfill their pessimistic expectations with high taxes. We further investigate the
robustness of our result to alternative scenarios, allowing for adjustments in public spending, debt
default and private access to international markets.
vi
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Chapter 1
Fiscal Discipline on Monetary Policy
1.1 Introduction
Standard views on monetary-fiscal interactions state that monetary policy generates redistribution,
but it cannot do much about it. Indeed, monetary policy is and ought to be a ’blunt’ tool. Fiscal
policy on the other hand, with the appropriate set of targeted instruments, could address these
redistributive concerns. Each authority plays its score. This view is for instance supported by a
former Chair of the Federal Reserve:
Policies designed to affect the distribution of wealth and income are, appropriately, the
province of elected officials, not the Fed (...) Monetary policy is a blunt tool which
certainly affects the distribution of income and wealth (...) Other types of policies are
better suited to addressing legitimate concerns about inequality. [Bernanke (2015)]1
This paper argues that fiscal-monetary interactions are more subtle. Fiscal policy should not
be confined to undo the redistributive consequences of monetary policy. Especially, fiscal policy
has the unique capacity to shape heterogeneity within the economy and influence decisively the
conduct of monetary policy under discretion.
The underlying problem considered in the present analysis is the classic time-inconsistency of
optimal policy plans, initially uncovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). As time goes by, optimal
policy changes. Indeed, once expectations are set and private decisions taken, the policymaker
no longer factors in the expectational benefits of the optimal policy plan. This intertemporal
inconsistency generates welfare losses, since private agents anticipate the conduct of future policies.
This issue is particularly pervasive in nominal economies, as shown by Calvo (1978) for instance.
Indeed, nominal quantities (interest rates, money holding) are crucially sensitive to expectations,
but policies are implemented once expectations are locked-in and real decisions made.
Several institutional solutions have been proposed to address this issue. The monetary authority
could engage its reputation to prevent deviations from the announced policy plan, as in Barro and
Gordon (1983). Alternatively, the strategic appointment of a conservative central banker could
mitigate the excessive use of the inflation tax, as proposed by Rogoff (1985).2
This paper suggests a novel institutional feature to mitigate the welfare cost of monetary discre-
tion and support time-consistent policies. Formally, the present analysis asks whether progressive
fiscal policy can curb the inflation bias of a monetary authority acting under discretion. The anal-
ysis stresses that progressive fiscal policy generates redistributive conflicts over policy choices, and
the resolution of this conflict limits the inflation bias.
1Source: Brookings, Monetary Policy and Inequality, June 2015.
2These references do not cover the whole set of recommendations proposed by the literature.
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I consider an environment with heterogenous agents, where a public good is financed by resort-
ing to a mix of money seignorage and labor income taxes. The source of heterogeneity across agents
is lifetime productivity. The environment is structured to highlight dynamic distortions on labor
supply decisions and conflicts across agents. Informational restrictions prevents the use of first-
best type-specific lump sum taxes. Accordingly, any form of taxation is distortionary. Still, the
elasticity of the seignorage tax base changes over time. The optimal policy is not time-consistent
and an inflation bias arises when policy is implemented sequentially.
I introduce in this environment the possibility for fiscal policy to be progressive, namely that as
income increases, marginal tax rates increase above average tax rates. In effect, this paper studies
a three parameters taxation program. The labor tax plan is captured by a level and a progressivity
parameter. The inflation tax operates as a proportional tax on money holding. As in Werning
(2007), introducing progressivity on the labor tax plan introduces both redistribution within the
private sector and productive efficiency considerations.
Consider as a benchmark a benevolent policymaker. With agents’ linear utility in consumption,
the planner has no redistributive concerns. The optimal policy plan under commitment requires to
tax labor and money holding evenly, with no progressivity, and so to spread uniformly aggregate
distortions on labor supply decisions - across time and across the population. Under discretion
though, real money holdings are pre-determined to the tax collection decision, hence the temptation
to rely predominantly on the inflation tax. The latter is then not distortionary compared to labor
income taxes. Agents anticipate the willingness of the policymaker to resort to the inflation tax
and reduce their demand for money accordingly. This lead in equilibrium to a classic inflation
bias and welfare losses: inflation that is costless ex post is costly from an ex ante perspective.
Overall, progressivity generates only further distortions on labor supply decisions and is a priori
not desirable in an environment with only efficiency concerns.
Next, I relax the productive efficiency objective of the benevolent planner and study the deter-
minants of policy parameters when redistributive effects are taken into account. To do so, I build
a two-stage political game, where progressivity is determined one period in advance and the tax
mix is determined contemporaneously to the provision of the public good by majority voting.
This approach allows me to study specific determinants of the redistributive - efficiency trade-
offs induced by fiscal progressivity. The voting mechanism outlines how progressivity generates
redistributive conflicts across the population over the tax mix. This stage of the analysis reveals
the equity component, or redistributive nature of progressivity. Then, I analyze whether the
resolution of these conflicts justify to commit to progressivity.3 This step outlines the potential
for progressivity to support intertemporal efficiency by providing the right dynamic incentives.
In the second stage of the game, agents vote over the relative mix of inflation and labor taxes,
given the progressivity of the tax plan and the distribution of real money holding. Individual
preferences reveal strategic choices of individuals. On the one hand, every agents weighs their
3The pre-commitment to progressivity reflects tax inertia, as in Farhi (2010) or Ferriere (2015): some components
of the tax code, such as ’assiette’ or ’progressivity’ need time to be adjusted and are thus predetermined to the
decision of the ’level’ of taxes to be collected.
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individual exposure to each source of taxes. Agents are naturally biased toward the inflation tax,
since predetermined money holding form an inelastic tax base at this stage. On the other hand,
they consider how progressivity shifts the burden of labor taxation towards richer agent.
With proportional labor taxes (no progressivity), agents unanimously support the inflation tax
to reap the inelastic tax base. With progressivity, redistributive conflicts emerge. Low productivity
agents support labor taxes, whereas high productivity agents vote for inflationary policies, to
contain the welfare cost induced by high tax distortions on their labor supply. Under a progressive
tax plan, the decisive median agent favors moderately inflationary choices, thereby reducing the
magnitude of the inflation tax.
In the first stage of the game, agents learn their type, anticipate inflation, supply labor and
save. When asked about their taste for progressive tax plan, they weigh the disincentive effect
of progressivity, their exposure to labor taxes and the beneficial effect of curbing the inflation
tax. The central result of the analysis is that all agents favor positive level of progressivity for its
dynamic incentives provision.
Still, the choice of progressivity is not monotonic in productivity. The lowest productivity agent
support the level of progressivity that maximize the use of labor taxes; the highest productivity
agent support progressivity just enough to equalize marginal utilities over each of its tax base.
Finally, I show using numerical simulations how the optimal level of progressivity is influenced
by the distribution of productivity over the population. Essentially, the capacity of fiscal pro-
gressivity to curb welfare losses from monetary discretion is enhanced by a larger dispersion of
productivity. For higher level of variance in the distribution of productivity, the induced allocation
and intertemporal welfare gets closer to the full commitment allocation of the benevolent planner.
Overall, the political economy analysis allows to disentangle equity and efficiency concerns
generated by fiscal progressivity, by first outlining redistibutive conflicts between agents given the
progressivity of fiscal policy, and then characterizing the level of progressivity to sustain intertem-
poral time consistent policy plans.
Albanesi (2003) investigates whether monetary and fiscal policy plans are time consistent in
an economy with cash and credit goods, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983). The central result is that
the policy plan can be time-consistent under a specific distribution of nominal assets across the
population, but the analysis is silent on how to implement this distribution. In contrast, Camous
and Cooper (2014) analyze the choices of a discretionary policy maker in an environment with
heterogenous agents but absent redistributive concerns. They find that a strong inflationary bias
emerges. This project aims at investigating the impact of redistributive concerns within a related
environment.
The general idea of the present analysis is to shape redistributive forces within a heterogenous
economy to support time consistent policy plans. A close analysis can be found in Farhi, Sleet,
Werning, and Yeltekin (2012), in the context of capital taxation in an economy with imperfect com-
mitment. Progressivity optimally emerges as part of a dynamic plan, since it mitigates inequalities
3
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and the associated temptation to reduce them by exerting a capital levy.4
Cooper and Kempf (2013) investigates the credibility of deposit insurance in a heterogenous
Diamond-Dybvig economy. Redistributive concerns play a key role in the decision of the govern-
ment to intervene ex post in case of a bank run, but the credibility of deposit insurance can be
ensured with an appropriate ex ante tax scheme.
A similar idea is applied by Ferriere (2015) in a public debt environment with strategic default:
committing to progressive fiscal policy allows to influence the default decision ex post and the price
of debt issuance ex ante.
The rest of the document is organized as follow. Section 1.2 describes the economic environment
and the properties of progressive fiscal plans. In Section 1.3, I characterize the optimal policy plan
of a benevolent planner, to highlight the time inconsistency of monetary policy and the inflation
bias. Then I define in Section 1.4 the political economy environment and study the outcome of
the game. Section 3.6 concludes by discussing how the insights of the analysis would generalize to
richer environments.
1.2 Economic Environment
In this section, I set up a simple economy with heterogenous agents to analyze the influence
of progressive fiscal policy on the conduct of monetary policy. Time is discrete and finite. In
effect, the model is built as a real economy. Still, the analogy in notations and interpretations
with a nominal economy is kept on purpose and justified along the exposition. The environment
is parsimonious enough to capture the main forces at play, i.e. the distribution of taxes and
distortions on labor supply decisions. Especially, prices are flexible and the only cost of inflation
derives from expectations. These features allow to focus neatly on conflicts arising from tax policy
choices.5
1.2.1 Environment
Private Economy
Consider a two-period economy, t ∈ {1, 2}, populated by a mass 1 of agents, and a government
that needs to finance an exogenous amount of expenses g at t = 2. Agents differ in lifetime labor
productivity z, distributed over the population according to the cumulative distribution function
F (·) defined on the compact set [zl, zh], with 0 < zl < zh ≤ 1.6
The preferences of an agent of type z over consumption and labor are represented by a utility
function U(z; c2, n2, n1). Agents work and save when young (t = 1), work and consume when old
4Scheuer and Wolitzky (2014) investigates time-consistent dynamic taxation in the same environment, under the
assumption that a policy is sustainable if it maintains the support of a large enough political coalition over time.
The profile of capital taxation is U-shaped in their economy, so as to build a strong middle class and avoid the
formation of a reforming coalition.
5In the concluding remarks, I explain how the main results would generalize to richer environments.
6The numerical illustrations provided throughout the analysis assume that z is uniformly distributed over [0, 1].
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(t = 2). This structure introduces an explicit motive for saving without resorting to additional
frictions.7 Formally, savings in this real environment are invested in a storage technology that
provides no return. Still, I call this object money, and justify below the analogy of this environment
with a nominal economy.
Throughout the analysis, I assume that preferences are linear in consumption and quadratic in
labor disutility:8
U(z; c2, n2, n1) = c2 − (n2)
2
2
− (n1)
2
2
. (1.1)
Production is linear. An agent of type z produces output yt = znt, where nt is labor supply
at t ∈ {1, 2}. Agents are taxed at t = 2. Fiscal policy collects resources from old agents labor
income, and monetary policy operates as a tax on real money holdings. The tax structure follows
the informational restrictions introduced by Mirrlees (1971): only labor income is publicly observ-
able, whereas individual productivity, money holding and labor supply are private information.
Accordingly, an agent that earns labor income y2 = zn2 at t = 2 pays taxes according to a tax plan
τ(y2, θ), where θ is the labor tax parameter. Similarly, as real money holdings are not observable,
taxes on money holding are constrained to be linear. Accordingly, monetary policy operates as an
inflation tax on money holding at t = 2, with the uniform rate noted pi. The expected inflation
rate is noted pie.
The budget constraints of an agent of type z write:
m = y1,
c2 = y2 − τ(y2, θ) +m(1− pi),
(1.2)
where m represents real money holding, held between t = 1 and t = 2.
The solution to individuals optimization problem is straightforward and gives to the following
expressions characterizing the optimal productions decisions y1(·) and y2(·):9
y1(z, pi
e) = z2(1− pie) y2(z, θ) = z2
[
1− ∂τ(y2, θ)
∂y2
]
. (1.3)
Production decisions in both young and old age are driven by real return to working, defined
as the product of individual productivity and marginal tax rates. Especially, high anticipated
inflation induces agents to reduce labor supply and money demand when young.10 Similarly, at
t = 2, production decisions are driven by marginal tax rates and individual productivity. Note
7The structure generates a demand for money similar to money in the utility function, as in Calvo and Guidotti
(1993) for instance.
8Quasi-linear preferences imply that consumption absorbs all income effects, which simplify the analysis of tax
distortions.
9These expressions will be called implementability or envelope conditions when the problem of the government
is considered.
10Note that the demand for money exhibits complementarities with inflation. A seignorage Laffer curve naturally
arises, and for a given level of seignorage income, two inflation rates are possible. This indeterminacy is not the focus
of the present analysis. Accordingly, whenever necessary, I assume that private agents’ expectations of inflation lie
on the upward slopping part of the seignorage Laffer curve.
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that due to the linear quadratic structure, there is no income effect: production decision at t = 2
is driven only by labor taxes and at t = 1 only by expected inflation.
Given the dynamic nature of the model, I define value functions Vt(·) at each point in time. At
t = 2, given its real money holding m, an agent of type z exposed to a tax plan τ(·, θ) and inflation
rate pi derives utility according to:
V2(z,m, θ, pi) = y2(z, θ)− τ
(
y2(z, θ), θ
)− (y2(z, θ)/2)2
2
+m(1− pi). (1.4)
Similarly, at t = 1, an agent of type z, considering a labor tax plan τ(·, θ) and inflation rate pie:
V1(z, θ, pi
e) = y2(z, θ)− τ
(
y2(z, θ), θ
)− (y2(z, θ)/2)2
2
+ y1(z, pi
e)(1− pie)−
(
y1(z, pi
e)/2
)2
2
. (1.5)
The central difference between these indirect utility functions is the following. At t = 1, private
agents anticipate the disincentive effect of inflation on their labor supply decision, whereas at t = 2,
real money holding is predetermined and inflation operates as a non distortionary tax, in contrast
to labor taxation. As the analysis is conducted in a deterministic environment, perfect foresight
will ensure pie = pi.11
Note that the distribution of real money holding in the population at t = 2 is non degenerate.
Formally, from (1.2) and (1.3), individual demand for money at t = 1 writes:
m(z, pie) = z2(1− pie). (1.6)
With M being aggregate real money holding at t = 2, individual money holdings at t = 2
satisfy the following distribution across the population:12
φ
(
z,M
)
=
z2
E
(
z2)
M. (1.7)
The Government
I now turn to the description of the government and the policy tools. The only purpose of the
government is to finance an exogenous public good g, by collecting taxes at t = 2, either from
labor income or via seignorage of money. As mentioned above, I follow Mirrlees (1971) and assume
that individual productivity, money holding and labor supply decisions are privately observed,
only labor income is publicly observable.13 Accordingly, the government collects labor taxes on
observable labor income and seignorage revenue, as a proportional tax on predetermined money
11In a stochastic environment, these expressions would be modified to account for the realization of an exogenous
shock at t = 2, and the expectations over the shock at t = 1. Generalization of the results to stochastic shocks to
government expenditures is discussed in Section 1.4.2.
12M is an endogenous object derived in the analysis, but its level does not affect the relative distribution of money
holding across the population.
13The informational restriction prevents the implementation of type-specific lump sum taxes. Further, I implicitly
assume that the productivity level zl is low enough to prevent the implementation of a flat lump-sum tax across the
population. Both reasons provide an endogenous rationale for the use of distortionary taxes.
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holding.14
Given aggregate money holding M , the budget constraint of the government at t = 2 writes:∫
z
τ
(
y2(z, θ), θ
)
dF (z) +
∫
z
piφ(z,M)dF (z) = g, (1.8)
where the first term captures labor income tax under θ, the second seignorage income, and φ(z,M)
is the distribution of real money holding, given by (1.7).
In this environment, there is no ex post cost of inflation and real money holdings are prede-
termined to policy choices, whereas production decisions at t = 2 are sensitive to the tax plan
parameter θ. Hence, seignorage is a very attractive source of taxation under discretion. Still, the
choice of taxes affects the distribution of wealth and consumption across agents. This dimension
is potentially magnified in the presence of progressive income taxation.
1.2.2 Progressive Tax Plan
Consider a two parameters labor tax plan τ(y, θ) ≡ τ(y, α, λ), where y is labor income, α captures
the progressivity and λ the level of labor taxes. This plan needs two key properties for the purpose
of the analysis. A tax plan is progressive if and only if marginal tax rates are higher than average
taxes for all level of income:15
yτ(·) =
∂τ(y, θ)/∂y
τ(y, θ)/y
> 1 ∀y > 0. (1.9)
Second, we restrict attention to fiscal tax plans that are not redistributive per-se. This second
property is introduced to neatly focus on redistributive conflicts between labor income tax and
inflation and not redistributive conflicts driven by labor taxation.16 Formally, no agent can receive
a positive fiscal transfer. This condition writes:
τ(y, θ) ≥ 0 ∀y > 0. (1.10)
From now on, I assume the following isoelastic form for the tax plan.
Assumption 1. Let α ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0. The tax plan writes:
τ(y, α, λ) = λy1+α. (A.1)
This specification satisfies the desired properties (1.9) and (1.10).17 Especially, the average and
14To be clear, the informational constraint induces the tax rate on pre-determined quantities to be linear. This
is the essential ingredients that support the monetary policy interpretation of the model: monetary policy operates
as a blunt and anonymous tax on the predetermined tax base.
15This expression can also be understood as the elasticity of taxes with respect to labor income. This definition of
progressivity is standard, see for instance Benabou (2002), Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) or Holter,
Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2014).
16For an analysis of redistribution via progressive labor taxation, see for instance Meltzer and Richard (1981).
17An alternative candidate could be the following quadratic form: τ(y, α, λ) = λ(y + αy2).
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marginal tax rates write respectively τ(·)y = λy
α and dτ(·)dy = λ(1 + α)y
α. The ratio of marginal
tax to average tax rates is yτ(·) = 1 + α. Accordingly, when α = 0, the tax plan implements a flat
tax rate λ, and for any α > 0, the tax plan is progressive.18 Under Assumption 1, the production
decision of an agent of type z, i.e. y2(z, α, λ), is implicitly defined by the following expression:
19
1− λ(1 + α)yα2 −
y2
z2
= 0. (1.11)
Some Properties of Progressive Taxation
Note t(z, α, λ), the labor tax function for an agent of type z subject to the tax plan θ = (α, λ). It
is the tax plan evaluated at the production decision (1.11):
t(z, α, λ) = τ
(
y2(z, α, λ), α, λ). (1.12)
Over the population, define the aggregate tax function T (α, λ) as:
T (α, λ) =
∫
z
t(z, α, λ)dF (z). (1.13)
In the absence of progressivity, i.e. whenever the tax plan implements a flat tax rate, the
properties of these functions are well know and represented in Figure 1.1.20
The following lemma establishes some useful properties for these tax functions when α > 0.
Lemma 1. Given α > 0, the tax function t(z, α, λ) is defined for all λ ≥ 0 with the following
salient properties:
- Single-peaked Laffer curve, reached at λ¯(z, α) = 1
2(1+α)( z
2
2 )
α
.
- Stritctly concave on the upward slopping part of the Laffer curve.
- Strictly increasing in productivity z: dt(·)dz > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2.
The Laffer curve shape of the tax functions reflects the classic competing behavioral response
and mechanical effects of raising taxes:
dt(z, α, λ)
dλ
=
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ
+
∂τ(·)
∂λ
. (1.14)
The first term is negative and called behavioral response: an increase in labor taxes decreases
labor supply and production. The second term, labelled mechanical effect, is positive and captures
18Note that for any α ∈ [−1, 0], the tax plan is regressive. I do not consider this parameter space as it does not
emerge as a candidate policy choice in the analysis.
19As represented in Figure 1.2 and established in Appendix 1.6.1, for α > 0, y2(z, α, λ) is positive, strictly convex
and strictly decreasing for all λ ≥ 0.
20In the case α = 0, the individual tax function writes t(z, 0, λ) = z2(1 − λ)λ and the aggregate tax function
T (0, λ) = E(z2)(1 − λ)λ. These functions are strictly concave, positive for λ ∈ [0, 1] and reach a global maximum
for λ = 1/2.
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Figure 1.1: Production and Tax Functions without Progressivity (α = 0)
0 0.5 1 1.5
0 λ
z2
y(z, 0,λ)
t(z, 0,λ)
(a) Individual Production and Tax Functions
0 0.5 1 1.5
0 λ
E(z2)
4 -
t(zl, 0,λ)
t(zh, 0,λ)
T (0,λ)
(b) Aggregate Tax Function
This figure considers the case of no progressivity, i.e. α = 0. The left panel represents the production decision (1.3)
and the tax function (1.12) as a function of λ for an agent of type z. The right panel outlines how the tax functions
aggregate over the population according to (1.13).
the increase in tax collected. For low levels of labor taxes, the mechanical effect dominates, whereas
for high levels of labor taxes, the behavioral response dominates and the level of tax collected is
decreasing in λ.
Importantly, these properties carry through to the aggregate tax function:
Lemma 2. Given α, the aggregate tax function T (α, λ) is single-peaked and strictly concave on
the upward slopping part of the Laffer curve.
Proof. The argument considers partitions of the productivity space [zl, zh] and shows that the prop-
erties of the individual tax functions t(z, α, λ) are preserved when these functions are sequentially
added.
Lemma 1 establishes that for all z, t(z, α, λ) is single-peaked and strictly concave for all λ ∈
[0, λˆ(z, α)], with λˆ(z, α) > λ¯(z, α).21 Moreover both λ¯(z, α) and λˆ(z, α) are decreasing in z.
Consider F (z0, α, λ) = f(zl)t(zl, α, λ). This function satisfies the same properties as t(zl, α, λ).
Note λ¯(z0, α) the value of λ that maximizes F (z0, α, λ). Naturally, λ¯(z0, α) = λ¯(zl, α).
There is a productivity level z1 ∈ (z0, zh] such that λˆ(z1, α) = λ¯(z0, α) and for all z ∈ [z0, z1],
f(z)t(z, α, λ) is strictly concave and single-peaked, for all λ ∈ [0, λˆ(z1, α)]. Accordingly,
F (z1, α, λ) =
∫ z1
z0
f(z)t(z, α, λ)dF (z) + F (z0, α, λ) (1.15)
is also single-peaked, reached at λ = λ¯(z1, α) < λ¯(z0, α) and strictly concave over [0, λ¯(z1, α)].
Similarly, there is a productivity level z2 ∈ (z1, zh] such that λˆ(z2, α) = λ¯(z1, α), and by the
21See equation (1.68) in Appendix 1.6.2.
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same argument,
F (z2, α, λ) =
∫ z2
z1
f(z)t(z, α, λ)dF (z) + F (z1, α, λ) (1.16)
is also single-peaked, reached at λ = λ¯(z2, α) < λ¯(z1, α), and strictly concave over [0, λ¯(z2, α)].
Eventually, after n iterations,
F (zn, α, λ) =
∫ zn
zn−1
f(z)t(z, α, λ)dF (z) + F (zn−1, α, λ) =
∫ zh
zl
t(z, α, λ)dF (z) = T (α, λ), (1.17)
reaches a global maximum for λ = λ¯(α) ∈ (λ¯(zh, α), λ¯(zl, α)), and is strictly concave on its upward
slopping part.
Figure 1.2 represents the production functions (1.3) under a tax plan θ = (α, λ) with α > 0,
the tax function (1.12) for an agent of type z, the aggregate tax function (1.13) and summarizes
the key properties of Lemmas 1 and 2. The individual tax function reaches a maximum in λ¯(z, α).
By analogy, the peak of the aggregate tax function is reached for a value of λ noted λ¯(α).
Figure 1.2: Production and Tax Functions with Progressivity (α > 0)
0 1
0 λ
z2
λ(z,α)
y(z,α,λ)
t(z,α,λ)
(a) Individual Production and Tax Functions
0 1
0 λ
λ(α)
t(zl,α,λ)
t(zh,α,λ)
T (α,λ)
(b) Aggregate Tax Function
The left panel represents the production decision (1.3) and the tax function (1.12) for an agent of type z when
the tax plan features labor tax progressity, i.e. α > 0. The right panel outlines how the tax functions aggregate
according to (1.13).
1.2.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions are used in the developments to characterize the policy outcomes. The
first imposes a restriction on the distribution of agents to exhibit the usual property that the mean
productivity agent has higher productivity than the median.22
22This is typically the case for distributions that exhibit positive skewness.
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Assumption 2. Let zm = F
−1( 12 ) be the median productivity level. It satisfies:
zm ≤ E(z). (A.2)
Further, as government expenses play no particular role in this environment, I impose the
following upper limit on g.
Assumption 3. g is non stochastic and satisfies
0 < g <
E(z2)
4
. (A.3)
This restriction guarantees the existence of interior solutions to the taxation programs, namely
that there are enough resources in the economy in any circumstances to finance the public good.23
More importantly, the environment considers the presence of tax-inertia in fiscal policy, as in
Farhi (2010) and Ferriere (2015).24 The legislative process regarding fiscal policy is complex and
some structural elements of the tax code, influencing fiscal incidence for instance, requires more
time to be adjusted.25 Formally, in the present environment:
Assumption 4. Fiscal progressivity α is set one period in advance to tax collection. (A.4)
Accordingly, an essential feature of the environment is that progressivity is set at t = 1 (de
facto commitment), and predetermined to the choice of the relative mix of tax, i.e. level of labor
taxes and magnitude of inflation tax.
1.3 Productive Efficiency and the Benevolent Planner
This section considers as a benchmark the policy plans of a benevolent planner, both under com-
mitment and discretion. The planner does not have redistributive concerns, since individuals utility
is linear in consumption. Accordingly, this section investigates whether progressivity can be part
of an optimal policy plan and thus mitigate the aggregate welfare consequences of taxation.
1.3.1 Welfare Cost of Progressivity
This section takes a detour and consider a static labor taxation program. It derives a critical
property of isoelastic tax plans (A.1): progressivity induces unambiguous welfare losses, and so
both at the individual and aggregate level. Productive efficiency requires no progressivity. This is
formalized in the following Lemma.
23It is derived under the scenario of no labor taxation and top of the seignorage Laffer curve.
24Farhi (2010) introduces tax inertia on capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets.
In his analysis, this assumption deters the replication of the complete market outcome with state-contingent capital
taxes. Ferriere (2015) on progressivity of fiscal policy as in the present analysis.
25Also, tax inertia in fiscal policy is often contrasted with the flexibility of monetary policy.
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Lemma 3. Consider the static problem of financing a public good using labor taxes only. Both in
homogenous (zl = zh) and heterogenous agent economies (zl < zh), the optimal plan requires no
progressivity, i.e. α = 0.
Proof. Consider first the case of homogenous productivity, and the following static program:
max
α,λ
W (z, α, λ) = y(z, α, λ)− t(z, α, λ)−
(
y(z, α, λ)/z)2
2
, (1.18)
s.t. t(z, α, λ) = τ
(
y(z, α, λ), α, λ
)
= g, (1.19)
and non negativity constraints α ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0.
The budget constraint (1.19) implicitly defines λ(α), the level of labor taxes required to finance
g given progressivity α. Accordingly, the problem rewrites:
max
α
W˜ (z, α) = max
α
W
(
z, α, λ(α)
)
. (1.20)
Using the implementability condition (1.3), we can compute:
dW˜ (·)
dα
= −∂τ(·)
∂α
− ∂τ(·)
∂λ
dλ(·)
dα
, (1.21)
and totally differentiating (1.19) with respect to λ and α:
dλ(·)
dα
= −dτ(·)/dα
dτ(·)/dλ , with
dτ(·)
dx
=
∂τ(·)
∂y
dy(·)
dx
+
∂τ(·)
∂x
, x ∈ {α, λ}. (1.22)
These expressions allow to rewrite (1.21) as:
dW˜ (·)
dα
=
∂τ(·)/∂y
dτ(·)/dλ
λy(·)1+α
1 + α
dy(·)
dλ
. (1.23)
Since dτ(·)/dλ > 0 on the upward slopping part of the Laffer curve, it gives the desired result,
i.e. W˜ (α) is strictly decreasing in α and therefore is maximum for α = 0.
Now, let’s consider a similar problem, except that agents have different levels of productivity
z ∼ [zl, zh]. Let’s note the optimal tax plan
(
α∗, λ∗
)
. This tax plan induces a distribution {gz} of
the tax burden g across the population. Formally, for all z, t(z, α∗, λ∗) = gz.
Assume for now that type-specific flat rates are feasible. Using the previous result, since all
agents dislike progressivity, they would unanimously favor a type-specific tax scheme {λz} that
replicates the distribution of the tax burden {gz}, but with no progressivity, i.e. λzy(z, 0, λz) = gz.
So does the benevolent planner. Now, within this class of tax schemes, the planner prefers one
that implements a flat tax rate across the population. Indeed, efficiency requires to equalize labor
supply elasticities across the population.26 The labor supply elasticity of an agent z to a tax rate
λz writes (z, λz) =
λz
n(·)
dn(·)
dλz
= − λz1−λz . Accordingly, for all z′ 6= z, (z′, λz′) = (z, λz) if and only
26This claim can be stated formally by solving max{λz}
∫
zW (z, 0, λz)dF (z) subject to
∫
z t(z, 0, λz)dF (z) = g.
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if λz = λz′ .
Overall, within the class of isoelastic tax scheme (α, λ), a benevolent planner implements one
with no progressivity, i.e. α = 0.
For a given level of taxes to be collected, progressivity is only costly, for it increases marginal
tax rates, labor supply distortions and weighs on welfare. Therefore, individual agents dislike
progressivity for a given tax bill. Further, in the economy with heterogenous agents, efficiency
commands the equalization of labor supply elasticities across the population. This is achieved
with a flat tax rate, i.e. there is no aggregate efficiency gain to progressivity in an economy with
heterogenous agents.
1.3.2 Optimal Dynamic Policy Plan and Time Inconsistency
Now, I consider the dynamic economy described in Section 1.2 and characterize the optimal policy
plans of a benevolent planner, both under commitment and discretion. As underlined before, with
linear-quadratic preferences, the planner pursues a pure efficiency objective when choosing over
the labor tax plan and the inflation rate.
Under commitment, a benevolent policymaker solves:
max
α,λ,pi
∫
z
V1(z, α, λ, pi)dF (z), (1.24)
subject to the government budget constraint (3.6), the individual demand for money (1.6), the
production decisions (1.3), and the non-negativity constraints α ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, pi ≥ 0.
At t = 2, i.e. under discretion, the policymaker no longer internalizes the impact of its policy
plan on the demand for money. Given the aggregate level of money M ≥ 0, the induced distribution
of real money holding m(z) ≡ φ(z,M), and a predetermined level of progressivity α ≥ 0, it
considers the following program:
max
λ,pi
∫
z
V2
(
z,m, α, λ, pi
)
dF (z), (1.25)
subject to the government budget constraint (3.6), the production decisions (1.3), and non nega-
tivity constraints λ ≥ 0, pi ≥ 0. The following proposition characterizes the optimal policy plans
under commitment and discretion.
Proposition 1. The optimal dynamic policy plan prescribes no progressivity (α = 0) and an equal
sharing of tax distortions across time (λ = pi). Under discretion, for any level of progressivity
α ≥ 0, the policy plan implements the highest rate of inflation and possibly labor taxes to meet the
budget constraint. Welfare is lower under discretion.
Proof. First consider the planner acting under commitment, deriving the policy plan at t = 1.
By Lemma 3, we can rule out the possibility of α > 0. Indeed, if positive labor taxes are raised
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as part of the optimal plan, keeping the total amount collected fixed, welfare is higher with no
progressivity. Hence, the benevolent government solves:
max
λ,pi
∫
z
V1(z, 0, λ, pi)dF (z) = E(z
2)
(1− λ)2
2
+ E(z2)
(1− pi)2
2
(1.26)
subject to the government budget constraint:
E(z2)(1− λ)λ+ E(z2)(1− pi)pi = g. (1.27)
This problem is symmetric in the choice variables λ and pi. Accordingly, any interior solution to
(1.26) satisfies λ = pi. Further note that with no progressivity, the program of the government over
the heterogenous population z ∼ [zl, zh] is isomorphic to a program over a homogenous population
with productivity
√
E(z2).
Next, consider the planner acting under discretion. In this case, real money holdings are
predetermined to the tax decision, the inflation tax is non distortionary, whereas labor taxation is
distortionary, and so for any α ≥ 0. Any optimal plan requires thus to resort to the inflation tax,
and possibly complete seignorage with labor taxation if needed.27 As usual, intertemporal welfare
is lower under discretion than under commitment.
As seen in Lemma 3, progressivity raises marginal tax rates, and accordingly labor supply
distortions and welfare losses. Both under commitment and discretion, a benevolent planner that is
interested only in minimizing distortions would avoid any form of progressivity in labor taxation.28
Under commitment, the planner wants to spread equally the burden of taxation across agents
and time. This policy plan is not time consistent. Indeed, as real money holdings are predetermined
to tax choices, ex post inflation is beneficial since it operates much like a non distortionary lump-
sum tax. Inflation is higher under discretion than under commitment: this is the classic inflation
bias at play. The welfare losses discretion stem from the anticipation of inflation and its negative
effect on the demand for money.
Accordingly the rest of the analysis investigates whether progressive labor taxation would be
desirable to support time consistent policy plans, whenever redistributive concerns are considered.
To do so, the following section develops a political economy analysis of the determinants of policy
parameters. This approach will prove beneficial to highlight the conflicts that arise across agents
once progressivity is set. The idea to pre-commit to fiscal progressivity turns out to be decisive to
curb the inflation bias and support time consistent policy plans. This is the focus of next section.
27Formally, given aggregate real money holding M ≥ 0, the government under discretion with α = 0 solves:
maxλ,pi
∫
z V2
(
z,m, 0, λ, pi
)
dF (z) subject to E(z2)(1− λ)λ+ piM = g, where m ≡ m(z) is given by (1.7). One can
show that any interior solution to this program requires λ = 0. For α > 0, first recall from Lemma 3 that distortions
are lower with no progressivity, i.e. welfare higher. If the government were to raise positive labor taxes with α > 0,
it would do as well for α = 0.
28This element stems essentially from the absence of redistributive concern from the policymaker perspective,
related to linear utility of consumption at the individual level.
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1.4 A Political Economy
The analysis seeks to highlight the potential use of progressive fiscal policy to curb the inflation
bias and support time consistent policy plans in an environment with equity concerns. To do so, I
modify the collective choice mechanism of Section 1.3 and design the following game. At t = 1, the
progressivity of fiscal policy is set, and so before agents know their productivity level. At t = 2,
given the progressivity of the tax plan, majority voting determines the mix of labor taxes and
seignorage. The voting protocol here is a substitute for explicit redistributive concerns.29
Intuitively, progressive fiscal policy would modify the willingness to rely exclusively on the in-
elastic tax base if it generates sufficient redistributive conflicts across the population. Accordingly,
at t = 2, the voting protocol outlines the nature and the direction of these conflicts. Anticipating
on the outcome of the vote, progressivity is determined at t = 1 to provide appropriate intertem-
poral incentives. The analysis outlines the key elements giving rise to progressive fiscal policy in
this dynamic perspective.
1.4.1 Timing and Equilibrium Definition
I consider a political two-stage game with the following sequential decisions. In stage 1, the
progressivity parameter α is set behind a veil of ignorance, then individual productivities are
known, agents form inflation expectations, supply labor and save. In stage 2, given the progressivity
of the tax plan and the distribution of real money holdings, majority voting determines the relative
magnitude of labor taxes and inflation. Then agents produce, are taxed and consume. Note that
the relevant state vector at t = 2 is S2 = (α,M), since the aggregate level of money M uniquely
pins down the whole distribution of real money holdings (1.7).30
This sequential choice mechanism reveals how fiscal progressivity can mitigate the excessive use
of the inflation tax under discretion (Proposition 1). The voting mechanism at t = 2 stresses the
direction and magnitude of potential conflicts over policy choices across the population. Especially,
the analysis unveils how individual preferences for tax policy are influenced by the magnitude of
fiscal progressivity.
At t = 1, the progressivity parameter is set behind a veil of ignorance, namely before agents
learn their individual productivity. Still, the choice of α will reflect individual preferences for
progressivity. More importantly, the choice of progressivity will be driven by its influence on the
outcome of the vote and the magnitude of the inflation tax. Overall, this stage reveals whether
progressivity is appropriate to mitigate the inflation bias and induce dynamic efficiency.31
Therefore, a politico-economic equilibrium in this environment is defined as follow.
29Usually, equity or redistributive concerns are captured either by curvature in the utility function of individual
agents, or concave program of the planner. This section considers the political economy as a substitute for these
features.
30This is a consequence of the assumption of lifetime idiosyncratic productivity.
31With the hypothesis of lifetime productivity, the choice of α behind the veil of ignorance could also be interpreted
as the choice of a benevolent planner anticipating the voting outcome at t = 2.
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Definition 1. An equilibrium is defined as a set of policy choices (α∗, λ∗, pi∗) and private agents
decisions such that:
i. Productions and saving decisions of private agents are optimal, given the policy implemented.
ii. Given fiscal progressivity α and aggregate real money M , the tax mix {λ∗(α,M), pi∗(α,M)}
implemented at t = 2 cannot be defeated by any alternative in a majority vote.
iii. Given perfect foresight of stage 2 vote outcome, the choice of progressivity α∗ is set behind a
’veil of ignorance’ at t = 1.
Since private decisions and policy choices at t = 1 internalize the outcome of the vote during
stage 2, this game is solved by backward induction. The following analysis reveals the key forces
that drive each policy decision.
1.4.2 Stage 2 - Vote over the Relative Mix of Taxes
As stated above, the game spelled out is solved by backward induction. This section considers
the vote over the tax mix in stage 2. The formal protocol for majority voting is the following:
two political candidates, only interested in being elected, offer a tax platform and commit to
implement it once in office. The outcome of the vote, called Condorcet winner, must survive pair-
wise evaluation of all competing alternative. In other terms, the winning tax policy is preferred
by a majority of voters to any other policy. It is usually the favorite policy choice of one agent in
the population, called the decisive voter.32
Accordingly, the analysis establishes the existence of a Condorcet winner and characterizes the
properties of the outcome of the vote. Critically, I focus on two key elements. First, I show how
the presence of progressivity induces conflicts across the populations over the relative mix of taxes.
The nature of these conflicts supports the existence of a Condorcet winner. Second, I identify the
decisive voter and verify whether it supports positive labor taxation.
Importantly, I restrict the analysis to values of the aggregate seignorage tax base M ≥ E(z2)2 ,
anticipating on the equilibrium outcome. Indeed, under Assumption 3, seignorage alone could
finance the public good, with a maximum inflation rate pi = 12 . This restriction is not essential
and allows to avoid tedious discussions about corner solutions.33
Individual Ranking of Policy Alternatives
To understand the evaluation of policy proposals, I first study the behavior of individual preferences
over policy alternatives. Importantly, voters internalize the impact of policy proposals on their
individual production decisions and on the aggregate behavior of the economy.
32The outcome of majority voting is in general the solution to a modified taxation program with a social welfare
function in which only the utility of the decisive voter carries positive weight. Despite the fact that almost all agents
dislike the policy choice, it is usually considered as a good approximation to unveil conflicts in the population, since
half of the population wants to move in one direction, the other half in the other direction.
33These corner solutions are being discussed in the case of the benevolent planner policy plan - see Proposition 1.
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Formally, an agent of type z evaluates different policies (λ, pi) that belongs to the government
budget constraint (3.6), given the progressivity parameter α and aggregate real money holding
M . Thus, the set of policy alternatives is unidimensional. Note pi(λ, α,M) the level of inflation
required to satisfy the government budget constraint when the level of taxes is λ ≥ 0. An agent of
type z ranks different policies
{
λ, pi(λ, α,M)
}
according to the following value function:
V˜2(z,M,α, λ) ≡ V2
(
z, φ(z,M), α, λ, pi(·)). (1.28)
The derivative of this function with respect to λ outlines the trade-offs involved when varying
the level of labor taxes λ ≥ 0. Using the envelope conditions (1.3), it writes:
dV˜2(z, α,M, λ)
dλ
= −∂τ(·)
∂λ
− φ(z,M)dpi(·)
dλ
. (1.29)
This expression involves two terms that reflect the cost and benefits of raising labor taxes. On
the one hand, positive labor taxation is distortionary and costly. This is captured by the marginal
tax rate ∂τ(·)∂λ of agent z. On the other hand, an increase in labor taxation decreases the magnitude
of the inflation tax and preserves money holding as a source of consumption.34 This is captured
by the marginal consumption benefit from real money holding m(z) = φ(z,M), net of the change
in inflation dpi(·)dλ . This last term reflects the strategic dimension embedded in the evaluation of
policy alternatives. Using the government budget constraint to derive dpi(·)dλ , (1.29) rewrites:
dV˜2(z, α,M, λ)
dλ
= −∂τ(·)
∂λ
+
z2
E(z2)
dT (α, λ)
dλ
. (1.30)
Accordingly, the presence of progressivity in labor taxation could induce a significant discrep-
ancy between the individual marginal tax rate and the aggregate marginal level of taxes collected.
The following Lemma establishes the monotonic ranking of policy alternatives around individual
favorite policy, the so-called single-peaked property of the value function (1.28).
Lemma 4. For any α ≥ 0,M ≥ E(z2)2 , preferences over policy choices are single-peaked.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.3.
This result is intuitive: if for a given level of labor taxes, a marginal increase in λ induces
individual welfare losses, then for higher level of labor taxes, a further marginal increase in labor
taxes must be welfare decreasing. Accordingly, the value function (1.28) has a unique critical point
in λ over [0,+∞], which characterizes a global maximum. In other terms, all agents have a unique
bliss point policy.
Note from (1.30) that the shape of agent z value function is in effect independent of M , pi or
g. In other terms, the ranking of levels of labor taxes λ is independent of seignorage revenue. The
34Again, the analysis will stress that the relevant levels of labor taxes lie on the upward slopping part of the Laffer
curve, so that
dpi(·)
dλ
< 0. Whenever λ lies on the downward slopping part of the aggregate Laffer cure, i.e. λ ≥ λ¯(α),
then
dV˜2(·)
dλ
< 0. See equation (1.30).
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essential force driving the willingness of an agent of type z to increase or decrease labor taxation lie
in the capacity of fiscal progressity to raise labor taxes over the whole population, while minimizing
the individual cost to agent z.35
Accordingly, the bliss policy of an agent of type z is noted λ∗(z, α). Whenever the favorite
policy is interior, i.e. λ∗(z, α) > 0, it is the solution to dV˜2(z,α,M,λ)dλ = 0. Otherwise, it is simply
λ∗(z, α) = 0.
In the absence of progressivity, α = 0, agents unanimously vote in favor of financing the public
good with the inflation tax. This is formalized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. Whenever α = 0, all agents share the same bliss point policy, with λ∗(z, 0) = 0.
Accordingly, their favorite policy is to finance the public good with the inflation tax only.
Proof. When α = 0, then y(z, 0, λ) = z2(1 − λ) and T (0, λ) = E(z2)(1 − λ)λ. Therefore, (1.30)
rewrites dV˜2(z,α,M,λ)dλ = −z2λ ≤ 0. Thus, for all z, V˜2(·) is decreasing in λ. All agents have
single-peaked preferences with λ∗(z, 0) = 0.
This results is stronger than the outcome of the optimal policy plan under discretion (Proposi-
tion 1). Indeed, not only aggregate productive efficiency requires the exclusive use of the inflation
tax, but agents unanimously support seignorage to take advantage of the inelastic tax base.36
No agent strategically supports labor taxes. With no progressivity, there is no conflict in policy
choices.
With positive progressivity α > 0, this unanimity no longer holds and redistributive conflicts
arise. Low productivity agents support positive labor taxation to strategically shift the burden
of taxation to high productivity agent. Similarly, high productivity agents support inflationary
policies. This result is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Whenever α > 0, agents disagree over the policy plan. Individual bliss policies can
be ordered by type: the lower productivity z, the higher the desired level of labor taxation λ∗(z, α).
Formally, there is a productivity cut-off z¯(α) ∈ (zl, zh) such that:
- λ∗(z, α) > 0 if and only if z < z¯(α), and λ∗(z, α) = 0 otherwise.
- For all z < z¯(α), λ∗(z, α) is strictly decreasing in z.
- lim
zl→0
λ∗(zl, α) = λ¯(α).
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.4.
Lemma 6 establishes the ordering of bliss point policies by productivity type z. While the
usual single-crossing property does not hold in this economy,37 I show that whenever α > 0,
35Still, the level of inflation needed to clear the government budget constraint does depend on the seignorage tax
base M .
36Another interesting benchmark would be no heterogeneity (zl = zh) with progressivity (α > 0). In this case,
the presence of progressivity reinforces the distortionary effect of labor taxation, and the difference in tax base
elasticities. Agents unanimously support of the inflation tax. See Lemma 3.
37Single-crossing is a usual property of environments with majority voting: the marginal rate of substitution
between policy choices over the choice domain is monotone in the ordering of voters. For an extensive analysis of
single-crossing property and majority voting, see Gans and Smart (1996).
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low productivity agents have a higher desire for labor taxation, and so to strategically use the
tax-shifting opportunity allowed by progressivity: collecting a high level of labor taxes at a low
individual cost. For any positive level of progressive labor tax, conflicts over policy choices arise.
These redistributive conflicts may dampen the magnitude of the inflation tax.
Formally, the population is split in two, according to the cut-off value z¯(α). Any agent with
productivity z > z¯(α) would not support any labor taxation, whereas any agent with productivity
z < z¯(α) would approve positive labor taxes. The cut-off z¯ satisfies:38
z¯(α) =
[E(z2(1+α))
E(z2)
] 1
2α
. (1.31)
Figure 1.3 provides a graphical illustration of this result. The left panel represents the favorite
choice of the level of labor taxes λ∗(·) as a function of productivity z. The lower individual
productivity, the higher the support for labor taxation, since it collects relatively more taxes on
all higher productivity agents. Naturally, the lowest productivity agent zl has the highest desire
for labor taxation. Interestingly, when the lower bound on productivity zl gets very small, the
associated bliss point policy is to collect as much taxes as the aggregate Laffer curve allows, namely
set the level of labor taxes to λ¯(α).39 To illustrate the tax-shifting at play with progressivity, the
right panel represents the distribution of taxes, average taxes and marginal taxes induced by the
favorite policy of the median productivity agent zm. The average tax rate λy2(·)α is increasing in
z whenever α > 0. In the case of no progressivity, the average tax rate over the population would
be constant.
In turn, the associated level of inflation is increasing in z: higher productivity agents internalize
that they would bear the burden of higher labor taxes, hence they favor more inflationary policies.
Outcome of the Vote
Lemma 4, namely single-peaked preferences, is sufficient to establish the existence of a Condorcet
winner under majority voting. Still, to characterize the policy outcome, one needs to identify the
decisive voter. Lemmas 5 and 6 identifies the median productivity agent as the median voter.
Altogether, these results allow to characterize the outcome of the vote. The following proposi-
tion formalizes the existence of a Condorcet winner
{
λ∗(α,M), pi∗(α,M)
}
:
Proposition 2. Given M ≥ E(z2)2 and α ≥ 0, majority voting selects a unique policy choice. The
decisive voter is the median productivity agent, so that λ∗(α,M) = λ∗(zm, α), with the following
characteristics:
- For α = 0, the implemented policy relies exclusively on the inflation tax: λ∗(α,M) = 0.
- For any α > 0, the policy implements positive labor taxes λ∗(α,M) > 0, possibly comple-
mented with the inflation tax.
38See Appendix 1.6.4 for a formal derivation of the cut-off z¯(α).
39When z ≈ 0 and α > 0, the average rate tends to 0 for any λ, while the average tax rate on predetermined
money holding is pi.
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Figure 1.3: Individual Bliss Point Policies - Stage 2 Vote (α > 0)
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This figure represents the essential properties of stage 2 vote under progressive fiscal policy, i.e. α > 0. The left
panel displays the individual favorite level of labor taxes, decreasing in z. The right panel illustrates the tax-shifting
effect that supports the desire for positive labor taxation. The average tax rate is increasing in z, while it would be
constant under no progressivity.
Proof. First, by the assumption of permanent lifetime productivity, individual type z and real
money holding φ(z,M) are perfectly correlated, so that agents differ de facto only in one dimension.
Moreover, since preferences are single-peaked over a unidimensonial policy choice, majority voting
induces a unique Condorcet winner. The outcome of the vote is the bliss point policy of the median
voter. Since bliss policies are ranked by productivity type (Lemmas 5 and 6), the decisive voter is
the median productivity agent. This is a classic application of the median voter theorem.40
Lemma 5 establishes that whenever the labor tax plan is not progressive (α = 0), then agents
unanimously vote for no labor taxes, hence the outcome of the vote is naturally one with only
seignorage.
Lemma 6 establishes that this consensus is broken whenever there is some progressivity. I verify
that for any α > 0, the median voter supports strictly positive labor taxation. Formally, I verify
that zm < z¯(α), where z¯(α) is defined in Lemma 6 and satisfies (1.31). Using Jensen inequality:
E
(
z2(1+α)
)
E(z2)1+α
≥ 1⇒ z¯(α)2α ≥ E(z2)α ⇒ z¯(α)2 ≥ E(z2). (1.32)
Using the definition of the variance E(z2) = V (z2) + E(z)2, one gets:
z¯(α) > E(z) ≥ zm, (1.33)
where the last inequality comes from Assumption 2. For any α > 0, the median productivity agent
zm is below the cut-off value z¯(α).
As mentioned, with no progressivity, agents unanimously vote in favor of no labor taxes, since
40For detailed references, see for instance detailed in Persson and Tabellini (2002), chapters 2 and 3.
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the individual marginal cost systematically outweighs the aggregate benefits of collecting labor
taxes over the whole population.
Whenever α > 0, the outcome of the vote is one of positive labor taxes: for any distribution
of productivities that satisfies Assumption 2, i.e. where the median productivity level is below
the mean, the tax-shifting effect is strong enough that the median agent does want to collect
positive labor taxes. The tax distribution induced by the choice of the median productivity agent
is represented in Figure 1.7(b). Overall, any level of progressivity α > 0 contributes to curb the
inflation tax under majority voting.
Relaxing the restriction M ≥ E(z2)2 does not modify the essence of the result, but may trigger
corner solutions. Consider for instance the extreme case M = 0, then all agents have no choice
but to implement positive labor taxes to meet the government budget constraint.41
Finally, since the bliss policy of the median productivity agent does not depend on the aggre-
gate level of money holding M , the overall level of labor taxes collected is not sensitive to M .
Accordingly, relaxing Assumption 3 by allowing stochastic shocks to government expense g would
not modify the result: the level of labor taxes would not be sensitive to the realization of the shock,
the inflation tax would absorb all the randomness.42
Influence of Fiscal Progressivity on the Tax Mix
The previous result has established that the level of labor taxes λ∗(α,M) implemented under
majority voting is positive if and only the labor tax plan is progressive. An essential element is
then to understand how the implied labor tax function T (α, λ∗(α,M)), and conversely the inflation
rate, is sensitive to progressivity.43
Lemma 7. The tax function T (α, λ∗(α,M)) is positive for all α ≥ 0, admits a global maximum,
and is eventually converging to 0 as the level of progressivity gets to infinity.
Proof. The proof establishes some critical properties of the tax function induced by the outcome
of the vote:
T (α, λ∗(α,M)) =
∫
z
t
(
z, α, λ∗(α,M)
)
dF (z). (1.34)
First, from Lemma 5, T
(
0, λ∗(0,M)
)
= 0. Second, its derivative when α = 0 is strictly
positive.44 Formally, Appendix 1.6.5 derives the following inequality:
dλ∗(α,M)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
> 0. (1.35)
41More generally, whenever 0 ≤M ≤ g − T (α, λ∗(zm, α)), then the policy implemented is pi = 1 and a necessary
level of labor taxes to meet the government budget constraint.
42Further, as inflation expectations are only sensitive to the mean level of inflation, and not to any other moment,
stochastic shocks to government expenses would not modify the analysis of stage 1.
43Formally, T (α, λ∗(α,M)) is the aggregate labor tax function (1.13) evaluated at the vote outcome λ∗(α,M) =
λ∗(zm, α).
44Appendix 1.6.5 presents an extensive derivation of this partial result.
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Figure 1.4: Policy Mix as a Function of Progressivity
0 α
total labor taxes
inflation rate
This figure represents the tax mix implemented under majority voting as a function of productivity α. The plain
line represents T
(
α, λ∗(α,M)
)
, the aggregate level of labor taxes. The dashed line represents the inflation rate
needed to meet the government budget constraint. These curves do not read as Laffer curves but rather reveals the
trade-offs faced by the decisive voter. When α = 0, unanimity for the inflation tax gives rise to high inflation and
no labor taxes. When α increases, the median productivity agent supports higher labor taxes, up to a point where
it becomes individually costly to raise more labor taxes. In the limit, no labor taxes are collected.
Further, as for any λ > 0 and α ≥ 0, y(z, α, λ) > 0 and t(z, α, λ) > 0, we have that
T (α, λ∗(α,M)) > 0.
Finally, consider the level of labor taxes when progressivity gets toward infinity. Rewrite the
tax function for an agent z as:
t(z, α, λ) = λe(1+α) log
(
y(z,α,λ)
)
. (1.36)
From this expression, we have lim
α→+∞t(z, α, λ) = 0. A fortiori, limα→+∞T (α, λ
∗(α,M)) = 0. Given
these properties, the tax function T (α, λ∗(α,M)) has a global maximum.
Figure 1.4 represents the change in total labor tax collected as a function of α. As the median
productivity agent is decisive, it is important to understand how his willingness to raise labor
taxes are modified when α increases. When α = 0, no labor tax is collected. Then an increase
in progressivity induces the median agents to increase total labor taxes collected. As the level of
progressivity increases further, the distortions induced leads him to decrease the total amount of
labor taxes collected. Eventually, as α tends to infinity, the distortionary effect of progressivity is
too high for any amount of labor taxes to be collected. By the government budget constraint, the
level of seignorage revenue, as well as the inflation rate, is the mirror of the behavior of total labor
taxes collected.45
45Note that these curves should not be read as standard Laffer curve. Indeed, as shown in next section, individuals
turn to have favorite level of progressivity that lies on both the upward and downward slopping part of these curves.
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1.4.3 Stage 1 - The Determinants of Fiscal Progressivity
The previous section has characterized the outcome of the vote and the tax mix implemented in
stage 2, when the progressivity of the labor income tax plan was given. This section investigates
whether progressivity arises in this environment, when it is set behind a veil of ignorance at t = 1.
In the political literature, the veil of ignorance refers to a choice mechanism where parties involved
in the decision process know nothing about their particular abilities, tastes, and position within
the social order of society. Accordingly, they make choices based upon moral considerations, since
they will not be able to make choices based on self- or class-interest.
Under this scenario in the present environment, progressivity is determined before agents learn
their individual productivity level. Still, to establish the emergence of α∗ > 0 in equilibrium, I
first study the preferences of an agent of type z over progressivity.
Individual Preferences over Progressive Labor Tax
As in Section 1.3, individual agents internalize the impact of policy choices on their individual
production decisions and on the aggregate behavior of the economy. An agent of type z has
preferences over progressivity α ≥ 0 according to the following value function:
V˜1(z, α) ≡ V1(z, α, λ, pi), (1.37)
where λ = λ∗(α,M) and pi = pi∗(α,M) are respectively the fiscal level and inflation rate, given
by the outcome of the vote at t = 2 (Proposition 2). Further, M is the aggregate seignorage tax
base. It is the sum of individual demand for money (1.3), which in turn are a function of expected
inflation at t = 1. From (1.6) and (1.7), it satisfies:
M = E(z2)
(
1− pi∗(α,M)). (1.38)
This value function has two components, associated to each labor supply decisions. Production
at t = 1 is subject to the inflation tax, whereas the production at t = 2 is subject to labor income
tax. The derivative of (1.37) with respect to α outlines the sources of variation of welfare for an
agent of type z when changing the level of progressivity α. Formally, using the envelope conditions
(1.3):
dV˜1(z, α)
dα
=− ∂τ(·)
∂α
− ∂τ(·)
∂λ
dλ∗(·)
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor income tax
− y1(·)dpi
∗(·)
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflation tax
(1.39)
The first two terms reflect the welfare losses associated to progressive labor income tax. They
capture both the direct effect of progressivity and the distortions induced by individual exposure
to labor taxes. The magnitude of the latter depends on the relative position of agent z within the
distribution, i.e. on its exposure to the tax-shifting effect identified in stage 2.
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The third term is the marginal cost of inflation. It refers to the dynamic incentives provided
by progressivity, i.e. the capacity of progressivity to balance the tax burden over labor income and
seignorage tax bases.
To understand how progressivity operates, consider an extreme case with α close to 0. The
decisive voter implements at t = 2 a policy relying essentially on inflation to finance the public
good. An increase in α would then decrease inflation and transfer some of the tax burden on
t = 2 labor income. Accordingly, progressivity α is critical to allocate the tax burden on each
labor supply decision, anticipating the outcome of the vote in stage 2. In effect, progressivity
contributes to balance inevitable welfare losses on each production decision, in a time consistent
way. Therefore, the last term of (1.39) is decisive in providing the dynamic incentives that support
progressivity.
This intuition, and the unanimous desire for dynamic incentives, is formalized in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 8. Any agent z ∈ [zl, zh] would favor a strictly positive level of progressivity, i.e. for all
z, α∗(z) > 0.
Proof. To establish this result, I need to show that the derivative of the value function (1.37) when
α = 0 is strictly positive for any z. λ∗(α) and pi∗(α) satisfies the government budget constraint:46
T
(
α, λ∗(α)
)
+ E(z2)pi∗(α)
(
1− pi∗(α)) = g. (1.40)
Importantly, from the analysis in Section 1.4.2, we know that whenever α = 0, λ∗(0) = 0 and
all the public good is financed with inflation only. Therefore:
∂τ(·)
∂y2
= λ(1 + α)y2(·)α ⇒ ∂τ(·)
∂y2
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0, x (1.41)
∂τ(·)
∂α
= λ log
(
y2(·)
)
y2(·)1+α ⇒ ∂τ(·)
∂α
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0, x (1.42)
∂τ(·)
∂λ
= y2(·)1+α ⇒ ∂τ(·)
∂λ
∣∣∣
α=0
= z2. (1.43)
Totally differentiating the government budget constraint (1.40) with respect to α:
dT
(
α, λ∗(α)
)
dα
+ E(z2)
(
1− 2pi∗(α))dpi∗(α)
dα
= 0. (1.44)
The first term writes:
dT
(
α, λ∗(α)
)
dα
=
∫
z
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dα
+
∂τ(·)
∂α
+
∂τ(·)
∂λ
dλ∗(·)
dα
dF (z). (1.45)
46Recall from Lemma 6 that the outcome of the vote λ∗(·) is independent of the aggregate seignorage tax base
M . In (1.40), the dynamic between inflation and the seignorage tax base is captured by the quadratic term in pi∗(·).
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Using (1.41), (1.42) and (1.43), we can evaluate (1.44) in α = 0 and get:
dλ∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
+
(
1− 2pi∗(0))dpi∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0. (1.46)
As dλ
∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
> 0, from (1.35), we have dpi
∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
< 0. Substituting this last expression into
(1.39):
dV˜1(α, z)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= −z2 dλ
∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
− z2(1− pi∗(0))dpi∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= −z2 dpi
∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
pi∗(0) > 0,
(1.47)
where the last inequality uses dpi
∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
< 0 and pi∗(0) > 0.
Overall, this lemma shows that any agent z would support a strictly positive level of progres-
sivity at t = 1, for it provides dynamic incentives and curbs the excessive use of the inflation tax.
It is essential that progressivity α is evaluated before individual demands for money are formed.
Indeed, if it were not the case, the result would not hold, and especially high productivity agents
would not favor positive level of progressivity.
Figure 1.5 plots α∗(z) as a function of z. Individual favorite choice of progressivity is not
monotonic in productivity z. Indeed, individuals weigh their individual exposure to labor taxation,
the deadweight loss associated with progressivity and the reduction in inflation. When the lower
bound on productivity is close to 0, an agent of type zl would anticipate that with progressivity,
its average tax rate is nul.47 Therefore, it would implement the level of progressivity that would
maximize total labor taxes collected.48 An agent with a low z would then supports a higher
level of progressivity to exploit further the tax-shifting possibility, while minimizing his individual
exposure to labor taxes.49 An agent with a higher z would support a lower level of progressivity,
since it internalizes that it would bear a large welfare cost associated to labor taxes. The highest
productivity agent zh would favor progressivity just enough to exploit the dynamic rebalancing
between inflation and labor taxes.
Progressivity Behind a Veil of Ignorance
The equilibrium definition stated in Section 1.4.1 indicates that progressivity is set behind a veil of
ignorance, namely before agents learn their productivity parameter z. Under this mechanism, the
choice of progressivity is not driven by special-interests, but rather reflects individual preferences
in the economy, independently of particular productivity level.
47Recall that with α > 0, the average tax rate writes
τ(·)
y2(·) = λy2(·)
α.
48Formally, agent zl ≈ 0 would pick α that maximizes T
(
α, λ∗(α)
)
, the peak of the labor income tax function.
See Figure 1.4.
49Note that in this case, the choice of α would lie in the downward slopping part of the tax function T
(
α, λ∗(α)
)
.
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Figure 1.5: Stage I Individual Choice of Progressivity
0
1
2
z
zhzl ≈ 0
α
∗(z)
This figure plots the individual favorite choice of α as a function of productivity z. The non monotonicity
of α∗(z) stems from the interplay between tax-shifting, deadweight loss of progressivity and reduction in
inflation. When zl ≈ 0, the favorite α exploits all the labor tax possibilities offered by the outcome of the
vote. For a low value of z, an agent would select a higher α to take benefit of the tax-shifting effect. An
agent with a high z would choose a lower value of α, for it internalizes that it bears a large cost of labor
income taxes.
Under this scenario, the level of progressivity is set to solve the following program:
max
α
∫
z
V˜1(z, α)dF (z), (1.48)
where the tax mix parameters λ∗(·) and pi∗(·) are the outcome of stage 2 vote, as in (1.37).
This program involve two types of efficiency concerns. First, as outlined in Lemma 3, progres-
sivity is not desirable when it comes to maximize aggregate production at t = 2. On the other
hand, as shown in Lemma 8, progressivity is effective in curbing the inflation bias and balancing
distortions on each labor supply decision. In this program though, the tax-shifting property that
was motivating strategic variations in progresssivity in Lemma 8 is not present. The following
proposition makes clear that efficiency concerns induced by the distribution of labor taxes over the
population do not deter the emergence of progressivity.
Proposition 3. Whenever progressivity is set at t = 1 behind a ’veil of ignorance’, then α∗ > 0.
Proof. Note W (α) ≡ ∫
w
V˜1(z, α)dF (z) the welfare criterion of interest. Applying Lemma 8, we
naturally have W ′(0) > 0, so that the optimal level of progressivity is not zero. As when α gets
very large no labor taxes are effectively collected (see Lemma 7), α∗ is finite.
Recall that a planner under commitment - Proposition 1, would optimally seek to equalize
distortions and welfare losses over the two tax bases. Here, progressivity allows to support a
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similar allocation, with the burden of taxation distributed over each labor decision. Further, the
tax allocation induced by the choice of progressivity is time-consistent.
Progressivity creates further source of distortions - on t = 2 labor supply, but these are out-
weighed by the reduction on the inflation bias. The political environment stresses that strategic
conflicts at t = 2 are effective to support a time consistent reduction in inflation. Note that the ex
ante aggregate welfare is higher under this institutional scheme than under a pure discretionary
benevolent planner set-up. Indeed, the discretionary policy could be implemented with α = 0. At
t = 2 then, unanimity for inflation would pick the tax mix that relies on the inflation tax to finance
the public good (see Lemma 5). The analysis makes clear that this allocation is dominated by one
with a positive level of fiscal progressivity. Finally, as in Lemma 8, it is critical that α is set before
agents from individual demand for money, since its desirability relies on its capacity to preserve
the real value of money holding.
1.4.4 Progressivity, Dispersion and Welfare
As mentionned in Section 1.4.2, heterogeneity in agents productivity is essential for positive labor
taxes to emerge in equilibrium. Intuitively, with progressivity, the median productivity agent
strategically shift the burden of taxation to higher productivity agents. Had the median voter
more agents above him, it would favor a higher level of labor taxes. In turn, in stage 1, the level
of progressivity selected would improve the intertemporal welfare of the overall economy.
To verify this intuition, I perform the following numerical exercise. I assume that productivities
are distributed uniformly on [zl, zh] and the median productivity level is fixed at 0.5. Then, I
compute the equilibrium outcome and associated welfare, increasing the variance of the distribution
of productivities.
Figure 1.6 plots the outcome of this exercise. The left panel represents the level of progressivity
selected behind the veil of ignorance, and the induced breakdown of the government resources into
labor taxes and seignorage. The right panel represents the intertemporal welfare of the economy
relative to the full commitment benchmark.
Two elements emerge. When the variance of productivity increases, the selected level of pro-
gressivity decreases, but the rebalancing from seignorage to labor taxes is improved, as would
prescribe the optimal plan under commitment. Accordingly, as the variance of productivity in-
creases, pre-committing to progressivity allows welfare to get closer to the commitment outcome.
Overall, the higher the variance of productivity, the lower the inflation bias and the closer is
the economy to the commitment outcome. Accordingly, pre-committing to fiscal progressivity is
more effective to curb the inflation bias in an economy with substantial heterogeneity.
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Figure 1.6: Dispersion of Productivity and Welfare
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This figure plots the numerical simulation exercise described in Section 1.4.4. As the variance of productivity
increases, the level of progressivity selected under the political game decreases, and the balance of taxes improve:
more labor taxes are collected, the inflation bias is reduced. Accordingly, the intertemporal welfare relative to the
commitment benchmark increases.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper studies how the design of fiscal policy can address the time inconsistency of monetary
policy. In a stylized environment, I showed how progressive fiscal policy generates redistributive
conflicts that mitigate the excessive use of the inflation tax. Further, progressivity is desirable,
despite its inner distortionary nature, since it contributes to minimize intertemporal distortions
over tax bases.
The analysis is developed in a framework that embeds two key simplifications. First, the
economy considered here is real, not nominal. Second, the voting mechanism is used as a substitute
for the absence of explicit equity concerns. I now discuss these points.
A planner with explicit redistributive concerns would like to pre-commit to progressivity as
shown in the political environment here, since the desirability of redistribution would resonate
with the direction of conflicts analyzed here.50
Further, the results presented here would still hold in a fully-fledged nominal economy, where
prices and wages would be sensitive to inflation. For instance, a nominal economy could feature
an ex post cost of inflation, stemming from a cash-in-advance constraint or price stickiness for
instance. Alternatively, if wages were nominal, the tax plan could generate bracket creep, where
progressive taxation increases automatically as taxpayers move into higher tax brackets due to
inflation. Such features would put a natural brake on the desire of the inflation tax, but not
alleviate the essential tax-shifting dynamics outlined in the analysis.
An interesting avenue for research would be to relax the assumption of permanent lifetime
50Such explicit redistributive concerns would be captured by curvature in individuals utility functions.
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productivity to generate an empirically plausible distribution of income and wealth. Such analysis
would provide further evidences in favor of the capacity of fiscal progressivity to curb the inflation
bias.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Production under Progressive Tax Plan
Consider the t = 2 production decision of an agent of type z subject to the tax plan θ = (α, λ).
max
y2
y2 − τ(y2, α, λ)− (y2/z)
2
2
. (1.49)
Under the isoelastic tax plan A.1, the first order condition characterizing y2(z, α, λ) is given by:
1− λ(1 + α)yα2 −
y2
z2
= 0. (1.50)
The derivatives of the production function with respect to the parameters are given by:
dy2(·)
dλ
=
−(1 + α)yα2
λ(1 + α)αyα−12 + 1/z2
< 0, (1.51)
dy2(·)
dα
= −λy
α
2
(
1 + (1 + α) log(y2)
)
λ(1 + α)αyα−12 + 1/z2
, (1.52)
dy2(·)
dz
=
2y2/z
3
λ(1 + α)αyα−12 + 1/z2
> 0. (1.53)
y2(·) is decreasing in λ and strictly positive. When α > 0, y2(·) tends to 0 when λ goes to +∞.
Consider the second derivative of y2(·) with respect to λ. Using (1.50), rewrite (1.51) as:
dy2(·)
dλ
= −(z2)1+α(1 + α) (y2/z2)1+α
α+ (1− α)y2/z2 . (1.54)
The second derivative writes then:
d2y2(·)
dλ2
= −(z2)1+α(1 + α)G′(y2/z2)dy2(·)
dλ
, (1.55)
with
G(X) =
X1+α
α+ (1− α)X G
′(X) = αXα
1 +X + α(1−X)[
α+ (1− α)X]2 > 0 ∀X ∈ [0, 1]. (1.56)
Overall, the labor supply function y2(z, α, λ) is strictly decreasing and convex for all λ ≥ 0 and
α > 0.
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1.6.2 Tax Function under Progressive Tax Plan (lemma 1)
Single-Peaked Laffer Curve
By definition, t(z, α, λ) = τ
(
y2(z, α, λ), α, λ). Taking the total derivative of t(·) with respect to λ:
dt(z, α, λ)
dλ
=
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ
+
∂τ(·)
dλ
= λ(1 + α)y2(·)α dy2(·)
dλ
+ y2(·)1+α. (1.57)
Using (1.51), we can rewrite (1.57) as:
dt(·)
dλ
= − 1
1 + α
dy2(·)
dλ
[2y2(·)
z2
− 1
]
. (1.58)
Hence we get that dt(·)dλ ≥ 0 if and only if y2(z, α, λ) ≤ z
2
2 , i.e. using (1.50), if and only if:
0 ≤ λ ≤ λ¯(z, α) = 1
2(1 + α)(z2/2)α
. (1.59)
Strict Concavity on the Upward Slopping Part of the Laffer Curve
Take the second derivative of the tax function w.r.t. λ:
d2t(·)
dλ2
= − 1
1 + α
[d2y2(·)
dλ2
(2y2(·)
z2
− 1
)
+
2
z2
(dy2(·)
dλ
)2]
. (1.60)
Rewrite (1.51) as:
dy2(·)
dλ
=
−(1 + α)y2(·)1+α
α+ (1− α)y2(·)/z2 , (1.61)
and get:
d2y2(·)
dλ2
=
α
y2(·)D(·)
[
1 +D(·)](dy2(·)
dλ
)2
, (1.62)
where D(·) is the denominator of (1.61): D(·) = α + (1 − α)y2(·)z2 . Using (1.62), we can rewrite
(1.60) as:
d2t(·)
dλ2
= − 1
1 + α
1
D(·)y2(·)
(dy2(·)
dλ
)2[
α
(
1 +D(·))(2y2(·)
z2
− 1
)
+
2y2(·)
z2
D(·)
]
. (1.63)
The term into brackets is critical for the sign of d
2t(·)
dλ2 . Posing X =
y2
z2 , we can rewrite the term
into brackets as a polynomial P (X), where the range of interest is X ∈ [0, 1]:
P (X) = α
(
1 +D(·))(2X − 1) + 2XD(·), (1.64)
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with D(·) = α+ (1− α)X. Further computations lead to:
P (X) = 2(1− α2)X2 + 3α(1 + α)X − α(1 + α). (1.65)
We verify:
P (0) = −α(1 + α) < 0 P (1/2) = 1 + α
2
> 0 P (1) = 2(1 + α) > 0. (1.66)
Hence, there is a unique Xˆ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that P (X) > 0 if and only if X ∈ [Xˆ, 1], i.e. there is a
unique λˆ(z, α) > λ¯(z, α) such that:
d2t(·)
dλ2
≤ 0⇐⇒ λ ≤ λˆ(z, α). (1.67)
Further note that:
dX
dz
=
dy2(·)/z2
dz
= −λ(1 + α)αy2(·)α−1 dy2(·)
dz
< 0, (1.68)
which imply dλˆ(z,α)dz < 0, i.e. the upper bound of strict concavity of the individual Laffer curves
are (inversely) ordered by productivity z.
Ordering of the Tax Functions by Productivity
We are to left verify that the tax functions are ordered by productivity type z. Using (1.53):
dt(z, α, λ)
dz
=
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dz
> 0. (1.69)
1.6.3 Single-Peaked Preferences - Stage 2 (lemma 4)
I show that the value function (1.28) is single peaked for any λ ≥ 0, any α ≥ 0 and any z ∈ [zl, zh].
Formally, the shape of this function is given by (1.30):
1
z2
dV˜2(·)
dλ
= − 1
z2
∂τ(·)
∂λ
+
1
E(z2)
∫
z
dt(z, α, λ)
dλ
dF (z), (1.70)
where for all z, the derivative of the tax function is driven by the behavioral response ∂τ(z,·)∂y2
dy2(z,·)
dλ
and the mechanical response ∂τ(z,·)∂λ .
With no progressivity - α = 0
With α = 0, then y(z, 0, λ) = z2(1− λ) and T (0, λ) = E(z2)(1− λ)λ. Therefore (1.70) rewrites:
dV˜2(z, α,M, λ)
dλ
= −z2λ ≤ 0. (1.71)
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Thus, for all z, V˜2(·) is decreasing in λ. All agents have single-peaked preferences and the peak is
reached for λ∗(z, 0) = 0.
With progressivity - α > 0
The following developments establish the single-peaked property of value functions (1.28) for spe-
cific probability distributions F (·) and then uses an aggregation approach to generalize the result
to any probability distribution function.
Note that for all λ ≥ λ¯(α), dV˜2(·)dλ is strictly negative (downward slopping part of the aggregate
Laffer curve). Hence we are interested in the behavior of individual preferences over labor taxation
on the upward slopping part of the aggregate Laffer curve, i.e. over λ ∈ [0, λ¯(α)].
Two intermediate results will prove useful in the following developments:
i. Behavioral response. Consider the term G(z, λ) = 1z2
∂τ(·)
∂λ , then:
dG(z, λ)
dz
> 0
d2G(z, λ)
dzdλ
< 0 ∀λ ∈ [0, λ¯(z, α)]. (IR.1)
ii. Mechanical response. Consider the term H(z, λ) = 1z2
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ . For any λ ≥ 0, it is negative,
initially decreasing, with at most one critical point. (IR.2)
Proof of IR.1 Let G(z, λ) = 1z2
∂τ(·)
∂λ =
y2(·)1+α
z2 . The first derivative w.r.t. z writes:
dG(z, λ)
dz
=
1
z4
[
(1 + α)y2(·)α dy2(·)
dz
z2 − 2zy2(·)1+α
]
=
2α
z3
y2(·)α
λ(1 + α)αy2(·)α−1 + 1/z2
[2y2(·)
z2
− 1
]
,
(1.72)
which is positive on the upward slopping part of the Laffer curve. Further, we can rewrite this
expression as:
dG(z, λ)
dz
=
2αz2(1+α)
z3
(y2(·)/z2)1+α
α
(
1− y2(·)/z2
)
+ y2(·)/z2
[2y2(·)
z2
− 1
]
. (1.73)
Note Q(X) = X
1+α
α+(1−α)X
(
2X − 1) so that the cross second derivative of G(·) writes:
d2G(z, λ)
dzdλ
=
2αz2(1+α)
z3
Q′
(
y2(·)/z2
)dy2(·)
dλ
1
z2
. (1.74)
The sign of Q′(·) is critical for the sign of this expression. Formally, with Q(X) = N(X)/D(X),
it writes:
Q′(X) =
N ′(X)D(X)−D′(X)N(X)
D(X)2
(1.75)
N ′(X) = Xα
[
2(2 + α)X − (1 + α)] D′(X) = (1− α). (1.76)
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Reorganizing the numerator of Q′(X):
Q′(X) =
Xα(1 + α)
D(X)2
[− α+ 3αX + 2(1− α)X2]. (1.77)
Now consider P (X) = −α+3αX+2(1−α)X2 and verify that P (0) = −α < 0, P (1/2) = 1/2 > 0
and P (1) = 2 > 0, so that for all X ∈ [1/2, 1], P (X) > 0.
Hence, for all λ ∈ [0, λ¯(z, α)], as y2(·)/z2 ∈ [1/2, 1], we have d
2G(z,λ)
dzdλ < 0.
Proof of IR.2 Consider now H(z, λ) = 1z2
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ . It is unambiguously negative. Rewrite
H(·) as:
H(z, λ) =
1
z2
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ
= −z
2(1+α)
z2
[
1− y2(·)
z2
] (1 + α)(y2(·)/z2)1+α
α+ (1− α)y2(·)/z2
= −z2α(1 + α)Q(y2(·)/z2),
(1.78)
with Q(X) = (1−X) X1+αα+(1−α)X . The first derivative of H(·) w.r.t. λ writes then:
dH(z, λ)
dλ
= −z2α(1 + α)Q′(y2(·)/z2)dy2(·)
dλ
1
z2
. (1.79)
The sign of Q′(·) is critical for the sign of dH(z,λ)dλ . Formally, with Q(X) = N(X)/D(X), we can
derive:
Q′(X) =
N ′(X)D(X)−D′(X)N(X)
D(X)2
(1.80)
N ′(X) = Xα
[
1 + α− (2 + α)X] D′(X) = (1− α). (1.81)
Reorganizing the numerator of Q′(X):
Q′(X) =
Xα
D(X)2
[
(1 + α)α−Xα(2α+ 1)−X2(1− α)(1 + α)]. (1.82)
Now consider P (X) = (1+α)α−Xα(2α+1)−X2(1−α)(1+α) and verify that P (0) = (1+α)α >
0 and P (1) = −1 < 0. Since X = y2(·)/z2 and dy2(·)dλ , we can conclude that Q′(y2(·)/z2
)
= −1 < 0
when λ = 0 and over λ ≥ 0, Q′(y2(·)/z2
)
= 0 has a unique solution.
Overall, H(z, λ) is negative, initially increasing and has a unique critical point in λ over [0,+∞].
Degenerate Distribution Consider the preferences over the tax mix of an agent of type z when
the probability distribution of productivity is a degenerate distribution in h.51 For this special
51Think as population of mass 1 of agents of productivity h and mass 0 of agent of productivity z.
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case, note ˜˜V2(·) the value function of an agent of type z and rewrite (1.70) as:
1
z2
d ˜˜V2(·)
dλ
=
1
h2
∂τ(h, ·)
∂y2
dy2(h, ·)
dλ
+
1
h2
∂τ(h, ·)
∂λ
− 1
z2
∂τ(z, ·)
∂λ
. (1.83)
The first term is 0 for λ = 0, and strictly negative for all λ > 0. Let’s consider the following cases:
i If z = h: second and third terms in (1.83) cancel out. Unambiguously, for all λ ≥ 0:
d ˜˜V2(·)
dλ
≤ 0, (1.84)
where the inequality is binding if and only if λ = 0. Accordingly, the value function is single
peaked, where the maximum is reached for λ = 0.
ii If z > h: the sum of second and third terms in (1.83) is strictly negative.
Indeed, using IR.1, ddz
[
1
z2
∂τ(·)
∂λ
]
> 0 on the upward slopping part of the Laffer curve. Unambigu-
ously, for all λ > 0:
d ˜˜V2(·)
dλ
< 0. (1.85)
Accordingly, the value function is single peaked, where the maximum is reached for λ = 0.
iii If z < h: using IR.1, the sum of second and third terms in (1.83) is strictly positive.
Accordingly, d
˜˜V2(·)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
> 0. Since for all λ > λ¯(h, α) d
˜˜V2(·)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
< 0, we can conclude that ˜˜V2(·) has
a critical point in [0, λ¯(h, α)] that characterizes a global maximum. To ensure single-peakedness,
we show that this critical point is unique. Let λ∗(z, h, α) be a solution to d
˜˜V2(·)
dλ = 0. It satisfies:
− 1
h2
∂τ(h, ·)
∂y2
dy2(h, ·)
dλ
=
1
h2
∂τ(h, ·)
∂λ
− 1
z2
∂τ(z, ·)
∂λ
. (1.86)
Over [0, λ¯(h, α)], the right-hand side is positive and decreasing. By IR.2, The left-hand side is
0 for λ = 0, positive, initially increasing, has at most one critical point, and is strictly superior to
the right-hand side for λ = λ¯(h, α).
Accordingly, λ∗(z, h, α) is the unique critical point of (1.83) for λ ≥ 0. It lies on the upward
slopping part of the left-hand side of (1.86). It characterizes a global maximum. The value function
is single-peaked.
Figure 1.8(a) summarizes these findings by representing the first derivative of the Laffer curve
in h, i.e. first two terms in (1.83), and the individual cost of taxation to agent z, i.e. third term
in (1.83).
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Figure 1.7: Single-Peaked Preferences
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This figure represents graphically each term of the derivative w.r.t. λ of the value function, see (1.70). The left panel
considers the cases of degenerate PDF, where agent z expresses its preferences when the population is made of agents
of type h. The value function as exactly one critical point which characterizes a global maximum, if and only if z < h.
Otherwise, the value function reaches a maximum for λ = 0. The right panel considers the aggregation process that
leads to the single-peaked preference result for any PDF. Especially, the dashed line represents 1
E(h2)
∫
h
dt(·)
dλ
dF (h),
which as shown in Lemma 2, has the same properties as for any degenerate PDF.
Aggregation The generalization of the single-peakedness of value functions presented above
relies on two elements. First, for any probability function F (·), (1.70) can be written as a weighted
sum of the functions (1.83). Formally,
1
z2
dV˜2(·)
dλ
=
1
E(h2)
∫
h
1
z2
d ˜˜V2(·)
dλ
h2f(h)dh
= − 1
z2
∂τ(z, ·)
∂λ
+
1
E(h2)
dT (α, λ)
dλ
.
(1.87)
Second, as shown in Lemma 2, the properties of individual tax functions t(h, α, λ) carry to the
aggregate tax function
∫
h
t(h, α, λ)dF (h) for any F (·). Accordingly, the single-peaked properties
of ˜˜V2(·) is also preserved under additivity.52 Figure 1.8(b) presents a graphical argument to make
this point clear, relying on the additive properties of individual tax functions.
Overall, the value function (1.28) is single peaked for any z, any α and any F (·). A necessary
and sufficient condition for the peak to be non 0, i.e. to be reached at λ > 0, is:
dV˜2(·)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
> 0. (1.88)
1.6.4 Policy Conflicts under Progressivity - Stage 2 (lemma 6)
Consider individual policy choices under progressive labor taxes, i.e. α > 0. By Lemma 4, the
value function V˜2(·) given by (1.28) is single-peaked and downward slopping ∀λ ≥ λ¯(α). If there is
52Importantly, the multiplying or weighting terms in (1.87) are all positive and do not modify the variations of
the functions considered.
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an interior global maximum λ∗(z, α) > 0, then it is unique and it satisfies the following conditions:
dV˜2(·)
dλ
= −∂τ(·)
∂λ
+
z2
E(z2)
dT (α, λ)
dλ
= 0
d2V˜2(·)
dλ2
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(z,α)
< 0. (1.89)
Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of an interior global maximum is:
dV˜2(·)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
> 0. (1.90)
This condition induces the cut-off z¯(α), such that λ∗(z, α) > 0 if and only if z < z¯(α). If z ≥ z¯(α),
then λ∗(z, α) = 0. Formally, solving (1.90), z¯(α) is defined by:
z¯2α =
E(z2(1+α))
E(z2)
. (1.91)
To verify the ordering of bliss point policy choice by productivity type, I derive the following
comparative statics for al z < z¯(α). Totally differentiating (1.89) with respect to λ and z:
dλ∗(z, α)
dz
= −
d2V˜2(·)
dλdz
d2V˜2(·)
dλ2
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(z,α)
. (1.92)
The denominator is negative since λ∗(α, z) is a global maximum.
Next, I show that the numerator is negative if and only if the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between inflation and labor taxes is decreasing in z. The MRS is defined as:
MRS(z) = −dV2(·)/dλ
dV2(·)/dpi = −
∂τ(·)/∂λ
m(z)
= −E(z
2)
M
∂τ(·)/∂λ
z2
, (1.93)
and its derivative w.r.t. z:
dMRS(z)
dz
=
E(z2)
z2M
[
− d∂τ(·)/∂λ
dz
+
2
z
∂τ(·)
∂λ
]
. (1.94)
Now, taking the derivative of dV˜2(·)dλ w.r.t. z:
d2V˜2(·)
dλdz
= −d∂τ(·)/∂λ
dz
+
2z
E(z2)
dT (α, λ)
dλ
, (1.95)
and evaluating this expression in λ∗(z, α), using (1.89):
d2V˜2(·)
dλdz
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(z,α)
= −d∂τ(·)/∂λ
dz
+
2
z
∂τ(·)
∂λ
=
z2M
E(z2)
dMRS(z)
dz
. (1.96)
Overall, we get:
d2V˜2(·)
dλdz
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(z,α)
< 0⇔ dMRS(z)
dz
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(z,α)
< 0. (1.97)
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Next I show that the derivative of the MRS w.r.t. z is indeed negative whenever agent z selects
a value of λ on the upward slopping part of its Laffer curve, i.e. for all λ ≤ λ¯(z, α). From (1.94):
dMRS(z)
dz
= −E(z
2)
M
1
z4
[
(1 + α)y2(·)α dy2(·)
dz
z2 − 2zy2(·)1+α
]
= −y2(·)
α
z3
E(z2)
M
2α
λα(1 + α)y2(·)α−1 + 1/z2
[2y2(·)
z2
− 1
]
,
(1.98)
which is negative as long as y2(·) ≤ z22 , i.e. as long as λ ≤ λ¯(z, α).
Finally, I show that λ∗(z, α) is necessarily on the upward slopping part of agent z Laffer curve.53
λ∗(z, α) < λ¯(z, α)⇔ dV˜2
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(z,α)
< 0
⇔ 1
z2
∂τ(·)
∂λ
∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(z,α)
>
1
E(z2)
dT (α, λ)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(z,α)
⇔ 1
2
(z2
2
)α
>
1
E(h2)
[ ∫ zh
zl
dt(h)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(z,α)
dF (h).
(1.99)
Accordingly, if for all h ∈ [zl, zh], dt(h)dλ
∣∣∣
λ=λ¯(z,α)
< h
2
2
(
z2
2
)α
, then we have the desired result.
Using λ¯(z, α) = 1
2(1+α)
(
z2
2
)2 , we can verify that y2(h, ·) evaluated in λ¯(z, α) is defined by:
1− y
α
2
2
(
z2
2
)
α
− y2
h2
= 0. (1.100)
The inequality (1.99) is then satisfied if and only if, for λ = λ¯(z, α):
2
[
1− y2(h, ·)
h2
][2y2(h, ·)
h2
− 1
]
<
α
2
h2
y2(h, ·) +
1− α
2
. (1.101)
Let X = y2(h,·)h2 ∈ [0, 1]. The last expression rewrites then:
2
[
1−X
][
2X − 1
]
<
α
2X
+
1− α
2
(1.102)
The right-hand side is bigger than 1/2 for all X ∈ [0, 1], whereas the left-hand side reaches a
maximum value of 1/4.
Altogether, we have the desired result: ∀z ∈ [zl, z¯(α)], dλ
∗(z,α)
dz < 0. Finally, note that for all
α > 0,
lim
z→0
1
z2
∂τ(·)
∂λ
∣∣∣
λ=0
= lim
z→0
z2α = 0,
which induces lim
z→0
1
E(z2)dT (α, λ)
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(z,α)
= 0 and therefore lim
z→0
λ∗(z, α) = λ¯(α). This property
53Intuitively, if λ∗(z, α) > λ¯(z, α) and since λ¯(z, α) is decreasing in z, all agents that have a higher productivity
level are taxed at a level on the downward slopping part of their Laffer curve. Agent z could then increase the total
tax bill on higher productivity agents by reducing the level of taxes.
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outlines the clear dominance of the tax-shifting effect for low values of z.
1.6.5 Total Taxes as a Function of Progressivity (lemma 7)
This section derives the following partial result:
dT
(
α, λ∗(·))
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
> 0. (1.103)
Formally, the total derivative of the tax function is given by:
dT
(
α, λ∗(·))
dα
=
∫
z
∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dα
+
∂τ(·)
∂α
+
∂τ(·)
∂λ
dλ∗(·)
dα
dF (z). (1.104)
From Lemma 5, λ∗(0,M) = 0. Therefore, we can easily verify ∂τ(·)∂y2
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0, dy2(·)dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0
and ∂τ(·)∂α
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0. Since ∂τ(·)∂λ > 0, (1.103) holds if and only if:
dλ∗(·)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
> 0, (1.105)
where λ∗(·) is given by the bliss policy choice of the median productivity agent. It is the solution
to:
dV˜2(zm, α,M, λ)
dλ
= 0. (1.106)
Totally differentiating this expression with respect to λ and α gives:
dλ∗(·)
dα
= −d
2V˜2(·)/dλdα
d2V˜2(·)/dλ2
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(·)
. (1.107)
The denominator is negative since the value function is strictly-quasi concave. The numerator is
given by:
d2V˜2(zm, α,M, λ)
dλdα
= −d∂τ(·)/∂λ
dα
+
z2m
E(z2)
d2T (α, λ)
dλdα
. (1.108)
Consider the second term in this expression:
d2T (α, λ)
dλdα
=
∫
z
d
dα
[∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ
]
+
d∂τ(·)/∂λ
dα
dF (z). (1.109)
As ∂τ(·)∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ = −λ (1+α)
2y2(·)2α
λ(1+α)αy2(·)α−1+1/z2 , we can easily show using λ
∗(0,M) = 0:
∫
z
d
dα
[∂τ(·)
∂y2
dy2(·)
dλ
]∣∣∣
α=0
= 0. (1.110)
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Further:
d∂τ(·)/∂λ
dα
=
[
log
(
y2(·)
)
+
1 + α
y2(·)
dy2(·)
dα
]
y2(·)1+α ⇒ d∂τ(·)/∂λ
dα
∣∣∣
α=0
= z2 log
(
z2
)
. (1.111)
Rewrite (1.108) then as:
d2V˜2(zm, ·)
dλdα
∣∣∣
α=0
= −z2m log
(
z2m
)
+
z2m
E(z2)
∫
z
z2 log(z2)dF (z). (1.112)
Using the formula for the covariance,54 and since z2 and log(z2) are both increasing of z:
d2V˜2(zm, ·)
dλdα
∣∣∣
α=0
> z2m
[− log(z2m) + logE(z2)]. (1.113)
Since logE(z2) > logE(z)2, and using Assumption 2, we finally get:
d2V˜2(zm, ·)
dλdα
∣∣∣
α=0
> 0, (1.114)
so that (1.105) holds and a fortiori (1.103).
54cov(X,Y ) = E(XY )− E(X)E(Y ).
39
Bibliography
Albanesi, S. (2003): “Optimal and Time-Consistent Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Heteroge-
neous Agents,” CEPR Discussion Papers 3713, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Barro, R. J., and D. B. Gordon (1983): “Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of
monetary policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(1), 101–121.
Benabou, R. (2002): “Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What
Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?,” Econometrica, 70(2), 481–517.
Calvo, G. A. (1978): “On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy,”
Econometrica, 46(6), pp. 1411–1428.
Calvo, G. A., and P. E. Guidotti (1993): “On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case
of the Optimal Inflation Tax,” Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 667–87.
Camous, A., and R. Cooper (2014): “Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility,” Working Paper
20650, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cooper, R., and H. Kempf (2013): “Deposit Insurance and Orderly Liquidation without Com-
mitment: Can we Sleep Well?,” Working Paper 19132, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Farhi, E. (2010): “Capital Taxation and Ownership When Markets Are Incomplete,” Journal of
Political Economy, 118(5), 908 – 948.
Farhi, E., C. Sleet, I. Werning, and S. Yeltekin (2012): “Non-linear Capital Taxation
Without Commitment,” The Review of Economic Studies.
Ferriere, A. (2015): “Sovereign Default, Inequality, and Progressive Taxation,” mimeo, New
York University.
Gans, J. S., and M. Smart (1996): “Majority voting with single-crossing preferences,” Journal
of Public Economics, 59(2), 219 – 237.
Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G. L. Violante (2014): “Optimal Tax Progressivity:
An Analytical Framework,” Staff Report 496, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Holter, H. A., D. Krueger, and S. Stepanchuk (2014): “How Does Tax Progressivity and
Household Heterogeneity Affect Laffer Curves?,” Working Paper 20688, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott (1977): “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsis-
tency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473–91.
Lucas, R. J., and N. L. Stokey (1983): “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy
without capital,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(1), 55–93.
40
Bibliography
Meltzer, A. H., and S. F. Richard (1981): “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,”
Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914–27.
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971): “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review
of Economic Studies, 38(114), 175–208.
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini (2002): Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy,
Zeuthen lecture book series. MIT Press.
Rogoff, K. (1985): “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(4), 1169–89.
Scheuer, F., and A. Wolitzky (2014): “Capital Taxation under Political Constraints,” Working
Paper 20043, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Werning, I. (2007): “Optimal Fiscal Policy with Redistribution,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122(3), 925–967.
41
Chapter 2
Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility
with Russell Cooper
2.1 Introduction
But there is another message I want to tell you. Within our mandates, the ECB is
ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.
[Mario Draghi, July 2012]1
This paper studies the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of strategic
uncertainty over the value of government debt. In real economies, beliefs of investors about the
likelihood of government default, and hence the value of its debt, can be self-fulfilling. Pessimistic
investors, fearing government default, will only purchase government debt if there is a sufficient
risk premium. The resulting increase in the cost of funds makes default more likely.2 Pessimism
can be self-fulfilling even if fundamentals are sound enough that an equilibrium without default
exists as well.
These results hold for real economies, in which the intervention of a monetary authority is not
considered. Does this debt fragility exist in a nominal economy? The presence of a monetary
authority can provide an alternative source of revenue through an inflation tax and perhaps use
its influence to stabilize real interest rates. Can the monetary authority act to eliminate strategic
uncertainty over the value of sovereign debt? If so, will it have an incentive to do so? The answers
to these questions are relevant for assessing the relevance of these results on strategic uncertainty
in debt markets and for guidance on the conduct of monetary policy.
The overlapping generations model with active fiscal and monetary interventions provides a
framework for analysis. The model is structured to highlight strategic uncertainty in the pricing
of government debt stemming from the default choice of a government. By construction, there
is an equilibrium without default, and in general there are other equilibria with state contingent
default.
The monetary authority intervenes through transfers to the fiscal entity, financed by an inflation
tax. The monetary intervention has a number of influences. First, the inflation tax delivers
real resources to the government, thus reducing the debt burden from taxation. Second, the
realized value of inflation alters the real value of debt and consequently the debt burden left to
1This statement is an excerpt from the address of Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at a
financial conference, in July 2012.
2This interaction between beliefs and default is central to Calvo (1988); and other contributions that followed,
including Cole and Kehoe (2000), Roch and Uhlig (2012) and Cooper (2012).
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the fiscal authority. Third, it may impact expectations of future inflation and thus the tax base
for seignorage.
Given these transfers and its outstanding obligations, the fiscal authority chooses to default
or not. Our analysis emphasizes the dependence of this default decision, and thus the extent of
strategic uncertainty, on the conduct of monetary policy. As our results develop, the capacity of
the monetary authority to stabilize sovereign debt markets relies on the interplay of the inflation
and expectation channels, not on on the collection of revenue from the inflation tax.
We undertake the analysis under alternative monetary policy regimes. If there is complete
discretion in monetary policy or if the monetary authority commits to a strict inflation target, the
strategic uncertainty in the real economy is present in the monetary economy.
However, if the monetary authority can commit to a particular state contingent transfer func-
tion, given an inflation target, then its intervention can stabilize debt valuations. Specifically, this
policy is designed to eliminate all equilibria with state contingent default, preserving the one in
which debt is risk-free. Interestingly, this desired intervention does not “bail-out” the fiscal au-
thority. Rather, the countercyclical nature of this policy induces an accommodative fiscal stance
in times of low productivity. This intervention leans against negative sentiments of investors and
preserves the fundamental price of debt.
This policy is reminiscent of the commitment of the European Central Bank, reflected in the
above quote of Mario Draghi, to undertake whatever it takes to counter pessimistic self-fulfilling
expectations on Eurozone sovereign debt markets. Under the intervention we design, the central
bank uses its commitment power to have a stabilizing influence on sovereign’s debt valuations. In
equilibrium, no actual intervention is required and debt is uniquely valued. Moreover, this policy
does not endanger the primary objective of the central bank, to anchor inflation expectations
around an inflation target.
We present conditions such that this policy is credible, so that commitment to its implemen-
tation is not needed. The implementation requires a punishment: we consider the case where a
deviating monetary authority returns to a strict inflation target regime. Not surprisingly, all else
the same, a patient monetary authority is less likely to deviate. But there is another element in
the analysis: the higher the risk of self-fulfilling debt crisis in the inflation target regime, the more
credible is the promise of the central bank to intervene ex post to counter pessimistic beliefs on
debt valuation.
Other analyses examine possible strategies for central banks to address self-fulling debt crises.
Calvo (1988) extends his real economy to include a discussion of inflation as a form of partial
default. He imposes an exogenous motive of money demand and an explicit cost of inflation
function that affects net output.3 Calvo (1988) argues that there may exist multiple equilibria in
the determination of inflation and the nominal interest rate on government debt. For this analysis,
there is no interaction between fiscal and monetary debt repudiation.
Corsetti and Dedola (2013) augments Calvo’s framework to study the interaction of fiscal and
3Specifically, see equations (16) and (19) in Calvo (1988).
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monetary policy. Their analysis retains some of the central features of Calvo’s model, including
exogenous money demand and costly ex post inflation. They argue that monetary interventions
through the printing press will not generally resolve debt fragility. But, the central bank, through
its holding of government debt, can have a stabilizing influence.
Aguiar, Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath (2013) build a nominal economy with a debt roll-over
crisis, as in Cole and Kehoe (2000). They investigate the optimal degree of conservativeness of the
central bank (as in Rogoff (1985)) as a tool to address inefficient debt crises. Moderate inflation
aversion contains the occurrence of self-fulfilling debt crisis and restrains the inflation bias in normal
times.
Our analysis differs from these others papers in a couple of fundamental ways: (i) endogenous
money demand and (ii) no assumed ex post costs of inflation. In particular, money demand in our
model comes from intertemporal savings of households and the cost of inflation occurs through
the ex ante effect of anticipated inflation on labor supply. The endogeneity of money demand
is central to our results. Our environment displays a complementarity between expected and
realized inflation. Money demand reflects expected inflation. The absence of an explicit ex post
cost of inflation provides a strong incentive for ex post inflation. With these two features, under
discretion, the central bank can be cornered into a high inflation equilibrium, unable to either
inflate nominal debt or provide additional resources via seignorage, along with a low inflation
equilibrium.4 Accordingly, our analysis of fragility in debt markets builds upon the critical need
to anchor inflation expectations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the economic environment and the
fiscal problem of the government. Section 2.3 displays debt fragility in a benchmark real economy.
Section 2.4 defines the relevant equilibrium concept in the nominal economy and investigates the
presence of debt fragility under two monetary policy frameworks: delegation and discretion. Section
2.5 characterizes a monetary policy rule that can eliminate debt fragility and presents conditions
such that this strategy is credible. Section 3.6 concludes.
2.2 Economic Environment
Consider an overlapping generation economy with domestic and foreign agents. Agents live two
periods. Time is discrete and infinite.
There are a couple of key components of the model. First, agents differ in productivity in young
age and form a demand for savings. Relatively poor agents hold money as a store of value rather
than incurring a cost to save through an intermediary. Importantly, money demand is endogenous,
thus making the tax base for seignorage dependent on inflation expectations of young agents.
Second the government issues debt each period and faces a choice on how to finance the re-
payment of its obligations. In particular, the government can tax labor income, print money or
default on its debt.
4This feature of our model is similar to that explored in Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998).
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The environment is structured to highlight debt fragility: there are multiple self-fulfilling values
of government debt. In this section, we describe the choices of private agents and the fiscal
environment.
2.2.1 Private Agents
Every period, a continuum of mass 1 of domestic agents (households) is born and lives two periods.
These agents consume only when old and their preferences are linear in consumption and labor
disutility is quadratic. This restriction is introduced to neatly capture the reaction of agents to
government policy choices.
Domestic agents produce a perishable good in both young and old age. Production is linear. In
youth, productivity is heterogenous. A mass νm of agents have low productivity zm = 1. A mass
νI = 1− νm of agents have high productivity zI = z > 1. In old age, productivity A is stochastic,
i.i.d., and common to all old agents.5
Agents have access to two technologies to store value: money or financially intermediated
claims. Access to the latter is costly: agents pay a participation cost Γ for access to intermediaries.
Limited financial market participation sorts agents in two groups. For convenience, we will refer
to poor agents, who will hold only money in equilibrium, and rich agents, who hold intermediated
claims in equilibrium. Intermediated claims are invested either in nominal government bonds or
in a risk-free asset, e.g. storage, that delivers a real return R > 1.
Poor Households
Poor households have low labor productivity zm = 1 in youth. Their savings between young and
old age are composed only of money holdings, whose real return is given by p˜i′, the inverse of the
gross inflation rate.6 Their labor supply decisions in young and old age solve:
max
n,n′
E
[
u(c′)− g(n′)]− g(n), (2.1)
subject to young and old age real budget constraints:
m = n (2.2)
c′ = A′n′(1− τ ′) +mp˜i′ + t′. (2.3)
In youth, poor agents supply labor n and have real money holdings, m, carried on from young
to old age. Return on money is given by the gross inverse inflation rate p˜i′. In old age, poor agents
supply labor n′, which is augmented by aggregate productivity A′. τ ′ is the tax rate on labor
income of old agents and t′ ≥ 0 a possible lump-sum transfer. Denote by nmy and nmo the optimal
5Formally, the distribution of A has full support on the closed and compact set [Al, Ah]. F (·) is the associated
cumulative distribution function, and f(·) = F ′(·).
6We verify later that these agents prefer to save via money rather than costly intermediaries in equilibrium.
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labor supply decision of young and old poor agents. With u(c) = c and g(n) = n
2
2 , labor supply
decisions are:
nmy = E(p˜i
′) and nmo = A
′(1− τ ′). (2.4)
Labor supply in both young and old age are driven by real returns to working. In youth, agents
form expectations p˜ie = E(p˜i′), and supply labor accordingly: if agents expect high inflation, i.e. a
low p˜ie, they will reduce labor supply and the associated demand for real money holding. Similarly,
tax on old age labor income is distortionary: a high tax rate reduces return to working and hence
the labor supply of old agents.
In contrast to, for example, Calvo (1988), money demand is endogenous in our model, reflecting
a labor supply and an asset market participation decision. This is important since the impact of
expected monetary interventions is to influence the magnitude of the ex post tax base created by
money holdings. This interaction between the tax base and the inflation tax rate generates an
inflation Laffer curve.
Rich Households and Financial Intermediation
Rich households differ from poor agents by their productivity in youth, zI = z > 1. This higher
productivity induces them to pay the fixed cost Γ to access intermediated saving. A parametric
restriction ensures that young rich agents save via the financial sector for any positive expected
inflation rate.7 Formally,
Assumption 1.
z2 >
RΓ
R2 − 1 > 1. (A.1)
The rich solve:
max
n,n′
E
[
u(c′)− g(n′)]− g(n), (2.5)
subject to young and old age real budget constraints:
m+ s = zn− Γ (2.6)
s = bI + k (2.7)
c′ = A′n′(1− τ ′) + p˜i′m+ 1D(1 + i′)p˜i′bI +Rk + t′. (2.8)
In youth, rich agents supply labor n and produce zn. After incurring the fixed cost Γ, they
invest a per capita amount s in intermediated claims. These claims are invested in government
bonds bI and risk-free assets k so that s = bI + k, where bI denotes the per-capita holding of
government debt of domestic rich agents. Government debt is nominal and pays an interest rate
7We verify this in characterizing equilibria.
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i′ next period if there is no default. When old, these agents supply labor n′, contingent on the
realization of A′ and the tax rate τ ′. Consumption in old age depends on the decision D ∈ {r, d}
of the government to repay or default on its debt, captured here by the operator 1D in (2.8): 1r=1
and 1d=0.
Finally, given linear utility of consumption, the portfolio decision between intermediated saving
s and money holding m is only driven by expected returns. As long as expected return on money
holding p˜ie is strictly inferior to the real return R on the risk-free asset, rich households do not
hold money. The portfolio for intermediated savings will include both nominal government debt
and risk-free asset as long as the expected return on government debt equals that on the asset:
(1 + i′)p˜ie
(
1− P d) = R, (2.9)
where P d is the probability of default, determined in equilibrium, and p˜ie the expected inflation
over states where debt is repaid. We refer to this as the ‘no-arbitrage condition’. Denote by nIy and
nIo the optimal labor supply decisions of intermediated agents in young and old age. The solution
to (2.5) implies:
nIy = Rz and n
I
o = A
′(1− τ ′). (2.10)
Labor supply nIy of young agents is determined by the expected return R on intermediated
savings. In old age though, the effective return on intermediated savings will depend on the realized
inverse inflation rate p˜i′, the nominal interest rate i′ and the default decision of the government.
Foreign Households
In addition to domestic agents, there are also foreign households who hold domestic debt. Like rich
households, they save through intermediaries that hold government debt and consume the domestic
good. The details of the foreign economy are not important for this analysis except that foreign
households are risk neutral and have access to domestic debt as a store of value. In equilibrium,
they hold a fraction (1− θ) of domestic debt.8
2.2.2 The Government
The government is composed of a treasury and a central bank. Every period, it has to finance a
constant and exogenous flow of real expenses g. Government expenditures do not enter into agents
utility. To finance these expenses, it can raise taxes on old agent labor income, print money and
issue nominal debt B′.9 Alternatively, it can default on its inherited debt obligation.
8Given the indifference of risk neutral agents regarding their portfolio of government debt and storage, θ is not
determined in equilibrium. Thus equilibria will be characterized for given values of θ.
9The assumption of no taxation of income when young is just a simplification that allows us to neatly disentangle
demand for money, for intermediated claims and labor supply driven by taxation.
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Under repayment, the real budget constraint of the government is:
(1 + i)p˜ib+ g = τ
(
νmAnmo (τ) + ν
IAnIo(τ)
)
+
∆M
P
+ b′. (2.11)
The left hand side contains the real liabilities of the government, net of realized inflation p˜i, where
b is real debt outstanding. On the right hand side, njo(τ) is the labor supply decision of old agents
of type j ∈ {I,m}, ∆M is the change in the total money supply (M) and P is the price level.
Denote by σ the rate of money creation that implements the change in money supply ∆M .
Assume g = b′, so that new expenses are financed exclusively by debt. With this restriction,
fiscal policy has no intergenerational element. Instead, debt created when agents are young is paid
for or defaulted on when these agents are old.10 We return to this restriction in our concluding
comments. So the government budget constraint under repayment becomes generation specific:
(1 + i)p˜ib = τ
(
νmAnmo (τ) + ν
IAnIo(τ)
)
+
∆M
P
. (2.12)
Instead of repayment, the government can fully renege on its debt. But there are two costs of
default for domestic agents. First, direct costs of default are born by old rich agents, who hold a
fraction θ of government debt. Second, if the government repudiates its debt, the country suffers
from a deadweight loss, as commonly assumed in the literature on strategic default.11 Formally,
aggregate productivity contemporaneously drops by a proportional factor γ. The model excludes
punishments involving exclusion from future capital markets. This is partly to ensure that default
effects are contained within a generation but also reflects the quantitative finding that the main
force preventing default is the direct output loss.12
As the government budget constraint holds over time for a given generation, a decision to
default on period t debt has no direct effect on future generations. That is, default affects only
the welfare of current old agents, who otherwise are taxed via seignorage or labor tax.
The government weights the welfare burden of tax distortions against the direct costs and
penalty induced by the default decision. Denote by W r(·) the welfare of the economy under
repayment and by W d(·) under default. The decision to default is optimal whenever ∆(·) =
W d(·)−W r(·) ≥ 0.
Given aggregate productivity A, nominal interest rate i, real money tax base m−1, tax rate
τ , money printing rate σ that satisfy (2.12) and the induced inverse inflation rate p˜i, the welfare
10This use of generational budget balance appears in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Cooper, Kempf, and Peled
(2010), for example. An alternative, as in Cole and Kehoe (2000), could add more strategic uncertainty through
debt rollover. For an analysis of self-fulfilling debt crisis with active debt issuance and maturity management, see
Lorenzoni and Werning (2013).
11Penalties and direct sanctions are central theoretic concepts for enforcement of international asset trade. See
the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). For an extensive review, see Eaton and Fernandez (1995).
12Empirical evidence regarding reputation costs of default are mixed: exclusion from international credit markets
are short-lived and premium following defaults are usually found to be negligible. An extensive discussion can be
found in Trebesch, Papaioannou, and Das (2012). From a theoretical point of view, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show
that reputation mechanisms cannot enforce international asset trade, if the government can buy foreign assets as
an alternative source of insurance.
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criterion WD(·) for D ∈ {r, d} is:
WD(A, i,m−1, τ, σ, p˜i) = νm
(
cmo (D)−
nmo (D)
2
2)
+ νI
(
cIo(D)−
nIo(D)
2
2)
. (2.13)
The levels of p˜i are chosen under each of the options, as a function of the monetary regime under
which the economy operates.
Specifically, under repayment, D = r, the welfare of old agents is:
W r(A, i,m−1, τ, σ, p˜ir) =
[
A(1− τ)]2
2
+ νmm−1p˜ir +
(
(1 + i)p˜ir −R)θb+ νIR(Rz2 − Γ). (2.14)
Here the inflation is created by the printing of money that is transferred directly to the treasury.
The option to default, D = d, triggers penalties but no tax need be raised. In keeping with the
generational view of the budget constraint, any money creation in the current period is transferred
lump-sum to the current old. The amount of this transfer will depend on the monetary regime. In
this case, the welfare of old agents becomes:
W d(A, i,m−1, σ, p˜id) =
[
A(1− γ)]2
2
+ νmm−1p˜id −Rθb+ νIR(Rz2 − Γ) + T (σ,m−1, p˜id), (2.15)
where T (σ,m−1, p˜id) is the aggregate lump sum transfer to old agents that implements p˜id.13
2.2.3 Assumptions
The following two assumptions are used for characterizing equilibria. The first places a lower bound
on γ so that default is costly, especially when no debt is held by domestic agents.
Assumption 2.
A2l γ(2− γ)
2
> νm. (A.2)
Under this assumption, default is not a desirable option when seignorage revenue alone could
service principal and interest on debt.14 The next assumption ensures that the fundamentals of
the economy are compatible with a risk-free outcome, i.e. given the real level of debt b, a real
interest rate of R, the debt will be repaid for all A. That is, there is a solution to (2.9) without
default. Formally,
Assumption 3. b < b¯ where
b¯ =
A2l (1− γ)γ
R
. (A.3)
Note that Assumption 3 is stated in the extreme case where there is no seignorage revenue,
and all debt is held by foreigners.15 The presence of an equilibrium without default provides a
13Computations are detailed in Appendix 2.7.1.
14This is established in the construction of equilibria.
15This assumption is derived using the government budget constraint with no inflation, no fiscal resource from
seignorage and all debt is held by foreigners (θ = 0). It implies that there will be an equilibrium without default
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convenient benchmark for the analysis.
2.3 Debt Fragility in a Real Economy
To explicitly illustrate debt fragility, first consider this economy without money and nominal
quantities. The equilibrium in the monetary economy will be constructed on the foundation of the
multiplicity in the real economy.
The government issues real debt and can raise only taxes on labor income. Given A and real
interest rate i, its budget constraint under repayment is simply:
(1 + i)b = A2(1− τ)τ. (2.16)
Let τ be the smallest tax rate satisfying (2.16) so that tax revenue are locally increasing in the tax
rate.
Private agents can save only through intermediation. For simplicity, set Γ = 0 so that there
are no costs associated to saving through the holding of government debt. Further, assume θ = 0
so that all debt is held by foreigners and all domestic saving is through storage.
The labor supply choices of the rich are given by (2.10). Since the poor access the intermediary
for saving, their labor supply decisions are given by
nmy = R and n
m
o = A
′(1− τ ′). (2.17)
The government defaults whenever W˜ d(·) ≥ W˜ r(·), where these values for the real economy are
defined by:
W˜ r(A, i, τ) =
[
A(1− τ)]2
2
+ νmR2 + νI(Rz)2, (2.18)
and
W˜ d(A, i) =
[
A(1− γ)]2
2
+ νmR2 + νI(Rz)2. (2.19)
For the real economy with θ = 0, the government will default whenever τ > γ. Equivalently,
using (2.16), the government defaults for any realization of A < A¯, where A¯ satisfies:
A¯2 =
(1 + i)b
γ(1− γ) . (2.20)
This expression defines A¯(i), the default threshold of the government as a function of the real
interest rate i.
risk when some of the debt is held by domestic agents and when money printing does provide resources to the fiscal
authority. Indeed, domestic holding of public debt or a higher money printing rate relaxes the willingness of the
fiscal authority to default rather than repay its debt.
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The probability of default given i is F
(
A¯(i)
)
. Using this, the no-arbitrage condition (2.9)
becomes:
(1 + i)
(
1− F (A¯(i))) = R. (2.21)
This equation may have several solutions.16 Default arises both because of fundamental shocks
(low A) and strategic uncertainty: the probability of default depends on the interest rate, and in
equilibrium on the beliefs of investors which determine this probability. Hence the multiplicity.
Proposition 1. If government debt has value, then there are multiple interest rates that solve the
no-arbitrage condition (2.21).
Proof. An equilibrium of the debt financing problem is characterized by an interest rate i and a
default threshold, A¯ solving (2.20) and (2.21). Combining these expressions yields
A¯2
(
1− F (A¯)) = Rb
γ(1− γ) . (2.22)
Any A¯ solving this equation is part of an equilibrium.
Denote by G(A) the left side and by Z the right side of (2.22). G(·) is continuous on [Al, Ah],
G(Al) = A
2
l > 0 and G(Ah) = 0.
Consistent with Assumption 3, if Z < A2l = G(Al), there is a risk free interest rate: A¯ = Al
and (1 + i) = R is a solution to (2.22). Also, by continuity of G(·), there is A¯ ∈ (Al, Ah) such that
G(A¯) = Z. Hence there is also an interest rate that carries a risk-premium and that solves the
no-arbitrage condition.
Relaxing Assumption 3, if Z > A2l = G(Al), all equilibria include default risk and thus a risk
premium. If b is very high, then Z will be large as well and there may be no equilibrium in which
debt is valued. If debt is valued so that there is a solution to (2.22), then G(A) > Z for some
A > Al. Again, by continuity, there is a second equilibrium.
The multiple equilibria of the debt financing problem identified here are welfare ordered. The
fundamental equilibrium with certain repayment provides higher utility than any other equilibrium
with higher interest rate and state contingent default. In the fundamental equilibrium, repayment
is preferred to default in those states where default is optimal in the other equilibria. And in
repayment states, lower interest rate in the fundamental equilibrium requires lower taxes, hence
higher welfare, than under the other equilibria.
Importantly, note that Proposition 1 does not directly restrict the level of debt, b. As long as
debt has value, there are multiple equilibria. The level of debt though cannot be too large. Else an
equilibrium with valued debt will not exist, since the government would default for all realizations
of A.
16This source of multiplicity is at the heart of Calvo (1988) and Cooper (2012).
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The underlying source of strategic uncertainty is aptly captured by Proposition 1 for the real
economy. It is a building block for the analysis of a monetary economy. The subsequent develop-
ments allow debt to be held both internally and externally.
2.4 Debt Fragility in a Monetary Economy
This section studies the interaction of monetary interventions and debt fragility. Intuitively, mon-
etary policy acts via three channels. First, it can collect seignorage taxes and supplement the
resources collected through labor taxation. Second, by adjusting the realized inflation rate, it can
lower the real value of debt.
But, third, there are potential resource costs of funding the government through the inflation
tax: young agents perceiving high inflation in the future will work less, reducing the monetary tax
base. This effect though depends on the extent of discretion in the conduct of monetary policy.
Also, the mean inflation rate p˜ie is priced into the nominal interest rate, which makes attempts to
deliver surprise inflation difficult.
Accordingly, this section of the paper is constructed around two polar cases, distinguished by
the ability of the monetary authority to commit.
i. Monetary delegation: monetary policy decisions are made by an independent central bank
that pursues a known and explicit rule, independent of fiscal considerations. We consider the
case of strict inflation targeting: the central bank is committed to an unconditional inflation
rate.
ii. Monetary discretion: monetary and fiscal decisions are linked. Given the state of the econ-
omy, money creation and taxes are set so as to minimize welfare costs and tax distortions of
old agents given a budget constraint. Default is also chosen optimally ex post.
Before analyzing debt fragility under these monetary regimes, we formally define the equilibrium
concept of the nominal economy.
2.4.1 State Variables and Equilibrium Definition
The strategic uncertainty identified in Proposition 1 is modeled through a sunspot variable, denoted
s, that corresponds to confidence of domestic and foreign households about the repayment of
government debt next period.
- If s = so, agents are “optimists” : they coordinate on the risk free (fundamental) price of
the government debt.
- If s = sp, agents are “pessimists” : they coordinate on higher risk / lower price equilibria
with state contingent default.
52
Chapter 2. Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility
The distribution of sunspot shocks is i.i.d. Denote by p ∈ (0, 1) the probability of s = so. In
the event there is a unique equilibrium price, then the fundamental price obtains regardless of the
sunspot realization. Note that we only consider cases where debt has value.17
The state of the economy is S = (A, i,m−1, s, s−1). Aggregate productivity, A, is realized
and directly affects the productivity of the old. There are two endogenous predetermined state
variables, m−1 and i, respectively real money holdings of current old agents, and the nominal
interest rate on outstanding public debt. Both the sunspot shock last period, s−1, and the current
realization, s, may impact fiscal policy, monetary policy and the choices of private agents.
To define a Stationary Rational Expectations Equilibrium (SREE), it is necessary to be precise
about market clearing conditions, the link between money printing, inflation and seignorage revenue
and from these, the government budget constraint. These conditions are used in the equilibrium
definition and in constructing various types of equilibria.
Market Clearing
In every state, the markets for money and bonds must clear. The condition for money market
clearing is
νmm(S) = M(S)
P (S) ∀S, (2.23)
where P (S) is the state dependent money price of goods and M(S) is the stock of fiat money.
This equation implies that the real money demand of the current young equals the real value of
the supply.
The market for government debt clears if the no-arbitrage condition (2.9) holds and the savings
of the rich plus the demand from the foreigners is not less than the real stock of government debt.
We assume that the foreigners’ endowment is large enough to clear the market for bonds as long
as (2.9) is met.
Government Budget Constraint, Inflation and Seignorage
The SREE version of the government budget constraint, (2.12), requires a couple of building blocks.
The inverse inflation rate, p˜i, is given by:
p˜i(S) = P (S−1)
P (S) =
m(S)
m(S−1)
1
1 + σ(S) , (2.24)
using (2.23). Revenue from seignorage is:
∆M
P (S) = σ(S)ν
mm(S−1)p˜i(S) = νmm(S)
(
σ(S)
1 + σ(S)
)
. (2.25)
17The case of “market shutdown”, where debt has no value, is not of direct interest for our analysis.
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Here m(S−1) represents the real money holdings of the current old. Importantly, these equations
imply a one-to-one mapping between the rate of money creation σ(S) and realized inverse inflation
p˜i(S). This reflects the fact that m(S−1) is given in (2.24) and the employment and money demand
for the current generation, m(S), is, as we verify below, independent of the current rate of money
creation. Accordingly, our equilibrium definition is stated with the government setting inflation
p˜i(S).
Embedded in (2.25) is an interaction between inflation expectations, that determines the real
money holding m(S−1), and realized inflation. This element will give rise to a monetary Laffer
curve and strategic interactions between expected inflation and delivered inflation, as unveiled in
the rest of the analysis.
Substituting these expressions for seignorage and the inverse inflation rate into the government
budget constraint:
(1 + i)p˜i(S)b = τ(S)(νmAnmo (τ(S)) + νIAnIo(τ(S)))+ νmm(S)( σ(S)1 + σ(S)
)
, (2.26)
and using the labor supply policy functions of old agents:
(1 + i)p˜i(S)b = A2(1− τ(S))τ(S) + νmm(S)( σ(S)
1 + σ(S)
)
. (2.27)
Stationary Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Definition 1. A Stationary Rational Expectations Equilibrium (SREE) is given by:
- The labor supply and savings decisions of private agents,
(
nmy (S), nmo (S), nIy(S), nIo(S),m(S), k(S), b(S)
)
,
who form rational expectations in youth, supply labor in young and old age, solve (2.1) and
(2.5) subject to their respective budget constraints (2.2),(2.3) and (2.6),(2.8), given state
contingent monetary and fiscal policies ({τ(S), p˜i(S), D(S)}), for all S.
- The government maximizes its welfare criterion by choosing a policy ({τ(S), p˜i(S), D(S)})
subject to the government budget constraint, (2.27) for all S.
- All markets clear (goods, money, bonds) for all S.
The welfare criterion of the government will depend on the monetary policy framework, as
detailed below. The polar cases of delegation and discretion are studied within this framework;
the conduct of monetary policy determines what the government takes as given in choosing its
policy.18 Also, we characterize equilibria for given θ, share of government debt held by domestic
agents, as its value is not pinned down in equilibrium.
By making the sunspot binary (optimism or pessimism), we restrict attention to equilibria with
potentially at most two levels of the nominal interest rate. As discussed in Section 2.3, there could
18Aguiar, Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath (2013) and Corsetti and Dedola (2013) study discretionary monetary
authorities. Our analysis will also highlight particular forms of commitment by the central bank as well as the
reputation effect necessary to implement this solution without commitment.
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be more self-fulfilling levels of interest rates associated with different default thresholds. Allowing
the sunspot variable to have more than two realizations could capture these outcomes, without
changing the essential nature of the following analysis.
2.4.2 Monetary Delegation
In this institutional structure, the treasury has discretionary power over fiscal policy, choosing fiscal
policy ex post given the monetary intervention. In contrast, the monetary authority is endowed
with a commitment technology. We find that under monetary delegation to a strict inflation target,
debt fragility remains. The key intuition behind this result is that strict inflation targeting turns
a nominal debt contract into a real security. Hence the presence of debt fragility in real economy
identified in section 2.3 persists in the nominal economy with strict inflation targeting.
One interpretation of this structure is that the government of an individual country delegates
its monetary policy to an independent central bank, by joining a monetary union for instance. The
central bank of the union pursues an independent policy of strict inflation targeting and the fiscal
authority is left with discretionary tax policy choices (taxes or default).
Specifically, the central bank commits to an inflation target 0 < p˜i∗ ≤ 1 and delivers it by
printing money. By doing so, the central bank does not accommodate productivity shocks. Revenue
from seignorage is transferred to the treasury. Formally, the policy of the central bank is:
p˜i(S) = p˜i∗ ∀S. (2.28)
As the central bank is bound to deliver its inflation target p˜i∗, agents’ expectations are p˜ie = p˜i∗.19
In a stationary equilibrium, there is a stationary rate of money creation, σ∗, directly linked to the
target inflation: 11+σ∗ = p˜i
∗.
Using (2.25), modified to reflect the equilibrium under an inflation target p˜i∗, revenue obtained
from seignorage is:
∆M
P (S) = ν
mm(S)
(
σ(S)
1 + σ(S)
)
= νmp˜i∗(1− p˜i∗), (2.29)
as m = m−1 = p˜ie = p˜i∗. This is maximized at p˜iL ≡ 12 which is the top of the seignorage “Laffer
curve”. At p˜i∗ > p˜iL, a reduction in p˜i∗ (i.e. an increase in the rate of inflation) will increase
revenue.20 Within this monetary set-up, the government budget constraint under repayment be-
comes:
(1 + i)p˜i∗b = A2(1− τ)τ + νmp˜i∗(1− p˜i∗). (2.30)
19In particular, if there is default, the monetary authority prints money and transfers it to old agents to meet
this target.
20The determination of the optimal inflation target p˜i∗ is not part of the present analysis. The model could
provide a positive theory of inflation, where the inflation target would be set to minimize distortions associated to
tax revenue. Given the Laffer curve property of seignorage, any inflation target 0 < p˜i∗ < p˜iL is inefficient, but this
does not affect the essential results regarding debt fragility.
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To formally derive the result that debt fragility persists in this monetary regime, we establish
the existence of several interest rates that solve the no-arbitrage condition. To do so, we first verify
that the default decision in the monetary economy has the same monotonicity property as in the
real economy: if the government defaults for a given realization of technology A¯, then it would
default for any lower realization A ≤ A¯.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2, given a level of real obligations (1 + i)p˜i∗b, there is a unique
A¯(i) ∈ [Al, Ah] such that if A ≤ A¯(i), then the treasury defaults on its debt. Otherwise it repays
its debt.
Proof. Given a nominal interest rate i, the decision to repay or default on debt is given by ∆(·) =
W d(·)−W r(·), where the relevant welfare criteria are given by (2.14) and (2.15) and the lump-sum
transfer under default by T (p˜i∗) = νmp˜i∗(1 − p˜i∗). Hence, a point of indifference between default
and repayment, A¯(i) solves:
[A(1− γ)]2
2
− [A(1− τ)]
2
2
= (1 + i)p˜i∗θb− νmp˜i∗(1− p˜i∗), (2.31)
where τ satisfies the government budget constraint (2.30). Denote by G(A) the left side of (2.31).
Clearly if G(A) is monotonically decreasing in A, then the default decision satisfies the desired
cut-off rule. Rewrite G(A) as follow:
G(A) =
[A(1− γ)]2
2
− A
2
2
− A
2τ(τ − 2)
2
. (2.32)
Using the government budget constraint, (2.32) rewrites:
G(A) =
A2γ(γ − 2)
2
− [(1 + i)p˜i∗b− νmp˜i∗(1− p˜i∗)] (τ − 2)
2(1− τ) . (2.33)
The first term is negative since γ < 1. If seignorage revenue is enough to service debt, then no
tax need be raised and A¯(i) = Al, by Assumption 2.
21 Otherwise, (1 + i)p˜i∗b− νmp˜i∗(1− p˜i∗) > 0.
Finally, we need to derive the monotonicity of τ−21−τ with respect to A. Its derivative is:
−1
(1− τ)2
dτ
dA
> 0, (2.34)
which is positive since dτdA < 0 for the lowest value of τ that solves the budget constraint. Overall,
we have G′(A) < 0. Hence, the cut-off value A¯(i) is unique and default occurs if and only if
A ≤ A¯(i).
Note that if A¯(i) ≤ Al, then debt is risk free. Finally, A¯(i) = Ah is inconsistent with the
assumption that debt has value.
From this result, the probability of default P d becomes F (A¯(i)). This probability also implicitly
21To see this, set θ = 0, m = 1 and p˜ir = 0 in (2.14) and (2.15) and verify that ∆(·) = W d(·)−W r(·) < 0 under
Assumption 2.
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depends on p˜i∗, which appears on the right side of (2.31). Altogether, an interest rate for the
government debt solves:
(1 + i)p˜i∗
(
1− F (A¯(i))) = R. (2.35)
This expression outlines the interplay between beliefs, probability of default and best-response of
the government. As in the real economy, the probability of default depends on the interest rate,
and in equilibrium on the beliefs of investors which determine this probability.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, for any inflation target 0 < p˜i∗ ≤ 1, there are multiple
interest rates that solve the no-arbitrage condition (2.35).
Proof. An equilibrium of the debt financing problem is characterized by an interest rate i and a
default threshold A¯. Importantly, an equilibrium is such that beliefs of investors are consistent
with the best response of the government.
Investors believe that the government defaults with probability P d = F (A¯). This belief induces
A¯b(i), the default threshold consistent with P d:
(1 + i)p˜i∗
(
1− F (A¯)) = R⇒ A¯b(i). (2.36)
Given i, the government decision to repay or default induces A¯g(i), the realization of A for
which the government is indifferent between default and repayment:22
∆(A, i) = W d(A, i)−W r(A, i) = 0⇒ A¯g(i). (2.37)
An equilibrium requires A¯b(i) = A¯g(i). The nominal interest rate i can takes value on [i,+∞)
where i is the nominal interest rate consistent with risk-free debt. Formally, it satisfies (1 + i)p˜i∗ =
R. We study the monotonicity properties of A¯b(·) and A¯g(·).
The default threshold A¯b(i) induced by belief of investors has the following properties. First,
A¯b(i) = Al: if investors charge i, it means that they expect no default. Second, differentiating
(2.36) with respect to A¯ and i, one gets:
dA¯b(i)
di
=
(
1− F (A¯))
f(A¯)(1 + i)
> 0, (2.38)
since f(·) > 0. Finally, lim
i→+∞
A¯b(i) = Ah.
The best response of the government to i is captured by A¯g(i), the default threshold. Given
Assumption 3, for low values of i, debt is risk free.23 Hence, there is  > 0 such that A¯g(i+) = Al.
22Lemma 1 established that this threshold is unique. To determine ∆(A, i) from (2.14) and (2.15), set p˜i = m = p˜i∗
and set τ from (2.30) if the government decides to repay.
23Relaxing Assumption 3 and allowing a fundamental equilibrium with positive probability of default does not
change the central result that several interest rates are compatible with the no-arbitrage condition. This is explicit
in the real environment, as in Proposition 1, and can be established in the nominal economy as well.
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Second, by differentiating (2.31) with respect to A¯ and i, one gets:
p˜i∗b
[ 1− τ
1− 2τ − θ
]
di+ A¯
[
(1− γ)2 − (1− τ)
2
1− 2τ
]
dA¯ = 0. (2.39)
The factor of di is positive since 1−τ1−2τ > 1 and the factor of dA¯ is negative since
(1−τ)2
1−2τ > 1. Hence:
if A¯g(i) ∈ (Al, Ah), then dA¯
g(i)
di
> 0. (2.40)
Finally, there is an upper bound i¯ such that default occurs for all A if i ≥ i¯:
∀i > i¯, A¯g(i) = Ah. (2.41)
By continuity of the functions A¯g(·) and A¯b(·), there is a value i > i that satisfies A¯g(i) = A¯b(i).
The monotonicity properties of A¯g(i) and A¯b(i) are summarized in Figure 2.1. Under Assump-
tion 3, there is always an equilibrium with certain repayment, where the nominal interest rate is
i. In addition, there will exist an equilibrium in which the debt is never repaid and, accordingly,
investors place zero probability on repayment.24 Lemma 2 characterizes additional interior equilib-
ria in which default arises with a positive probability: there is A¯ ∈ (Al, Ah) and i > i that satisfy
the no-arbitrage condition with state contingent default.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the multiplicity of equilibria, including three interior equilibria. The
equilibrium of the debt financing problem labeled F is a locally stable equilibrium with a posi-
tive probability of default. Here local stability refers to best-response dynamics and is used for
comparative statics.25
This lemma provides the basis for the existence of a SREE in which sunspots matter, i.e. the
value of government debt is dependent upon the beliefs of investors. In equilibrium there are
sunspot dependent variations in employment, output and consumption.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2 and 3, for any 0 < p˜i∗ ≤ 1, there is a SREE with the
following characteristics:
1. If s−1 = so, the government security is risk free and the treasury reimburses with probability
1.
2. If s−1 = sp, the interest rate incorporates a risk-premium and the treasury defaults on its
debt with positive probability.
24As mentioned previously, we discard this “market shutdown” case, which always exists.
25Specifically, ‘best response dynamics’ points to the dynamics induced by investors responding to the treasury,
followed by the treasury responding to investors. To see why the F equilibrium is locally stable, suppose the interest
rate i is lower than the equilibrium value. Given i, the treasury decision is captured by a threshold level for default,
A¯g(i), along the solid line. Given this, investors will ‘set’ an interest rate such that the no-arbitrage conditions
holds, i.e. A¯b(i) along the dashed line. Following this dynamic will lead to the locally stable equilibrium.
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Figure 2.1: Multiplicity of Interest Rates under Monetary Delegation
i
A¯
Best Response of the Treasury: A¯g(i)
Beliefs of Investors: A¯b(i)
i
Al
Ah
F
This figure represents the mapping from interest rate i to default threshold A¯, both for investors and the fiscal
authority. Investors associate an interest rate i to a default threshold via the probability of default in the no-
arbitrage condition. This is the dashed line. Given the interest rate i, the optimal decision of the fiscal authority
to service its debt or default is captured by the default threshold, indicated by the solid line. An equilibrium is
reached when beliefs of investors are consistent with the best-response of the fiscal authority. The figure highlights
the existence of several equilibria, one of them being risk-free. The equilibrium indicated with a F is locally stable
under best response dynamics.
Proof. The characterization of the SREE directly comes from Lemma 2 and the existence of several
interest rates compatible with the no-arbitrage condition in equilibrium. We describe the optimal
behavior of agents consistent with the equilibrium definition.
As p˜ie = p˜i∗ ∈ (0, 1], poor agents save only with money holding and rich young agents invest in
intermediated claims. Indeed, consider a young household with productivity z. It can either save
with money holding or via the financial sector, incurring the fixed cost Γ.
If it chooses to hold money, its labor supply when young is n = zp˜ie, its real demand for
money holding is zn = z2p˜ie and the net expected contribution to consumption:
(
zp˜ie
)2
. If it
chooses the intermediated savings, its labor supply when young is n = Rz, its savings net of the
intermediation cost s = Rz2 − Γ and the net expected contribution to consumption: R(Rz2 − Γ).
Hence, intermediated saving dominates money holding if and only if:
z2 >
RΓ
R2 − (p˜ie)2 , (2.42)
which is true for any p˜ie ∈ (0, 1] as long as Assumption 1 holds. An aggregate fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of
the government security is being held by domestic rich agents.
If s−1 = so, then young agents form expectations P d = 0 and p˜ie = p˜i∗. They supply labor
accordingly. Consequently, the interest rate on debt satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (2.9) with
P d = 0 and p˜ie = p˜i∗. Given i, seignorage revenue νmp˜i∗(1 − p˜i∗) and using Assumption 3, the
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optimal policy of the treasury is then to raise labor taxes τ for all A so as to satisfy its budget
constraint and repay its debt.
All markets clear. The money demand of the young poor agents is constant at p˜i∗. The
price level adjusts to ensure market clearing. From this, p˜i∗ = 11+σ∗ . In this equilibrium, inflation
targeting and setting fixed money growth rate are equivalent. Given the no-arbitrage condition, the
bond market clears assuming the foreign lenders have enough endowment to buy the government
debt not purchased by domestic rich agents.
For the case s−1 = sp, we outline only differences with the previous case. From Lemma 2, there
is an interest rate i that carries a risk premium and satisfy the no-arbitrage condition, such that
(1 + i)p˜i∗ > R. Young agents form expectations P d > 0 and p˜ie = p˜i∗. They price the government
debt according to P d > 0 and p˜ie = p˜i∗. Given i and seignorage revenue νmp˜i∗(1 − p˜i∗), there
is a unique threshold A¯(i) such that the optimal policy of the treasury is to raise labor taxes τ
for all A ≥ A¯(i) to satisfy its budget constraint and default otherwise. Finally, expectations are
consistent with the best response of the government: P d = F
(
A¯(i)
)
.
Aguiar, Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath (2013) find a similar result if there is a very high perceived
cost of inflation: when the central bank is very inflation averse, it never chooses to inflate the
nominal value of debt, it is de facto committed to no inflation, converting nominal debt into real
debt. Roll-over crises occur for a larger range of debt.
Overall this section, particularly Proposition 2, makes clear that debt fragility, as identified in
real economies (Proposition 1), extends to economies with nominal debt. In effect, the inflation
target of the monetary authority converts the nominal obligation to a real one. Seignorage does
reduce the real debt burden left to the fiscal authority, but without eliminating the underlying
strategic uncertainty. The choice of the inflation target does not allow the monetary authority to
peg the real interest rate. Instead the real interest rate on debt continues to reflect the sentiments
of investors.
In Section 2.5, this stationary equilibrium is used as a threat point to support the credibility
of an alternative monetary regime. Let V dlg(p˜i∗, p) be the life-time welfare of agents in a given
generation under monetary delegation, where p˜i∗ is the inflation target and p the probability of
optimism. Formally, using (2.13) and (2.37), with m−1 = p˜ie = p˜i∗:
V dlg(p˜i∗, p) = p
[ ∫ Ah
Al
W r(A, i)dF (A)
]
+ (1− p)
[ ∫ A¯
Al
W d(A, i)dF (A) +
∫ Ah
A¯
W r(A, i)dF (A)
]
−
∑
j∈{m,I}
νj
(njy)
2
2
.
(2.43)
The first term corresponds to the expected welfare of old agents under optimism, when the
nominal interest rate i induces repayment for any realization of technology A. The second term
is the expected welfare under pessimism, where the risk premium included in the nominal interest
rate i > i leads the treasury to default for low realizations of A ∈ [Al, A¯]. Finally, as inflation
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expectations are anchored, the third term captures young agents’ disutility of labor is independent
of the realization of the sunspot shock.26
Importantly, the welfare of a generation under monetary delegation is increasing in the prob-
ability of optimism p and decreasing with the nominal interest rate i associated with pessimism.
Indeed, as discussed above, the equilibrium under optimism Pareto dominates the coordination
failure outcome, and the higher the risk premium under pessimism, the lower is welfare.
Finally, Proposition 2 is stated for any level of inflation target p˜i∗. This does not imply though
that the equilibrium is independent of the inflation target. The inflation target will influence
seignorage revenue and affect the fiscal burden. The size and magnitude of these effects will
depend on the target inflation relative to the peak of the “Laffer curve”.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2, for p˜i∗ ≥ p˜iL, an increase in the
target inflation rate will increase seignorage and lower the probability of default if and only if the
equilibrium of the debt financing problem is locally stable.
Proof. The proof relies on three expressions. The point of indifference between repayment and
default, (i.e. the default threshold A¯) is given in (2.31), the government budget constraint given in
(2.30), and the no-arbitrage condition, given in (2.35). These are all evaluated at a given inflation
target and thus p˜i∗. Substituting the no-arbitrage condition into (2.31) gives:
[A¯(1− γ)]2
2
− [A¯(1− τ)]
2
2
+ νmp˜i∗(1− p˜i∗)− Rθb
1− F (A¯) = 0, (2.44)
where τ satisfies the government budget constraint evaluated at A¯.
Taking the derivative of (2.44) w.r.t. A¯ and pi∗:
[
A¯(1− γ)2 − A¯(1− τ)2 + A¯2(1− τ)τA − Rθbf(A¯)(
1− F (A¯))2
]
dA¯+
[
A¯2(1− τ)τp˜i∗ + νm(1− 2p˜i∗)
]
dpi∗ = 0,
(2.45)
where τA and τp˜i∗ are given by the derivative of the government budget constraint evaluated in A¯.
Substituting the no-arbitrage condition into the budget constraint (2.30) and taking the derivative
w.r.t. τ, pi∗, A, one gets:
τA =
1
A2(1− 2τ)
[ Rbf(A)(
1− F (A))2 − 2A(1− τ)τ
]
τp˜i∗ = −ν
m(1− 2p˜i∗)
A2(1− 2τ) . (2.46)
Rearranging (2.45), one gets:
[
A¯(1− γ)2 − A¯ (1− τ)
2
1− 2τ +
Rbf(A¯)(
1− F (A¯))2
( 1− τ
1− 2τ − θ
)]
dA¯+
[
νm(1− 2p˜i∗)
(
1− 1− τ
1− 2τ
)]
dp˜i∗ = 0.
(2.47)
26Formally, nmy = p˜i
∗ and nIy = Rz from (2.4) and (2.10).
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The factor of dp˜i∗ is positive since p˜i∗ ≥ p˜iL and 1−τ1−2τ > 1. Hence the sign of the factor of dA¯ is
critical to derive the response of the default threshold to a change in the inflation target.
This sign is determined by the condition of local stability. An equilibrium is locally stable
under best response dynamics if and only if dA¯
g(i)
di <
dA¯b(i)
di . Rewriting (2.38) with the no-arbitrage
condition and using (2.39), the condition for local stability becomes:
A¯(1− γ)2 − A¯ (1− τ)
2
1− 2τ +
Rbf(A)(
1− F (A))2
[ 1− τ
1− 2τ − θ
]
< 0. (2.48)
Hence under local stability, dA¯dpi∗ > 0.
Proposition 3 is essentially a comparative statics result and thus holds for only a subset of
equilibria of the debt financing problem, i.e. those that are locally stable under best response
dynamics. A locally stable equilibrium is indicated in Figure 2.1 and refers to the determination
of the interest rate on debt and the default cut-off. The relative slopes of the two curves at this
point are used in the proof of Proposition 3.
This section studies debt fragility when the monetary authority commits to a strict inflation
target. As the environment does not feature any ex post cost of inflation, the central bank could be
tempted to deviate, inflate beyond expectations and thus steal the benefits of predetermined real
money balances. Still, this policy could be sustained with a reputational mechanism that takes full
demonetization of the economy as the punishment for deviating from the inflation target. Indeed,
the welfare in the real economy is lower than the welfare in the monetary economy. We formally
discuss this class of reputational mechanisms in Section 2.5.2.
2.4.3 Monetary Discretion
Does monetary discretion insulate against debt fragility? Intuitively, a discretionary policy maker
could adjust inflation and seignorage to accommodate variations in the price of government debt
driven by strategic uncertainty and avoid default.
In a monetary discretion regime, the government has full discretionary power over both mone-
tary and fiscal policy. It designs its policy (τ(S), p˜i(S), D(S)) in every state, as a best response to
realized productivity shock A, the sunspots (s−1, s) and predetermined variables of the economy
m−1 and i. The government maximizes the welfare of home agents. This is, in effect, the same
as minimizing the cost of its policy to taxpayers, hence to old agents, since they contribute to
government’s resources via the tax on labor income and seignorage on money holding.
In an environment with discretion, money creation provides an ex post source of revenue without
creating any distortion. This low social cost of revenue ought to reduce the likelihood of default
and stabilize debt values.
But, an essential element of this environment is the interaction between expected and realized
inflation. Specifically, if agents anticipate high inflation (low p˜ie), they would reduce labor supply
in youth and their real money holdings m−1 accordingly. To collect revenue from seignorage, the
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central bank then has to deliver a higher inflation rate (low p˜i), consistent with the initial beliefs
of agents. Hence, under discretion, the capacity of the central bank to support a stressed fiscal
authority may be compromised by the strategic complementarity between expected inflation and
delivered inflation: if agents anticipate the willingness of the central bank to resort to inflation,
the real money tax base would decrease, which in turn reduces the capacity of the central bank to
intervene.
The formation of expectations by young agents reflects these ex post policy choices. Let p˜ie(S)
denote the expectation of future (inverse) inflation given the current state S. Then the requirement
of rational expectations is p˜ie(S) = ES′ |S p˜i(S
′
) where the expectation is over the future state given
S. This condition will be used in the construction of equilibria under discretion.
To characterize a SREE under discretion, we first determine the policy choices of a discretionary
policy maker, then analyze the debt pricing dimension of the equilibrium and the associated sta-
tionary inflation expectations. The SREE combines these essential elements.
Choice Problem of a Discretionary Government
Given the productivity shock A, real money holding m−1 and nominal interest rate i on debt, the
government chooses the money printing rate σ and whether to default (D = d) or raise taxes τ
and repay its debt (D = r). Under this regime, the government sets the money growth rate σD
and collects seignorage given by:
∆M
P
= νmm−1σDp˜iD, (2.49)
where m−1 is the real money holding of current old agents and p˜iD is the inverse rate of inflation
for D ∈ {r, d} induced by the choice of σD. It is given by:
p˜iD =
1
1 + σD
m
m−1
. (2.50)
Here m ≡ m(S) is the real money demand of current young agents. As seen in (2.4), the money
demand of the young is driven by current inflation expectations that are entirely independent
of the current choices of the discretionary policy maker. Further, m−1, real money held by the
current old, is predetermined when the monetary authority decides on σD. Thus (2.50) captures a
direct link from money growth to inverse inflation p˜iD. The government budget constraint under
repayment is:
(1 + i)p˜irb = A2(1− τ)τ + νmm−1σrp˜ir. (2.51)
Hence, the government solves
D ∈ {r, d} = argmax
[
max
τ,σr
W r(A, i,m−1, τ, σr, p˜ir),max
σd
W d(A, i,m−1, σd, p˜id)
]
, (2.52)
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subject to its budget constraint (2.51), a non-negativity constraint on labor tax τ ≥ 0 and the
following restriction on the realized inverse inflation rate: p˜iD ∈ [p˜i, 1]. The solution generates
a default choice as well as a tax rate τ in the event of repayment and money growth rates σD
dependent on the default decision, D = d, r. As mentioned above, the money growth rate induces
a realization of the inflation rate, hence we describe monetary policy as the choice of p˜iD(·).
Following Calvo (1978), we assume that money printing is bounded so that the effective inverse
inflation rate cannot be lower than p˜i > 0.27 Importantly, our results do not hinge upon this precise
bound, but rather lie in the strategic interaction between expected and realized inflation under
discretion.28
If the government chooses to repay the debt, the real money tax base m−1 is given. Its policy
is naturally biased toward inflation since taxing money holdings does not distort labor supply
decisions of current money holders. If this tax revenue is sufficient to cover its obligations, there
is no labor tax imposed, and, using Assumption 2, repayment is preferred over default. Else, if
seignorage does not generate enough revenue to cover its obligations, the government must impose
a labor tax if it chooses to avoid default. Under discretion, the government relies primarily on
seignorage revenue to service debt. This characterization is summarized in Lemma 3.
In the event of default, the choice of the inflation rate is welfare neutral given the specified social
welfare function: when default occurs, monetary policy is implemented via lump-sum transfers
which are purely redistributive, and consequently has no influence on the choices of the government.
We set p˜id = p˜i in the event of default so that this rate is consistent with the inflation chosen
whenever the government is indifferent between default and repayment.
The following lemma summarizes the state contingent choices of the government under discre-
tion.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 2, given S, the policy choices of the discretionary government are:
1. if the government chooses to repay its debt, then
a. p˜ir = max
{
p˜i,Π(S)}, where Π(S) = νmm(S)νmm−1+(1+i)b ,
b. τ > 0 and solves the government budget constraint (2.51) if and only if p˜ir = p˜i.
2. if the government chooses to default, then τ = 0 and p˜id = p˜i.
3. the government chooses to default if and only if
∆(·) = [A(1− γ)]
2
2
− [A(1− τ)]
2
2
− (1 + i)p˜iθb+ T (S, p˜i) > 0,
27Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998) impose a similar restriction on the highest inflation regime that the
central bank can implement. In the appendix of that paper, this restriction is rationalized by the presence of an
alternative technology such that agents can bypass the cash-in-advance constraint. In effect, the return on this
alternative technology pins down the worst sustainable equilibrium and thus p˜i. In our framework, the poor could
store at a return of r < 1 instead of holding money and a parallel argument could be made for p˜i.
28Corsetti and Dedola (2013) and Aguiar, Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath (2013) adopt an ex post cost of inflation
to limit money creation.
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where τ solves (2.51) given p˜ir = p˜i under repayment and T (·) is the lump-sum transfer that
implements p˜i under default.
Proof. If the government repays, it will first use the inflation tax to obtain revenue since this tax
is not distortionary. It will use labor taxation only if needed to repay the debt. Hence, if the real
inflation tax base is large enough to service debt, then its labor tax policy is τ = 0.
We derive first the condition under which seignorage alone is enough to service debt. From
the budget constraint (2.51), if τ = 0, then (1 + i)p˜irb = νmp˜irm−1σ implying σ =
(1+i)b
νmm−1
. Using
(2.50), we get that under repayment p˜ir = m(S)m−1
1
1+σ , where m−1 is real money held by the old
and m(S) is the level of real money demand of the current young. The resulting inverse rate of
inflation is given by Π(S) = νmm(S)(1+i)b+νmm−1 . Hence, resource from seignorage is enough to service
debt if Π(S) ≥ p˜i.
We next verify that Π(S) ≥ p˜i implies the treasury chooses to service its debt rather than
default, i.e. ∆(·) ≡W d(·)−W r(·) < 0. With τ = 0, ∆(·) is:
∆(·) = [A(1− γ)]
2
2
− A
2
2
+ νmm−1(p˜i − p˜ir)− (1 + i)p˜irθb+ T (S, p˜i). (2.53)
Here T (·) = νmm−1σdp˜i is the lump-sum transfer that implements p˜id = p˜i, with σd = m(S)p˜im−1 − 1.
Also, as seignorage is sufficient to service principal and interest on debt, (1+ i)b = σrνmm−1, with
σr = m(S)p˜irm−1 − 1. Finally, by the definition of p˜iD, νmm−1p˜iD(1 + σD) = νmm(S) for D = r, d.
Rearranging (2.53), one gets:
∆(·) = [A(1− γ)]
2
2
− A
2
2
− νmm−1p˜irσr(θ − 1)
=
[A(1− γ)]2
2
− A
2
2
− νmm(S) σ
r
1 + σr
(θ − 1). (2.54)
This is negative by Assumption 2 as long as m(S)σ
r
1+σr (1 − θ) < 1. With θ ≤ 1 and σ ≥ 0 under
both optimism and pessimism, p˜i ≤ 1 so that m(S)= p˜ie(S) ≤ 1. Hence m(S)σ1+σ (1− θ) < 1. We get
∆(·) < 0, i.e. when seignorage is enough to service principal and interest, the government chooses
not to default.
If resource from seignorage is not enough to service principal and interest on debt, then positive
labor taxes are implemented: τ > 0 if and only if p˜i > Π(S). In this case, default is possible. Using
these elements together with (2.14) and (2.15), one gets the expression for ∆(·) stated in the
Lemma.
Equation (2.54) highlights an interesting aspect of redistribution in this economy. If all debt
is held internally, θ = 1, the default decision in this monetary economy is independent of the rate
of money creation. This reflects the fact that the inflation tax is not distortionary and simply
redistributes between rich and poor, both of whom are risk neutral. In this case, ∆ < 0 and
there is surely no default. But if θ < 1, then the inflation tax borne by the poor old agents is
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redistributed to the foreign holders of the debt, which is welfare reducing. Still, as argued in the
proof, default does not occur if the debt obligation can be financed entirely by seignorage.
Price of Government Debt
Building on this characterization, we next investigate whether debt fragility remains under mon-
etary discretion. First, we show that the multiplicity of interest rates consistent with the no-
arbitrage condition (2.9) persists and interacts with inflation expectations.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, under monetary discretion, there are multiple interest
rates that solve the no-arbitrage condition (2.9).
Proof. Consider the debt pricing building block of the equilibrium. We show that there are several
possible outcomes, and consistent with our equilibrium definition, these different outcomes are
driven by the realization of the sunspot s−1. Using Assumption 3 and Lemma 3, there is a risk-
free equilibrium of the debt financing problem, with inflation expectations p˜ie(so) ≥ p˜i.29 This may
arise with τ = 0 and p˜ie(so) ≥ p˜i or, from Lemma 3, with τ > 0 and p˜ie(so) = p˜i.
Suppose investors believe the government will default on its debt with positive probability. If
the belief is self-fulfilling, then the optimal policy of the government must be to set the inflation
level to p˜i for all A whether it reimburses its debt or defaults. Otherwise, resources from seignorage
would be enough to cover principal and interest on debt for all realization of A, and default would
be avoided. Hence, inflation expectations of agents are consistent with the best response of the
government at p˜ie(sp) = p˜i. The no-arbitrage condition pricing public debt becomes:
(1 + i)p˜i
(
1− F (A¯(i))) = R, (2.55)
where A¯(i), defined in Lemma 1, is the boundary of the default region given i.
From Lemma 2, we know that there are at least two interest rates i that are consistent with this
equilibrium condition, one of which carries a risk-premium and induces the government to default
for some realizations of A. Hence the initial pessimistic beliefs are self-fulfilling and support the
existence of an interest rate that carries a positive probability of default.
The key is that inflation expectations and probability of default are jointly linked by the
anticipation of the best response of the discretionary government. In particular, the interest rate
with a risk-premium that solves the no-arbitrage condition is systematically associated with the
lowest real money tax base m = p˜ie(sp) = p˜i, which in turn prevents the central bank from inflating
away the real value of debt.
29In general p˜ie(S) denotes expected (inverse) inflation. The notation p˜ie(s) highlights the dependence of expec-
tations on the sunspot, s. This is the expectation held by young agents regarding the future value of p˜i. This value
determines the labor supply and real money demand of young poor agents. It also influences the nominal interest
rate, see (2.9).
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Inflation Expectations
We now turn to the third component of the equilibrium: the determinants of inflation expectations
p˜ie(s). This section establishes two results. First, there exist inflation expectations, contingent on
the sunspot realization, that are consistent with the choices of the government. Second, there may
be multiple such levels of inflationary expectations. This last point arises from the complementar-
ities between monetary expectations and policy response.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 4, in the event of pessimism, young agents expect high
inflation, i.e. p˜ie(sp) = p˜i. That is, whenever the equilibrium of the debt financing problem induces
state-contingent default, the inflation rate is maximal. So, regardless of the current state S, given
pessimism in the previous period, s−1 = sp, the inverse inflation rate is p˜i(S) = p˜i. This is then
consistent with the initial expectations of the current old, formed when they were young in the
previous period, i.e. p˜ie(sp) = p˜i.
The issues of existence and multiplicity of inflation expectations arise when s−1 = so. From
Lemma 4, young agents anticipate the government will service its debt obligation for all S. The
question is then how the government will repay its obligation. Given the bias toward inflationary
financing of debt, what determines p˜ie(so) is whether seignorage resource is enough to service
principal and interest on debt for all (A, s). If the debt is not too large, then the inflation tax alone
is sufficient to cover debt obligations: i.e. p˜ir(A, s, ·) > p˜i for all (A, s) and p˜ie(so) > p˜i. In this case,
τ(A, s) = 0 for all (A, s). Else, the inflation tax will be maximal, p˜ie(so) = p˜i, and supplemented
by a labor tax. In both cases D(A, s, ) = r for all (A, s).
Formally, Lemma 3 established that with s−1 = so, given the real money tax base νmm−1 =
νmp˜ie(so), the inflation delivered by the discretionary government satisfies:
p˜ir(A, s, ·) = max
{ νmp˜ie(s)
νmp˜ie(so) + (1 + i)b
; p˜i
}
∀A ∀s ∈ {so, sp}, (2.56)
where the max operator captures whether seignorage resource is enough to service principal and
interest on debt, and p˜ie(s) = m(S) is the real money demand of current young agents, conditional
on the realization of the current sunspot s. The no-arbitrage condition gives: (1 + i)p˜ie(so) = R.
Accordingly, p˜ie(so) ≥ p˜i can be part of a stationary equilibrium if and only if it satisfies:
p˜ie(so) = pmax
{ νmp˜ie(so)
νmp˜ie(so) + Rp˜ie(so)b
; p˜i
}
+ (1− p) max
{ νmp˜ie(sp)
νmp˜ie(so) + Rp˜ie(so)b
; p˜i
}
, (2.57)
where p is the stationary probability of optimism.
The following lemma establishes the existence of stationary inflation expectations under opti-
mism that are consistent with the policy choices of the government for all b ∈ (0, b¯).
Lemma 5. Given Assumptions 2 and 3, under monetary discretion, there is a debt threshold
bˆ = ν
mp˜i(1−p˜i)
R such that:
1. If 0 < b < bˆ, then p˜ie(so) > p˜i is consistent with the government choice p˜ir(A, s, ·) > p˜i, for all
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(A, s).
2. If bˆ ≤ b < b¯, then p˜ie(so) = p˜i is consistent with the government choice p˜ir(A, s, ·) = p˜i, for all
(A, s).
Proof. Computation details are provided in Appendix 2.7.2.
In the first case, the level of debt and inflation expectations are such that seignorage is suffi-
cient to service debt for any realization of s. In the second case, the level of debt and inflation
expectations are such that seignorage is not sufficient to service debt, and must be complemented
with labor taxes for any realization of s.30
In fact, for some debt level b ≥ bˆ, p˜ie(so) can take several values. This is due to the interactions
between expected inflation and delivered inflation, present in (2.57). It can give rise to a seignorage
Laffer curve, where several rates of inflation in excess of p˜i generate the same real resource.31
In addition, there is another possible outcome with maximum inflation, i.e. p˜ie(so) = p˜i, and
positive labor taxes. These elements are summarized in Figure 2.2. To be clear, this multiplicity
is an outgrowth of allowing an endogenous money demand through the overlapping generations
structure.
Lemma 5 establishes the existence of p˜ie(so) for all b < b¯, but does not describe all the possible
regimes. Indeed, as explained in the proof of Lemma 4, the inflation regime under optimism does
not influence the existence of multiple valuations of debt. Hence, without loss of generality, we
select in Lemma 5 an inflation regime for b ≥ bˆ, marked in blue in Figure 2.2.
Equilibrium characterization
The analysis has established the government budget constraint under discretion, the potential
for multiple solutions to the debt valuation equation and the existence of inflation expectations
consistent with monetary policy. Taken together, these elements create the basis for sunspot
equilibria associated with the valuation of government debt. Formally,
Proposition 4. For any p˜i > 0, under Assumptions 2 and 3, there is a SREE under discretion
with the following properties:
1. If s−1 = so, government debt is risk free as the treasury reimburses with probability 1, with
either:
a. if 0 < b < bˆ, then p˜ie(so) > p˜i and for all A all s, p˜i(A, s, ·) > p˜i, τ(A, s, ·) = 0,
D(A, s, ·) = r,
30We do not impose further parametric restriction to ensure that bˆ < b¯, where b¯ is defined by Assumption 3. This
requires the lower bound on productivity Al or the cost of default γ to be high enough or the share of money holder
νm to be low enough. If it were the case that bˆ ≥ b¯, then only case 1 of Lemma 5 would apply, our results would
not be affected.
31This is the standard textbook Laffer curve, as in Theorem 26.2 of Azariadis (1993), and discussed in Appendix
2.7.2.
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Figure 2.2: Multiplicity of Inflation Regime under Optimism
b
p˜ie(so)
bˆ
p˜i
F
F
•
The figure illustrates the possibility of multiple stationary inflation expectations compatible with the policy of the
government. For b ≥ bˆ, several outcomes are possible: the ones marked F correspond to the seignorage Laffer curve,
where several rates of inflation are consistent with the repayment of debt, with no labor taxes. In addition, the
outcome labelled • can arise: agents reduce their real money demand to p˜i, which in turn induces the discretionary
government to generate p˜i and complement seignorage resource with positive labor taxes to service debt. The
inflation regime under optimism selected in this analysis are indicated in blue.
b. if bˆ ≤ b < b¯, then p˜ie(so) = p˜i and for all A all s, p˜i(A, s, ·) = p˜i, τ(A, s, ·) > 0,
D(A, s, ·) = r.
2. If s−1 = sp, the interest rate incorporates a risk-premium. For all A, p˜i(A, ·) = p˜i. The
treasury defaults on its debt for all A < A¯ where A¯ ∈ (Al, Ah) and p˜ie(sp) = p˜i.
Proof. We describe the optimal behavior of agents consistent with the equilibrium definition. This
proof builds on Lemma 4 and the existence of several interest rates (and associated inflation
expectations) consistent with the equilibrium definition.
If s−1 = so, then by Assumption 3, debt is risk free. Two cases need to be distinguished,
as established in Lemma 5. If b < bˆ, then inflation expectations under optimism p˜ie(so) allow
seignorage resource to be sufficient to service principal and interest on debt. Young agents form
expectations of no default and p˜ie(so) > p˜i. They supply labor accordingly, young agents with low
productivity save with money, young rich agents save via intermediated claims; the interest rate
i on the government security satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (2.9) with a zero probability of
default, i.e. P d = 0, and p˜ie(so). The optimal policy of the government is then to set for all A, all
s, p˜i(A, s, ·) > p˜i, τ(A, s, ·) = 0 and repay the debt.
On the other hand, if bˆ ≤ b < b¯, then there is an equilibrium with p˜ie(so) = p˜i, seignorage
resource is not sufficient and taxes need be raised to service debt. Using Lemma 3 and Assumption
3, for all A, all s, p˜i(A, s, ·) = p˜i, τ(A, s, ·) solves the government budget constraint (2.51) and
debt is repaid. Accordingly, young agents form expectations P d = 0, p˜ie(so) = p˜i, the government
security is priced according to (2.9). In both cases, all markets clear.
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For s−1 = sp, we detail only the differences with the previous case. Independently of the level
of b, young agents form rational expectations in which there is a positive probability of default, i.e.
P d > 0, and p˜ie(sp) = p˜i. The government security is priced accordingly. Given i and seignorage
revenue νmp˜i(1− p˜i), there is a unique threshold A¯(i) > Al such that the optimal policy is to raise
labor taxes τ for all A ≥ A¯(i) so as to satisfy the budget constraint (2.51) and default otherwise.
Finally, expectations are consistent with the best response of the government: P d = F (A¯(i)).
Does monetary discretion provide a shield against debt fragility? Can the government inflate
the real value of debt and generate additional resources to service its debt? The answer is negative.
As the proposition makes clear, this result does not hinge upon a particular inflation ceiling p˜i.32
Indeed, when pessimism hits the economy, the interplay between inflation expectations and real
money tax base corners the central bank into a high inflation regime with no more capacity to
inflate debt or provide additional resources to the treasury. Hence, under monetary discretion,
the sunspot shock to investors confidence triggers a joint shift in inflation expectations and debt
sustainability. This shift in inflation expectations is the driving force that neutralizes the strategy
of the discretionary government to print money and collect seignorage to service its debt.
Finally, the strategic complementarity between expected and delivered inflation may give rise to
inflation multiplicity, as discussed in sub-section 2.4.3. This element is not explicit in Proposition
4. The point of the proposition, and of this paper, is to study the interaction of debt fragility and
monetary policy. Accordingly, the analysis in Proposition 4 rests on the selection of a particular
equilibrium in the event of optimism, i.e. s−1 = so. The equilibrium selection is orthogonal to the
multiple solutions of the debt pricing equation, as argued before. Of course, it is possible to add
another, independent, dimension to the problem by introducing strategic uncertainty over the the
inflation rate, given optimism.
2.5 Leaning Against the Winds
These results make clear that the monetary authority may be unable to prevent debt fragility. If
there is a commitment to an unconditional inflation target, the environment is similar to a real
economy, thus exposing the debt to multiple valuations. If the monetary authority has complete
discretion, then it will use the inflation tax to raise revenue ex post and again fiscal tools may
be needed to finance debt repayments. In both cases, when productivity is low, the tax burden
can become excessive leading to default. In equilibrium, the valuation of debt will be subject to
investor sentiments in a sunspot equilibrium.
This section considers a more nuanced monetary intervention which is accommodative during
periods of low productivity. We show that with commitment, this intervention eliminates debt
fragility. Further, we provide conditions such that reputation effects are strong enough to support
this outcome without commitment.
32Specifically, it holds for p˜i arbitrarily close to 0, i.e. an inflation ceiling arbitrarily high.
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2.5.1 Stabilization through Commitment
This section returns to the commitment case. Instead of imposing an inflation target, we allow
the central bank to choose a state-contingent inflation policy that alters the real debt burden
and distributes resources from seignorage across states. As in Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum
(1998) this is a one period commitment, allowing the monetary authority to commit to inflation
next period, contingent on the current state. By carefully choosing the distribution of realized
future inflation, the central bank can provide a shield against debt fragility.
Suppose the monetary authority commits to a rule given by p˜i(A, i, s−1): the rate of inflation in
the current period depends on current productivity, the interest rate on outstanding debt as well as
the sunspot realization from previous period.33 This rule is devised with a couple of key properties.
First, to induce agents to hold money, the rule will deliver a target rate of inflation. Second, it will
support the fundamental equilibrium by using monetary tools to counter pessimistic expectations
so that equilibria with strategic uncertainty no longer exist.34 In this way, the monetary authority
responds to variations in current beliefs, reflected in the sunspot and the interest rate, by appro-
priately setting policy for the future. Importantly, if investors were pessimistic in the previous
period, this policy responds to variations in productivity: the rate of inflation is inversely related
to current productivity. Specifically, when A is high, the rate of inflation is relatively low and fiscal
policy, through the setting of tax rates, bears more of the burden of financing debt obligations.
But during times of low productivity, when default is likely, the monetary authority inflates the
real value of debt and generates seignorage revenue. Both effects allow the fiscal authority to set
low taxes and avoid default.
We first describe the desired properties of this policy, derive its existence and properties in
Lemma 6. Then, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of the economy under p˜i(A, i, s−1) and
argue that such monetary policy rule stabilizes debt valuations.35
Specifically, suppose the central bank commits to a rule in which p˜i(A, i, so) = p˜i∗ for all (A, i):
under optimism, there is an inflation target as in monetary delegation. Delivered inflation p˜i∗ is
independent of both current productivity A and the interest rate on debt. When s−1 = sp, the
central bank implements a state dependent (on (A, i)) monetary policy, labelled ‘law’, for leaning
against the winds. This policy satisfies two key properties.
First, given pessimism the policy rule anchors inflation expectations: p˜i(A, i, sp) meets the
inflation target on average: ∫
A
p˜i(A, i, sp)dF (A) = p˜i∗, (2.58)
33This commitment is independent of other elements of the state vector.
34To be clear, the policy is designed to eliminate equilibria with state contingent default. The equilibrium with
certain default remains.
35As written, the intervention depends on (A, i, s−1). In the equilibrium constructed below, optimism is equivalent
to an interest rate satisfying (1 + i)p˜i∗ = R. Hence there is only one interest rate conditional on optimism. If there
is pessimism, we condition monetary policy on the interest rate on the outstanding debt in order to specify the
monetary intervention both on and off the equilibrium path. An alternative would write the equilibrium conditions
solely as a function of the interest rate, not the sunspots. This is used in the discussion of policy implementation.
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for all i. Combined with the policy under optimism, p˜i(A, i, so) = p˜i∗, unconditional inflation
expectations are anchored at p˜i∗. Thus, the real money tax base is invariant and resources from
seignorage are given by:
∆M
P
= νmp˜i∗
(
1− p˜i(A, i, sp)). (2.59)
The government budget constraint under repayment becomes:
(1 + i)p˜i(A, i, sp)b = A2(1− τ)τ + νmp˜i∗(1− p˜i(A, i, sp)). (2.60)
Second, p˜i(A, i, sp) deters state contingent default: given A and i, the treasury either reimburses
its debt with probability 0 or 1. For low values of debt obligations, the fiscal authority will choose to
repay its debt, for all A. For high values of these obligations, the fiscal authority will default, again
for all A. Of course, the size of the debt obligations are determined in equilibrium, based upon
investor beliefs and central bank policy. Formally, Lemma 6 establishes that there is a monetary
policy rule ’law’ that satisfies these two properties.
Lemma 6. Given an inflation target 0 < p˜i∗ ≤ 1, there is a monetary policy rule p˜i(A, i, sp) that
satisfies the inflation target and deters state contingent default. Moreover, p˜i(A, i, sp) > 0 for all
(A, i) and is increasing in A.
Proof. We derive a state-contingent monetary policy rule p˜i(A, i, sp) that satisfies (2.58) and deters
state contingent default. Consider the case θ = 0, where all debt is held abroad, and νm ≈ 0, which
makes seignorage a negligible source of income for the fiscal authority. This simplified framework
outlines clearly that the capacity of the central bank to influence the default decision of the treasury
does not primarily rely on providing more or less resources, but rather on its capacity to alter the
real return to debt across states. The proof is extended to the general case θ ≥ 0 and νm ≥ 0 in
Appendix 2.7.3.
Given s−1 = sp, we focus on the dependence of inflation on the interest rate on outstanding
debt and the realization of the technological shock A. Consider a state contingent rule p˜i(A, i, sp),
denoted p˜ipA in the following analysis. This rule induces a unique interest rate cut-off i
δ such that
if i < iδ then the fiscal authority is induced to repay its debt for all A, i.e. with probability 1. If
i > iδ, then the fiscal authority defaults for all A, i.e. with probability 1. For i = iδ, the fiscal
authority is indifferent between repayment and default for all A. This condition for indifference is:
∆(A, iδ,m−1, τ, p˜i
p
A) = W
d(·)−W r(·) = 0 ∀A, (2.61)
where m−1 = p˜i∗ using the inflation target condition (2.58), p˜i
p
A is defined below and τ satisfies the
government budget constraint (2.60) given (A, iδ, p˜ipA):
(1 + iδ)p˜ipAb = A
2(1− τ)τ. (2.62)
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Using θ = 0 and νm ≈ 0, (2.61) implies τ = γ for all A. From the government budget constraint:
p˜ipA =
A2(1− γ)γ
(1 + iδ)b
∀A. (2.63)
Applying the inflation target requirement (2.58), the nominal interest rate cut-off iδ is:
1 + iδ =
(1− γ)γ
pi∗b
∫
A
A2dF (A), (2.64)
which gives:
p˜ipA =
A2pi∗∫
A
A2dF (A)
. (2.65)
We verify that this monetary rule deters state contingent default:
d∆(A, i,m, τ, p˜ipA)
di
= A2(1− τ)dτ
di
, (2.66)
where dτdi =
p˜ipAb
A2(1−2τ) > 0 from (2.62). As ∆(A, i
δ, p˜i∗, τ, p˜ipA) = 0 for all A, we get that for all A
and all i < iδ, ∆(·) < 0 and for all i > iδ, ∆(·) > 0. Hence there is no nominal interest rate i > 0
that induces the fiscal authority to default on its debt in a state-contingent manner. Finally, from
(2.65), we get p˜ipA > 0 and
dp˜ipA
dA > 0.
The lemma establishes two critical properties of ‘law’ - p˜i(A, i, sp). First, for all A, p˜i(A, i, sp) >
0, which rules out any issue of demonetization of the economy and state-contingent complete
default via inflation. Second, the policy rule is countercyclical: p˜i(A, i, sp) is increasing in A, i.e.
the lower the technology realization, the higher is inflation. Accordingly, the real return to debt
is state contingent and increasing in A.36 Also, this policy distributes resource from seignorage
across states, with high seignorage revenue νmp˜i∗(1− p˜ipA) for low realizations of A. Hence, even if
seignorage revenue is not essential to rule out equilibria with default, the policy further contributes
to lower the fiscal burden in states where fiscal needs are the highest, i.e. the induced fiscal policy
is also countercyclical.37
When the central bank commits to p˜i(A, i, s−1), there is a unique price for debt, namely the
fundamental price under inflation targeting. That is, there is no sunspot equilibrium affecting the
valuation of debt. Formally,
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 2, 3, when the monetary authority commits to p˜i(A, i, s−1),
with p˜i(A, i, sp) given in Lemma 6, debt is uniquely valued and risk-free. Debt fragility is eliminated.
Proof. Under Assumption 3, there is a risk-free outcome under strict inflation target 0 < p˜i∗ ≤ 1.
Hence, there is an equilibrium nominal interest rate i under optimism that satisfies (1 + i)p˜i∗ = R.
36The central bank uses its unique capacity to generate state-contingent inflation to turn a non-state contingent
nominal bond into a state contingent real asset.
37In fact, the proof in the text focuses on the case of νm near zero, where seignorage resource is negligeable.
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Now under pessimism, the monetary authority commits to p˜i(A, i, sp) as defined in Lemma 6. As
seen in the proof of this lemma, this rule delivers inflation as a function of the technological shock
A. It is noted {p˜ipA} in the following developments. We verify that under this rule, the best response
of the treasury is to repay its debt for all A and that the equilibrium interest rate is i.
A central property of {p˜ipA} is that it delivers the inflation target on average. By continuity and
monotonicity of p˜ipA in A, there is a realization A˜ such that p˜i
p
A˜
= p˜i∗. In this case, the best-response
of the fiscal authority is to raise taxes and repay its debt. Second, {p˜ipA} is such that if the fiscal
authority repays its debt with positive probability, it repays its debt with probability 1. Hence,
under {p˜ipA}, the fiscal authority repays its debt for all A: debt is risk-free. Finally, the no-arbitrage
condition under inflation target p˜i∗ uniquely pins down the nominal interest rate. Hence, under
{p˜ipA}, the nominal interest rate is i:
(1 + i)
∫
A
p˜ipAdF (A) = (1 + i)p˜i
∗ = R. (2.67)
This proposition makes clear that the commitment of the central bank rules out the effect of
pessimism on the value of debt. The key to this result is the relaxation of the incentive to default
by the fiscal authority through the erosion of the real return to debt in low productivity states.
Figure 2.3 displays the equilibrium monetary policy rule and the induced tax policy, as described
in Proposition 5.38 In the case s−1 = sp, note the distribution of inflation over realization of A:
for low A, high inflation, i.e. low real value of debt and high seignorage revenue. Hence, in case
of pessimism, the monetary authority implements a countercylical policy that stabilizes the price
of debt and provides fiscal relief for low values of A, compensated by lower inflation for higher
realizations of A. A critical element of this policy is the commitment of the central bank so that
inflation expectations are anchored and the real money tax base is not sensitive to variations in
private agents sentiments. It illustrates how the central bank can alter the real value of debt, and
incidentally distribute income from seignorage, so as to contain the fiscal pressure that weights on
the fiscal authority. In this sense, the monetary authority leans against the winds of pessimism as
well as those associated with low productivity.
As written, the monetary intervention depends jointly on the sunspot from the previous period
as well as the interest on outstanding debt. Along the equilibrium path, from Proposition 5, only
the fundamental price of debt will be observed. Though extraneous uncertainty may still exist, it
will not be reflected in the equilibrium interest rates. With this in mind, it may be more natural
to condition monetary interventions on interest rates so that along the equilibrium path, no actual
intervention is needed. But, the monetary authority stands ready to intervene in response to higher
interest rates that reflect investor pessimism. This is, in effect, a threat of the monetary authority
off the equilibrium path to intervene either to support the fiscal authority or, if interest rates are
too high, to allow default with probability one.
38The dependence on i is not explicit as these are the policy functions along the equilibrium path.
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Figure 2.3: State Dependent Monetary and Fiscal Policy
A
p˜i(A, s−1)
p˜i(A, s0)p˜i∗
p˜i(A, sp)
(a) Monetary Policy
A
τ(A, s−1)
τ(A, sp)
τ(A, so)
γ
(b) Fiscal Policy
The left panel represents the state dependent monetary policy to which the central bank commits. The right panel
represents the induced fiscal policy. The dependence of the policies on the sunspot and realized productivity are
displayed.
Formally, in this case, the monetary authority commits to the following policy, labelled ’wit’,
for ’whatever it takes’ :
if i = i, then ’dlg’ : ∀A p˜i(A, i) = p˜i∗
if i > i, then ’law’ : ∀A p˜i(A, i) = p˜ipA
(2.68)
With this implementation, the central bank commits to a strategy conditional on the nominal
interest rate and ensures that private investors coordinate on the fundamental price of debt i. In
equilibrium, only the fundamental price of debt is observed and the central bank implements its
unconditional inflation target. This approach is reminiscent of the analysis in Bassetto (2005).
Indeed, committing to this specific strategy rather than to a policy rule allows the monetary
authority to react to deviations from private agents and ensures a unique equilibrium outcome.39
Under this rule, given an inflation target p˜i∗, debt fragility is eliminated and the expected
life-time welfare of private agents is given by:
V wit(p˜i∗) =
∫ Ah
Al
W r(A, i)dF (A)−
∑
j∈{m,I}
νj
(njy)
2
2
≥ V dlg(p˜i∗, p), (2.69)
The inequality is strict whenever the probability of optimism p is lower than 1.
39In other words, committing to a strategy allows the monetary authority a second mover-advantage while an-
choring expectations in this dynamic game.
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2.5.2 Stabilization without Commitment
The preceding analysis assumes that the monetary authority is granted the capacity to commit to
policies and argues that this power can eliminate multiplicity. This section replaces the assumption
of commitment with an equilibrium response to deviations from ’wit’ that can, in principle, support
this policy without commitment. The argument uses a version of the grim trigger strategy in
repeated games, as in Rubinstein (1979). We focus on certain features of the economy, such as the
presence of strategic uncertainty, that make deviations from policy ’wit’ costly and thus support
the elimination of debt fragility as an outcome without commitment.
The monetary authority has an incentive to deviate from its committed policy to take advan-
tage of the non-distortionary nature of the inflation tax. To counter this gain, we construct an
equilibrium in which any deviations from ’wit’ are met by a strict application of ’dlg ’, the mon-
etary delegation regime of strict inflation targeting. From Section 2.4.2, this generates lifetime
welfare for each generation of V dlg(p˜i∗, p), given by (2.43), and which depends positively on p, the
probability of optimism.
The construction, formalized in Proposition 6, goes as follows. Along the equilibrium path the
monetary authority follows ’wit’ described in (2.68). This generates lifetime welfare of V wit(p˜i∗). In
a given state, the central bank can deviate and consider any policy whatsoever: this is modeled as
complete discretion for a single period, which is the most profitable deviation. After that deviation,
the ’whatever it takes’ type intervention is no longer credible. The monetary authority returns to
its essential mandate of a targeted inflation rate p˜i∗, labelled ’delegation’.
As in Lemma 6, assume θ = 0 for this presentation. We derive two expressions for the welfare of
old agents under the two outcomes of following the ’wit’ policy (2.68) or operating under discretion
’disc’, Wwit(·) and W disc(·) respectively. First consider the policy to be supported.
Wwit(A, i,m−1) =
W
dlg(A, i,m−1) =
[
A(1−τdlg)
]2
2 + ν
mm−1p˜idlg + νIR(Rz2 − Γ), if i = i
W law(A, i,m−1) =
[
A(1−τ law)
]2
2 + ν
mm−1p˜ilaw + νIR(Rz2 − Γ), if i > i
(2.70)
Under ’delegation’, the central bank implements its strict inflation target p˜idlg = p˜i∗. Whenever
the nominal interest rate is above its fundamental value, the central bank implements p˜ilaw = p˜ipA,
as defined in Lemma 6.40 The associated tax rates solve the government budget constraint (2.12)
given the monetary intervention. Recall that ’wit’ describes policy as long as i ∈ [i, iδ]. If the
interest rate on debt exceeds iδ the monetary authority cannot prevent a certain default.41 Thus
we explore credibility only for i ∈ [i, iδ].
40For the clarity of the exposition in this section, we assume that p˜i is low enough so that the feasibility of ’law’
is not an issue, i.e. p˜ipAl
> p˜i. Further, we assume that b is high enough, i.e. b > νmp˜i∗. None of the results depend
crucially on these elements.
41Again, the market shutdown case is of no interest for the present analysis.
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Now consider the potential deviation. Under discretion, given individual real money holding
m−1, the welfare of old agents is given by:
W disc(A, i,m−1) =
[
A(1− τdisc)]2
2
+ νmm−1p˜idisc + νIR(Rz2 − Γ), (2.71)
W disc(A, i,m−1) is the welfare of the old agents when the tax rate and inverse inflation rates,
(τdisc, p˜idisc) are determined under discretion, as in Proposition 4. In this case, the optimal mone-
tary policy is to rely on the inflation tax: p˜idisc = p˜i. The base for this tax, i.e. the money holdings
of the old agents, will be determined by the inflationary expectations they held in the prior period.
The incentive for maintaining policy ’wit’ is characterized by the following difference in agents’
welfare:
∆(A, i,m−1, p) = [Wwit(A, i,m−1)−W disc(A, i,m−1)] + β
1− β [V
wit(p˜i∗)− V dlg(p˜i∗, p)]. (2.72)
Here Wwit(A, i,m−1)−W disc(A, i,m−1) is the immediate gain to old agents from deviating to
full discretion from ’wit’. This is clearly a gain since the non-distortionary inflation tax is desirable
ex post, particularly when agents are holding large money balances.
The punishment arises from the second term, β1−β
[
V wit(p˜i∗)− V dlg(p˜i∗, p)
]
, where β ∈ (0, 1] is
the rate at which the monetary authority discounts successive generations.42 Here the punishment
for deviating from policy ’wit’ is the continuing operation of the monetary authority under the
strict inflation target regime. The idea here is that, like the ECB, the policy ’wit’ is built upon
a basic commitment to an inflation target.43 As constructed, that inflation target is met on
average by the policy and along the equilibrium path. If policy ’wit’ is not maintained, then the
experiment with that form of intervention is over and the monetary authority returns to its essential
goal of strict inflation target. In fact, resorting to the inflation target is a punishment precisely
because of the possibility of self-fulfilling debt crisis. Indeed, since V wit(p˜i∗) = V dlg(p˜i∗, 1), we have
V wit(p˜i∗) > V dlg(p˜i∗, p) for p < 1.
We evaluate the credibility of the policy ’wit’ whenever the capacity of the institution to
anchor inflation expectations is not challenged. Accordingly, along the deviations considered,
m−1 = p˜i∗. If ∆(A, i, p˜i∗, p) ≥ 0, then policy ’wit’ is incentive compatible in state (A, i, p). Using
this construction, the ’wit’ policy can be supported in an equilibrium without commitment if the
costs of deviating from it are sufficiently high. Formally,
Proposition 6. If the probability of pessimism is sufficiently high and β close enough to unity,
then the monetary authority will pursue the ’wit’ policy in all states, i.e. ∆(A, i, p˜i∗, p) ≥ 0 for all
A and i ∈ [i, iδ]. Debt fragility is eliminated.
Proof. Clearly Wwit(A, i, p˜i∗)−W disc(A, i, p˜i∗) ≤ 0 since the monetary authority operating under
42This welfare criterion is not inconsistent with the one derived for the repayment vs. default decision on debt.
As discussed in 2.2.2, this decision has welfare consequences that are contained within a generation.
43The deviation from ’wit’ to ’disc’ could be replaced by a deviation to the inflation target. This would generate
a smaller short term gain, making it easier to support ’wit’.
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discretion could replicate policy ’wit’. In fact from Proposition 4, it will choose p˜i = p˜i. This
inflation rate is higher than that under policy ’wit’ for any (A, i). Higher inflation relaxes the debt
burden left to be serviced with distortionary taxation and unambiguously increases welfare. Also
note that by construction ’wit’ deters state-contingent default. A fortiori, no default is possible
under discretion.
As V dlg(p˜i∗, p) is increasing in p, ∆(A, i, p˜i∗, p) is decreasing in p. So for low enough p, V wit(p˜i∗)−
V dlg(p˜i∗, p) can be large. Further, for β close to unity, β1−β [V
wit(p˜i∗)−V dlg(p˜i∗, p)] can be arbitrarily
large. Hence for p sufficiently small and β close enough to unity, ∆(A, i, p˜i∗, p) > 0 for all A.
This proposition nests two types of deviations from the equilibrium path. First, suppose in-
vestors in period t − 1 believe in policy ’wit’, charge the fundamental interest rate i and expect
the unconditional inflation target p˜i∗ in all states. Still in period t the monetary authority oper-
ating under ’wit’ can choose to deviate and resort to discretion. The gain from this is the use of
the non-distortionary inflation tax, which is the highest for A = Al. The cost is that ’whatever
it takes’ is no longer credible. But the foundation of the monetary authority as following strict
inflation targeting, i.e. delegation, is not altered. If the conditions of Proposition 6 are satisfied,
the monetary authority does not deviate along the equilibrium path.
Providing incentives for the monetary authority along the equilibrium path is necessary but
not sufficient for ’whatever it takes’ to be incentive compatible. Consider a deviation by investors
in which they believe there is a positive probability of default implying i > i. We maintain the
integrity of the monetary authority and thus anchor inflationary expectations at p˜i∗.44 In this
case, ’wit’ prescribes to implement {p˜ipA} as described in Lemma 6. In this case, the incentive
compatibility constraint will be binding in all states if it binds when A = Ah. Indeed, to deliver
the inflation target on average, the central bank tightens monetary policy whenever the realization
of technology is high. Still, if the conditions for Proposition 6 hold, the monetary authority will
have an incentive to intervene to preserve its reputation and follow policy ’wit ’. In this case, the
pessimism of the investors is not warranted, whatever the realization of A.
The conditions for supporting policy ’wit’ have two components. This first is the usual condition
that the monetary authority does not discount the future too heavily. The second is not standard
and involves the strategic uncertainty of the model. A gain from policy ’wit’ is the elimination of
debt crisis that do arise with probability (1 − p) under the strict inflation target regime. As this
probability of pessimism gets larger, the penalty associated with sticking to the inflation target
regime is larger. Accordingly, the higher the risk of coordination failure under inflation targeting,
the more credible it is for the central bank to promise to undertake ’whatever it takes’ to counter
pessimistic beliefs.
Finally, note that here we are not considering a deviation in which investors no longer trust the
monetary authority to meet the inflation target on average. Otherwise, investors may hold arbitrary
expectations about future inflation, which would influence the gain from discretion relative to ’wit’.
44As discussed earlier, policy ’wit’ applies only for interest rates below a level denoted iδ. For pessimism sufficiently
high so that i > iδ, ’wit’ prescribes default with probability one. In that situation, there is no credibility to evaluate.
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As argued in Section 2.4.2, the foundation for the credibility of the strict inflation target regime
could be supported with the threat of demonetization of the economy.
2.6 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to determine whether monetary policy enhances or mitigates fiscal
fragility. Cast as a real economy, the basic environment has fragile debt: there are multiple
valuations of government debt depending on the beliefs of investors.
The effects of introducing monetary interventions depends on the commitment of the central
bank. If the central bank is committed to an inflation target, then debt fragility remains. If the
central bank is allowed full discretion, then the presence of an inelastic source of finance through
seignorage is internalized by private agents. Any temptation to inflate the real value of debt is
anticipated and debt fragility remains.
Finally, we analyze how a committed central bank can deter debt fragility, by designing a
specific monetary policy rule. We devise a state contingent intervention that eliminates pessimistic
evaluations of government debt. The policy requires the monetary authority to implement a
countercyclical policy, that erodes the real value of debt and provides resources, through seignorage,
in times of low productivity and thus low revenue. By supporting the fiscal authorities in these
states, the incentive for default is eliminated. Sovereign debt is no longer subject to multiple
valuations driven by investors’ sentiments. Interestingly, the credibility of this monetary strategy
increases with the risk of self-fulfilling debt crisis.
A number of extensions are worth consideration. First, the paper studies the extremes of
commitment and discretion. An interesting middle case would be stochastic commitment. A
government acting in period t would be allowed to adjust its policy in period t+1 with a probability
less than one. This partial commitment would create a cost of high inflation and thus enrich the
analysis.
Second, the model is dynamic but the fiscal policy is within a generation. Thus we have assumed
away the possibilities of debt turnover and intertemporal punishments for default.
Third, our analysis has underlined that the capacity of the central bank to stabilize debt
valuations rely on the issuance of non contingent nominal assets labelled in domestic currency. It
does not apply to real, indexed debt or debt issued in foreign currency. Allowing governments this
choice would be of interest.
Finally, as in many other studies, the outcome with discretion imposes an upper bound on
inflation. Providing further micro foundations for this bound remains an open area. Perhaps a
political economy model that stresses the redistribution aspects of labor income vs inflation tax
would be a productive approach.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Welfare under Repayment and under Default
As explained in section (2.2.2), the repayment vs. default decision in this environment is a discrete
choice that affects only the welfare of old agents. Hence, the welfare criteria of interest for D ∈
{r, d} is:
WD(A, i,m−1, τ, σ, p˜i) = νm
[
cmo (D)−
nmo (D)
2
2
]
+ νI
[
cIo(D)−
nIo(D)
2
2
]
. (2.73)
Using the labor supply policy functions from (2.4) and (2.10), we get the following consumption
and labor supply vectors:
cmo (r) = An
m
o (r)(1− τ) +m−1p˜ir cmo (d) = Anmo (d)(1− γ) +m−1p˜id + t
nmo (r) = A(1− τ) nmo (d) = A(1− γ)
cIo(r) = An
I
o(r)(1− τ) + (1 + i)p˜irbI +Rk cIo(d) = AnIo(d)(1− γ) +Rk + t
nIo(r) = A(1− τ) nIo(d) = A(1− γ).
Using νIbI = θb, one can solve for k, the risk-free component of individual portfolio of rich agents
from their budget constraint:
znIy = Rz
2 = bI + k + Γ⇒ νIRk = νIR(Rz2 − Γ)−Rθb. (2.74)
We derive the expressions for W r(·) and W d(·):
W r(A, i,m−1, τ, σ, p˜ir) =
[
A(1− τ)]2
2
+ νmm−1p˜ir +
(
(1 + i)p˜ir −R)θb+ νIR(Rz2 − Γ) (2.75)
W d(A, i,m−1, σ, p˜id) =
[
A(1− γ)]2
2
+ νmm−1p˜id −Rθb+ νIR(Rz2 − Γ) + T (·), (2.76)
where τ solves the government budget constraint under repayment and T (·) = νmm−1σp˜id is a
lump sum transfer that implements p˜id under default.
Default is optimal whenever ∆(·) = W d(·)−W r(·) ≥ 0.
2.7.2 Proof Lemma 5
As discussed in section 2.4.3, p˜ie(so) ≥ p˜i can be part of a stationary equilibrium if and only if it
satisfies:
p˜ie(so) = pmax
{ νmp˜ie(so)
νmp˜ie(so) + (1 + i)b
; p˜i
}
+ (1− p) max
{ νmp˜ie(sp)
νmp˜ie(so) + (1 + i)b
; p˜i
}
, (2.77)
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where the no-arbitrage condition gives: (1 + i)p˜ie(so) = R, and p is the stationary probability of
optimism.
First consider the situation in which seignorage alone is not sufficient to service principal and
interest on debt. In this case, the government sets p˜ir(s, ·) = p˜i for all s, and raises additional labor
taxes. Agents form expectations accordingly and (2.77) writes:
p˜ie(so) = (1− p)p˜i + pp˜i = p˜i. (2.78)
This case emerges whenever ν
mp˜i
νmp˜i+Rp˜i b
≤ p˜i, which rewrites:
b ≥ bˆ = ν
mp˜i(1− p˜i)
R
. (2.79)
Next, we show that whenever 0 < b < bˆ, there is a level of inflation expectation under optimism,
p˜ie(so), such that seignorage alone is sufficient to service principal and interest on debt for all (A,s).
(2.77) writes then:
p˜ie(so) = p
νmp˜ie(so)
νmp˜ie(so) + Rp˜ie(so)b
+ (1− p) ν
mp˜i
νmp˜ie(so) + Rp˜ie(so)b
. (2.80)
Multiply both sides by νmp˜ie(so) + Rp˜ie(so)b and get:
νmp˜ie(so)2 − pνmp˜ie(so) +Rb− (1− p)νmp˜i = 0. (2.81)
Hence, (2.80) has at least a positive solution if b ≤ bα, where:
bα =
p2νm + 4(1− p)νmp˜i
4R
. (2.82)
Under this condition, the solution to (2.81) that is necessarily positive45 is given by:
p˜ie(so) =
p+
√
p2 + 4(1− p)p˜i − 4 Rbνm
2
. (2.83)
This solution is compatible with (2.77) if it satisfies the following two conditions:
νmp˜ie(s)
νmp˜ie(so) + Rp˜ie(so)b
≥ p˜i ∀s ∈ {so, sp}, (2.84)
We verify that bα ≥ bˆ and that for all b < bˆ, when p˜ie(so) is given by (2.83), then the conditions
(2.84) are satisfied.
45The other solution to the polynomial can be both positive and feasible, hence there is possibly multiple stationary
inflation regimes due to the Laffer curve property of seignorage.
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Note F (p) = 4R
(
bα − bˆ). Substituting and rearranging:
F (p) = p2νm − p4νmp˜i + 4νmp˜i2 = νm(p− 2p˜i)2 ≥ 0, (2.85)
which gives bα ≥ bˆ.
Next, note G(p, b) ≡ p˜ie(so) , where p˜ie(so) is given by (2.83). The feasibility condition (2.84)
for s = sp then reads:
G(b, p) =
p+
√
p2 + 4(1− p)p˜i − 4 Rbνm
2
≥
√
Rbp˜i
νm(1− p˜i) . (2.86)
In this expression, the left side G(b, p) is decreasing in b, whereas the right side is increasing in b;
G(0, p) > 0 and the right side is equal to 0 for b = 0; G(bˆ, p) ≥ p˜i and the right side is equal to p˜i,
for b = bˆ. Hence for all b < bˆ, (2.86) is satisfied.
Finally, the feasibility condition (2.84) for s = so requires b ≤ bδ = νm4R and:
1−
√
1− 4 Rbνm
2
≤ G(b, p) ≤
1 +
√
1− 4 Rbνm
2
. (2.87)
Since p˜i(1 − p˜i) ≤ 14 , we have bˆ ≤ bδ. Note Bl(b) and Bu(b) the lower and upper bounds of this
inequality.
Bl(b), is increasing in b, Bl(0) = 0, Bl(bˆ) = 1−
√
1−4p˜i(1−p˜i)
2 =
1−
√
(1−2p˜i)2
2 ≤ p˜i for all p˜i ∈ [0, 1].
As G(b, p) is decreasing in b and G(bˆ, p) ≥ p˜i, we have that for all b ∈ [0, bˆ], G(b, p) ≥ Bl(b).
We finally verify that G(b, p) ≤ Bu(b) for all b < bˆ. Taking the derivatives of G(b, p) w.r.t. p:
dG(·)
dp
=
1
2
(
1 +
p− 2p˜i√
p2 + 4(1− p)p˜i − 4 Rbνm
)
. (2.88)
If p− 2p˜i > 0, then dG(·)dp > 0. If p− 2p˜i < 0, then verify that −1 ≤ p−2p˜i√p2+4(1−p)p˜i−4 Rbνm ≤ 0, so that
again dG(·)dp > 0. Hence, for all p ∈ [0, 1], all p˜i ∈ [0, 1], all b ∈ [0, bˆ]:
G(b, p) ≤ G(b, 1) =
1 +
√
1− 4 Rbνm
2
= Bu(b). (2.89)
Overall, we have shown that for all b ≤ bˆ, there is p˜ie(so) that satisfies (2.83) and solves (2.77).
2.7.3 Existence of the ”Leaning Against the Winds” Policy
This section details the proof of Lemma 6 in the general case θ ∈ [0, 1] and νm ≥ 0.
We adopt the following notations. Consider the central bank committing to a policy contingent
on A, noted {p˜iA}, and such that
∫
A
p˜iAdF (A) = p˜i
∗. Given m−1 = p˜ie(·) = p˜i∗, where p˜i∗ is the
inflation target of the central bank, the discretionary default decision of the treasury is captured
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by:
∆(A, i, p˜i∗, τ, p˜iA) = W d(·)−W r(·)
=
[A(1− γ)]2
2
− [A(1− τ)]
2
2
+ νmp˜i∗(1− p˜iA)− (1 + i)p˜iAθb, (2.90)
where τ solves the government budget constraint given p˜iA:
G(A, i, p˜i∗, τ, p˜iA) = A2(1− τ)τ + νmp˜i∗(1− p˜iA)− (1 + i)p˜iAb = 0. (2.91)
Moreover, in the economy with θ > 0, default occurs for two reasons: either it is the best
response of the treasury: ∆(·) > 0, or the fiscal capacity of the country cannot service debt, since
τ ≤ 12 .
We show that there is a unique state-dependent inflation policy {p˜ipA} and an induced interest
rate cut-off iδ such that the policy delivers the inflation target on average, and, if the central bank
commits to {p˜ipA}, then the fiscal authority services its obligation for all A if and only if i < iδ.
We proceed in two steps: first we show that for any it, there is a unique policy {p˜iA(it)} such
that the treasury reimburses its debt if and only if i < it. Second, we show that there is a unique
iδ such that {p˜iA(iδ)} satisfies the inflation target. The desired policy is given by p˜ipA = p˜iA(iδ) for
all A.
Part I. Consider a nominal interest rate it such that 1 + it > 0 and a realization A ∈ [Al, Ah].
(i) The following elements establish that there is a unique inflation level p˜iA(i
t) such that the
fiscal authority is indifferent between repayment and default.
First, there is an inverse inflation rate p˜i1A(i
t) such that debt is serviced with no taxes on labor
income.
G(A, it, p˜i∗, τ, p˜i1A(i
t)) = 0⇒ τ = 0. (2.92)
In this case, using Assumption 2, ∆(·) < 0. Using the government budget constraint with τ = 0,
one gets:
p˜i1A(i
t) =
νmp˜i∗
νmp˜i∗ + (1 + it)b
> 0. (2.93)
Similarly, the central bank can set the inverse inflation rate to p˜i2A(i
t) so that if the treasury
desires to service its debt, it has to set τ = 12 . Formally:
p˜i2A(i
t) =
A2
4 + ν
mp˜i∗
νmp˜i∗ + (1 + it)b
. (2.94)
Importantly, for any inflation rate between these two cases, the lower the inflation, i.e. the
higher p˜iA, the higher the tax rate to service debt. Formally, differentiating the government budget
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constraint w.r.t. τ and p˜iA:
∀p˜iA ∈ [p˜i1A(it), p˜i2A(it)],
dτ
dp˜iA
=
νmp˜i∗ + (1 + it)b
A2(1− 2τ) > 0. (2.95)
Moreover, the lower the inflation, i.e. the higher p˜iA, the higher the value of ∆(·) = W d(·) −
W r(·):
d∆(·)
dp˜iA
=
1− τ
1− 2τ (ν
mp˜i∗ + (1 + it)b)− (νmp˜i∗ + (1 + it)θb) > 0, (2.96)
since 1−τ1−2τ > 1 for τ ∈ [0, 12 ).
Hence, there is a unique p˜iA(i
t) that has the desired property to make the treasury indifferent
between repayment and default. Especially,
- if ∆
(
A, it, p˜i∗, 12 , p˜i
2
A(i
t)
)
> 0, then p˜i1A(i
t) < p˜iA(i
t) < p˜i2A(i
t),
- if ∆
(
A, it, p˜i∗, 12 , p˜i
2
A(i
t)
) ≤ 0, then p˜iA(it) = p˜i2A(it).
(ii) Next, we verify that for any i < it, the fiscal authority services its debt, otherwise for any
i > it, it defaults. Given p˜iA(i
t), we have:
d∆(·)
di
= A2(1− τ)dτ
di
− p˜iA(it)θb = 1− τ
1− 2τ p˜iA(i
t)b− p˜iA(it)θb > 0. (2.97)
(iii) Also, we establish the following properties of p˜iA(i
t):
dp˜iA(i
t)
dA
> 0
dp˜ipA(i
t)
dit
< 0. (2.98)
If p˜iA(i
t) = p˜i2A(i
t), these properties are straightforward. In the case p˜iA(i
t) < p˜i2A(i
t), first differen-
tiate the government budget constraint w.r.t. (A, i, τ, p˜iA) to get:
dτ
dA
= − 2(1− τ)τ
A(1− 2τ)
dτ
di
=
p˜iAb
A2(1− 2τ)
dτ
dp˜iA
=
νmp˜i∗ + (1 + i)b
A2(1− 2τ) (2.99)
Then differentiate ∆(A, i, p˜i∗, τ, p˜iA) w.r.t to its arguments and using the derivative of τ w.r.t
(A, i, p˜iA), one gets:
[
A(1− γ)2 −A (1− τ)
2
1− 2τ
]
dA+
[ 1− τ
1− 2τ
(
νmp˜i∗ + (1 + i)b
)− (νmp˜i∗ + (1 + i)θb)]dp˜iA = 0 (2.100)[ 1− τ
1− 2τ p˜iAb− p˜iAθb
]
di+
[ 1− τ
1− 2τ
(
νmp˜i∗ + (1 + i)b
)− (νmp˜i∗ + (1 + i)θb)]dp˜iA = 0. (2.101)
Since 1−τ1−2τ >
(1−τ)2
1−2τ > 1 for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ 12 and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we get the desired results.
(iv) Finally, the limits behavior of p˜iA(i
t) are derived from the inequality
p˜i1A(i
t) < p˜iA(i
t) ≤ p˜i2A(it), (2.102)
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which gives lim
it→+∞
p˜iA(i
t) = 0 and lim
it→−1
p˜iA(i
t) > 1.
Part II. By applying the inflation target requirement (2.58), we show that there is a unique
iδ > 0 such that: ∫
A
p˜iA(i
δ)dF (A) = p˜i∗. (2.103)
Note H(i) =
∫
A
p˜iA(i)dF (A), which is defined for all i such that 1 + i > 0. The properties of
p˜iA(i) naturally convey to H(i): H(i) is strictly decreasing in i; lim
i→+∞
H(i) = 0; lim
i→−1
H(i) > 1.
Hence there is a unique iδ such that H(iδ) = p˜i∗.
Overall, the monetary policy rule {p˜ipA} that meets the inflation target and deters state contin-
gent default, exists, and satisfies:
∀ A p˜ipA = p˜ipA(iδ). (2.104)
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Chapter 3
Public Debt and the Cyclicality of Fiscal
Policy
with Andrew R. Gimber
3.1 Introduction
Public debt to GDP ratios in advanced economies have been rising since the mid-1970s, and have
recently reached levels not seen since just after World War II Abbas, Belhocine, El-Ganainy, and
Horton (2011). The recent financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession exacerbated this trend
through bailouts, stimulus packages, rising unemployment claims, and falling tax revenues. This
has led to a heated debate over the pace of fiscal consolidation, with one side emphasizing the
burden on economic growth imposed by high levels of public debt, and the other warning that
pursuing austerity during a recession could be very costly or even self-defeating.
In this paper we present a new theory that provides a partial reconciliation of these two views.
We show that there is a threshold level of debt above which the economy is vulnerable to self-
fulfilling fiscal crises. However, the mechanism that makes such crises possible is that fiscal policy
becomes procyclical, in the sense that the government’s optimal response to a reduction in output
is to raise the tax rate.1 Thus, our model lends qualified support to both sides of the debate over
fiscal consolidation: the proximate cause of the crisis is the government’s desire to raise the tax
rate in a recession, but the source of this desire is the high level of public debt.
In Calvo (1988) and related papers,2 investors’ expectations of sovereign default cause them to
charge a risk premium that makes default more likely. Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2013)
argue that this sovereign risk channel provides a motivation for fiscal consolidation. However, even
countries that did not face an increase in sovereign risk premia have pursued fiscal consolidation
in the years since the onset of the Great Recession. Our focus in this paper is not on self-fulfilling
expectations of sovereign default, but on another type of self-fulfilling macroeconomic crisis caused
by high levels of public debt. Accordingly, we focus on cases in which investors charge the lowest
risk premium compatible with the economy’s fundamentals. Our analysis can explain why a highly
indebted government might adopt procyclical fiscal policy during a recession, even without facing a
high sovereign risk premium. Indeed, in our baseline model debt is risk free because the government
1Since “procyclical” can be used to describe both variables that are positively correlated with output and policies
that exacerbate the business cycle, there is potential for ambiguity when describing the cyclicality of tax rates.
Throughout this paper, we use “procyclical” to refer to a negative correlation of tax rates and output, that is, tax
policy that could exacerbate output fluctuations.
2See also Cooper (2015) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), for instance.
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never defaults, and debt sustainability is ensured by future fiscal capacity.3
Unlike a committed Ramsey planner, the government in our model takes households’ current
labour supply decisions and output as given when setting the contemporaneous tax rate and issuing
new debt. Fiscal policy is therefore a function of current output, as well as of the inherited stock of
public debt. This leads to a standard time inconsistency problem of the kind identified by Kydland
and Prescott (1977). Whatever the level of public debt, the government always chooses a higher
contemporaneous tax rate than a Ramsey planner would choose, because it does not internalize
the distortionary effect on current output. However, the key insight of our analysis is that the
government’s inability to commit to a tax rate can have even more severe consequences, because
when debt is high fiscal policy becomes procyclical, thereby inducing a coordination problem among
households.
When the economy suffers a fall in output, there are two countervailing effects on the gov-
ernment’s optimal choice of the contemporaneous tax rate. The first is that, for given tax rates,
contemporaneous consumption falls relative to future consumption. This provides the government
with a consumption-smoothing motive to reduce the contemporaneous tax rate relative to the fu-
ture tax rate.4 The second effect, which we call the tax-base effect, is that the contemporaneous
tax base shrinks, meaning that the government must raise tax rates at some point in order to
remain solvent in the long run.
When the inherited stock of public debt is low, the consumption-smoothing effect dominates.
This means fiscal policy is countercyclical: the government’s optimal response to a fall in output
is to cut the tax rate and issue more debt, postponing the necessary tax collection to the future.
A household that expected aggregate labour supply to be low would therefore anticipate a low tax
rate, and choose a high level of labour supply itself. Under these conditions there is no scope for
coordination failure, and our economy has a unique equilibrium.
However, when the inherited level of public debt is high, the tax-base effect dominates. Optimal
fiscal policy then becomes procyclical, because deferring all fiscal consolidation (tax increases) when
output is low would impose an unacceptable burden on future consumption. This unleashes the
possibility of multiple equilibria. In the good equilibrium, labour supply is high because workers
anticipate a low tax rate, and the government optimally chooses a low tax rate because output is
high. In bad equilibria, which we label fiscal policy traps, workers restrict their labour supply in
anticipation of a high tax rate, and the resulting low output induces the government to fulfil their
pessimistic expectations by setting a high tax rate. Welfare is lower in fiscal policy trap equilibria
than in the high tax-base, low tax-rate equilibrium.
The idea that high levels of public debt can pose a threat to the economy is most famously
associated with Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). In particular, they argue that countries with sovereign
debt to GDP ratios above 90 percent have significantly lower rates of economic growth on average.
The burden of distortionary taxation imposed by debt service could explain why high levels of
3We show in section 3.5.2 that our results are robust to allowing for government default.
4In our baseline model we abstract away from private-sector borrowing decisions, but this consumption-smoothing
motive applies whenever consumers are not fully Ricardian. We relax this assumption in section 3.5.3.
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debt might reduce growth, but not why there might be a discrete drop in growth above some
threshold level of debt. Our model contributes a novel explanation for why there might be such
a threshold effect, based on self-fulfilling beliefs about the stance of fiscal policy. In our model, a
country with a level of public debt just above the threshold is exposed to the risk of a high-tax,
low-output equilibrium. If this equilibrium is selected, the country’s economic performance will be
significantly worse than that of a similar country with a public debt level just below the threshold.
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997) introduce similar concerns about taxpayer coordination failure
into a dynamic model with income and capital taxation. They consider only balanced-budget fiscal
policy: specifically, they study the undesired consequences of balanced-budget rules when labour
supply and tax rates are chosen simultaneously. In addition to procyclical fiscal policy, they
show that this leads to equilibrium indeterminacy. The authors stress the crucial role of capital
accumulation in driving the result. Finally, they consider the role of public debt, but not as a
choice variable: they maintain budget balance and a fixed stock of public debt, so what matters
are the interest rates that have to be serviced. Nevertheless, high levels of debt in their analysis
can lead to fiscal policy indeterminacy.
Cole and Kehoe (2000) consider a dynamic environment in which the government is prone to
self-fulfilling debt rollover crises. They assume a constant tax rate, and allow the government to
adjust its debt level by varying its expenditure. In their model, there is a source of domestically
initiated crisis, via capital accumulation. By reducing saving, households reduce capital next period
and bring the economy into the crisis zone where market shutdown is an option, hence making the
initial belief that drove the reduction in saving self-fulfilling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present the general framework
of analysis. Section 3.3 sets out our main analytical results. Next, in section 3.4, we illustrate by
way of an example the mechanism by which the cyclicality of fiscal policy depends on the inherited
debt position and can lead to a self-fulfilling crisis. In section 3.5, we build on this example to
investigate the robustness of our results to relaxing several of our baseline assumptions. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 A Model of Taxpayer Coordination Failure
In this section, we first outline the mechanism by which taxpayer coordination failure can arise in
a static environment, and then present the general framework of our dynamic analysis.
3.2.1 Static Economy with a Balanced Budget
Consider a static environment, as proposed by Cooper (1999, 131–132), in which the government
must finance a fixed level of expenditure G through a proportional ex post tax on labour income.5
The economy is populated by a mass-one continuum of ex ante identical households, indexed by
5We can think of G as pre-contracted expenses that do not enter into household utility directly.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibria on Either Side of the Laffer Curve
τ
G, τn(τ)
G
τn(τ)
τG τB
This figure outlines the coordination problem created by the government’s inability to commit to a tax rate. For
a given level of government expenditure, there are two levels of labour supply, associated with different tax rates,
that satisfy the government budget constraint. The equilibrium with high labour supply and a low tax rate provides
higher utility than the one with low labour supply and a high tax rate.
i ∈ [0, 1], who derive utility from consumption, ci, and disutility from labour supply, ni. Production
is linear, so with a proportional tax rate τ , household i’s consumption is ci = (1− τ)ni. Since the
pre-tax real wage is fixed at unity, households’ optimal labour supply will be a function of the tax
rate: ni = n(τ). We assume that the substitution effect dominates the income effect in the utility
function, so that labour supply is decreasing in the tax rate: dn(τ)/dτ < 0.
The government’s budget balance constraint is τn = G, where n =
∫
i
nidi is aggregate labour
supply. The government must pay for its fixed expenditure, so the tax rate will depend negatively
on the tax base: τ = G/n. This creates strategic complementarities among households: the higher
is aggregate labour supply, the lower will be the tax rate, and so the higher is household i’s optimal
labour supply.
The equilibrium condition is τn(τ) = G. As Figure 3.1 shows, there are two Pareto-ranked
equilibria: a good equilibrium with a low tax rate τG and high labour supply n(τG), and a bad
equilibrium with a high tax rate τB and low labour supply n(τB). Given the presence of strategic
uncertainty over the tax rate, households may coordinate on the inefficient Nash equilibrium, which
lies on the downward-sloping part of the Laffer curve.
If the government could credibly commit to a tax rate, this strategic uncertainty among house-
holds would disappear. However, in a static environment with fixed expenditure, the government
has no choice but to respond to a revenue shortfall by raising the tax rate. The combination of dis-
cretion over the tax rate and an absolute requirement to balance the budget leads to the possibility
of coordination failure. The first of these assumptions is reasonable: sovereign governments cannot
in fact commit to keep tax rates constant regardless of the state of the economy.6 However, the
6Income tax policy can change relatively quickly, particularly during crises, and even retroactive tax increases
are not unheard of. On 6 November 2012, voters in California passed Proposition 30, which included increases in
top marginal tax rates that applied retroactively to income earned since 1 January 2012. The Minnesota omnibus
tax bill (HF 677), signed into law on 23 May 2013, included a new top income tax bracket and an increase in the
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balanced-budget view of fiscal policy is less realistic because governments routinely borrow to cover
revenue shortfalls when output is lower than expected (and even balanced-budget constitutional
amendments can be overturned).
The focus of the present paper is therefore to offer the government the possibility to issue new
debt rather than increase taxes in the event of a revenue shortfall. Does this allow the government
to eliminate the taxpayer coordination failure and steer the economy to the more efficient outcome
with a low tax rate and high labour supply? Our answer will be that this depends on the inherited
debt level. If the outstanding debt burden is sufficiently low, then the government’s ability to
adjust its debt position in the event of a revenue shortfall will ensure that there is a unique, low-
tax equilibrium. However, if the inherited stock of debt is large enough then the government will
optimally respond to lower output with higher taxes, unleashing the possibility of a fiscal policy
trap.
3.2.2 Two-Period Economy with Taxes and Debt Issuance
We consider a two-period economy: t = 1, 2. The government inherits a level of debt B1, owed
to foreign investors. In period 1, households choose labour supply and produce accordingly. The
government then sets its fiscal policy, choosing the tax rate on labour income τ1 and the new debt
B2 to be issued to foreign investors. This debt is backed by future primary fiscal surpluses and is
always repaid in period 2, so the government can borrow at the risk-free rate R between periods 1
and 2. We interpret the terminal period 2 as the long run.
The focus of our analysis is on the determinants of labour supply and fiscal policy in period 1.
We next describe these choices.
Households’ Preferences and Choices
There is a unit mass of households in the economy, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Households live over the
two periods but are hand-to-mouth consumers, meaning they can neither save nor borrow between
periods 1 and 2.7 Moreover, since households are atomistic, they do not internalize the impact of
their labour supply choices on the government’s choices of tax rate and debt issuance. In period 1,
household i forms a belief about the tax rate τ1 and solves:
max
n1,i
u(c1,i)− g(n1,i) (3.1)
subject to
c1,i = (1− τ1)z1f(n1,i). (3.2)
Consumption utility is increasing and concave: u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0; and labour disutility is
increasing and convex: g′(·) > 0 and g′′(·) < 0.
alternative minimum tax rate, both of which applied retroactively to the beginning of 2013.
7We explore the implications of relaxing this assumption in section 3.5.3 below.
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The individual production function is y1,i = z1f(n1,i), where z1 > 0 is an aggregate productivity
parameter and f(·) is an increasing function that exhibits weakly decreasing returns to scale and
is unbounded above: f ′(·) > 0, f ′′(·) ≤ 0 and limn→+∞ f(·) = +∞.
The labour supply decision n(τ1) is implicitly defined by the following first-order condition:
(1− τ1)z1f ′(n1,i)u′
(
(1− τ1)z1f(n1,i)
)
= g′(n1,i). (3.3)
We assume that the curvature of the utility function is such that substitution effects dominate
income effects:
u′(c) + cu′′(c) > 0 ∀c ≥ 0.
This ensures that labour supply is a decreasing function of the tax rate:
dn(τ1)
dτ1
=
z1f
′(·)(u′(·) + c1u′′(·))
(1− τ1)z1f ′′(·)u′(·) +
(
(1− τ1)z1f ′(·)
)2
u′′(·)− g′′(·)
< 0. (3.4)
Government’s Preferences and Choices
The government faces an intertemporal tax-smoothing problem. It has an inherited stock of debt
owed to foreign investors, B1, which it is committed to repaying. In each period, the government
also has to finance an exogenous amount of expenses Gt ≥ 0, which do not enter into household
utility directly.8 Given inherited debt B1 and aggregate labour supply n1, it optimally sets the
tax rate τ1 and issues new debt B2 to risk-neutral foreign investors. Importantly, the choice of B2
is constrained by the requirement that all outstanding debt is repaid in period 2.9 Future fiscal
capacity is defined by the maximum amount of debt B¯2 that can be issued in period 1.
The government’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
τ1,B2
u(c1)− g(n1) + βV (B2) (3.5)
subject to
B1 +G1 ≤ τ1z1f(n1) + B2
R
(3.6)
B2 ≤ B¯2. (3.7)
The function V (·) captures the continuation utility of the economy when in period 1 the government
issues bonds with face value B2 to be repaid in period 2. The government budget constraint (3.6)
states that debt service and government expenditure in period 1 must be financed by proportional
taxes on output and new debt issuance. Expression (3.7) states that, because of the long-run
solvency requirement, the government also faces a borrowing limit B¯2.
8In section 3.5.1, we endogenize short-run public expenditure G1.
9This assumption is introduced to highlight the fact that the mechanism at play in our analysis, namely the link
between inherited debt, the cyclicality of fiscal policy and the possibility of taxpayer coordination failure, is not
driven by self-fulfilling increases in sovereign risk premia. In section 3.5.2, we relax this assumption and show that
our results still hold.
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The continuation utility function V (·) satisfies the following concavity assumptions:
V ′(·) < 0, V ′′(·) < 0. (3.8)
In addition, we impose
lim
B2→B¯2
V ′(·) = −∞. (3.9)
This condition ensures that the government’s borrowing limit (3.7) will not bind in equilibrium
(see Lemma 1 below).10
Since V (·) is decreasing in B2, the government budget constraint (3.6) will be satisfied with
equality. Substituting this into the government’s objective function (3.5) and differentiating with
respect to the short-run tax rate τ1 yields the following first-order condition:
u′
(
(1− τ1)z1f(n1)
)
= −βRV ′(R(B1 +G1 − τ1z1f(n1))). (3.10)
Equation (3.10) implicitly defines the tax policy function τ(n1, B1).
11 We will demonstrate
below that the optimal short-run tax rate is unambiguously increasing in the inherited debt level
B1, but that the sign of its derivative with respect to short-run labour supply n1 is ambiguous.
When dτ(·)/dn1 > 0, we say that fiscal policy is countercyclical, meaning a drop in output induces
the government to lower the tax rate; when dτ(·)/dn1 < 0, we say that fiscal policy is procyclical,
meaning a drop in output induces the government to raise the tax rate. We will also show that the
cyclicality of fiscal policy and the number of equilibria in this economy depend on the inherited
level of debt.
Equilibrium Definition
The relevant choices of households and the government are both made in period 1. The government
inherits an amount of debt B1. Households form expectations about fiscal policy, supply labour
and produce accordingly. Given its outstanding debt and the economy’s tax base, the government
sets fiscal policy to maximize the lifetime utility of the population.
The relevant variables for the government’s decisions are aggregate labour supply, n1, and the
inherited amount of debt B1. Given (n1, B1), the government sets τ1 and issues new bonds B2.
We denote the policy functions τ(n1, B1) and B(n1, B1). In the long run, i.e. in period 2, debt is
fully repaid.
Accordingly, an equilibrium in this environment is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A subgame-perfect rational expectations equilibrium is a labour supply decision n1,
a tax rate τ1 and debt issuance B2 such that:
10Condition (3.9) states that the marginal utility of a reduction in the future debt burden approaches infinity
as the government approaches its debt limit. We demonstrate below that this condition is satisfied for natural
specifications of V (·) in which the cost of issuing additional debt in period 1 is higher taxes and lower consumption
in period 2.
11For comparison, a Ramsey planner with the ability to commit to a tax rate would solve (3.5) subject to (3.6),
(3.7) and the additional constraint n1 = n(τ1), implicitly defined by (3.3).
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- Given outstanding debt B1, households form rational expectations about fiscal policy, and
supply labour n1 to maximize their intratemporal utility (3.1).
- Given (n1, B1), the government sets the tax rate τ1 and issues debt B2 to maximize aggregate
lifetime utility (3.5) subject to its budget constraint (3.6) and borrowing limit (3.7).
Some comments are in order. First, we spell out the game and equilibrium definition as sequen-
tial actions, where households supply labour and then the government sets taxes. Similar economic
interactions would prevail if moves were simultaneous. On the other hand, it is essential that the
government does not move first. Indeed, if the government had a way to act as a Stackelberg leader
and commit to its policy, it would naturally solve the coordination problem by choosing a tax rate
on the left-hand side of the Laffer curve.
Second, although the government takes labour supply as given and therefore does not face a
Laffer curve, Nash equilibrium requires consistency between the tax rate the private sector expects
and the tax rate the government chooses. All equilibria must therefore be on the labour income
Laffer curve, but not all points on the Laffer curve will be equilibria.
More importantly, the analysis will unveil conditions under which the equilibrium is unique or
not. If the policy functions of households and the fiscal authority exhibit substitutability, which
we interpret as fiscal policy being countercyclical, then there will be a unique equilibrium. If
instead they exhibit complementarity, i.e. if fiscal policy is procyclical, then there may be multiple
equilibria.12
The next section is dedicated to deriving conditions on the inherited level of debt that give rise
to complementarities and create the possibility of fiscal policy traps.
3.3 Analysis
This section establishes the key result of the paper, namely that the level of debt is critical to the
cyclicality of fiscal policy and can induce complementarities that give rise to fiscal policy traps.
The argument is built on a geometric interpretation of the model in (n1, τ1) space.
13 Equilibria in
this environment can be represented by intersections of the labour supply function n(τ1) and the
tax policy function τ(n1, B1). We will show that there are three threshold levels of inherited debt,
B∗1 ≤ Bˆ1 < B¯1, such that when B1 < B∗1 a unique equilibrium is guaranteed, when Bˆ1 < B1 < B¯1
there will be multiple equilibria, and when B1 > B¯1 there will not be any equilibria. This result
will support our key idea that the level of debt is critical in creating the potential for self-fulfilling
fiscal crises.
We begin by characterising the labour supply function, which is everywhere downward sloping
and invariant to the inherited debt stock B1. We then characterize the government’s tax policy
function, starting with the limits imposed by the government’s budget constraint and borrowing
12Formally, since dn(·)/dτ < 0, the policy functions exhibit complementarities if and only if dτ(·)/dn ≤ 0.
13The geometric approach is very convenient, both for preserving generality of the results and for conveying the
main intuitions underlying our analysis.
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limit. Unlike the labour supply function, the tax policy function’s position and slope does depend
on the inherited debt stock B1.
We then show that when inherited debt is sufficiently low (B1 < B
∗
1), the tax policy function
will be upward sloping (countercyclical) at least until it crosses the labour supply function, thereby
ensuring a unique equilibrium. Then, we demonstrate that when the inherited amount of debt is
high enough that the repayment of newly issued debt cannot be met without tax revenues in
period 1 (Bˆ1 < B1 < B¯1), then the tax policy function will cross the labour supply function at
least twice. This situation gives rise to multiple equilibria.
We conclude this section with an economic explanation of why the slope of the tax policy
function is ambiguous and depends on the inherited debt stock B1. We decompose the government’s
optimal response to a change in labour supply into two countervailing effects: a tax-base effect and
a consumption-smoothing effect.
3.3.1 Properties of the Labour Supply Function
From (3.4) we know that labour supply is a monotonically decreasing function of the tax rate, so
the labour supply function n(τ1) is downward sloping in (n1, τ1) space. Optimal labour supply is
zero when the tax rate is 100 percent, and n(0) > 0 when the tax rate is zero. The labour supply
function starts at (0, 1) and cuts the horizontal axis at (n(0), 0). It continues below the horizontal
axis, because greater effort can be induced by negative tax rates (i.e. labour income subsidies).
Optimal labour supply depends only on the tax rate τ1, so the labour supply function will be
unaffected by changes in the inherited debt stock B1 or in the government’s debt issuance B2.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the properties of n(τ1), the reaction function of households.
Figure 3.2: Labour Supply Function
0
n1
τ1
1 n(τ1)
n(0)
3.3.2 Properties of the Tax Policy Function
The number of intersections (and hence the number of equilibria) will therefore depend on the
shape of the tax policy function, which, as we will show in this section, does depend on the debt
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stock B1 as well as on the quantity of labour supplied, n1. We will show that changes in B1 both
shift the tax policy function and alter its slope, thereby affecting the number of equilibria.
Constraints on the Government’s Choice of Tax Rate
Let us first consider the constraints the government faces. The borrowing limit B¯2 in (3.7) is the
highest level of debt that the government can feasibly repay in period 2 (often referred to in the
literature as the “natural” borrowing limit). This of course depends on the government’s fiscal
capacity in period 2. Let the maximum rollover threshold debt level,
Bˆ1 = B¯2/R−G1, (3.11)
be the inherited debt level at which the government is exactly solvent in period 2 if it collects zero
revenue in period 1. For debt levels strictly above this threshold, the government cannot repay its
debts in period 2 without collecting some tax revenue in period 1. For debt levels strictly below
this threshold, on the other hand, the government can in fact afford to subsidize labour supply in
period 1 by setting a negative income tax rate τ1 < 0 and still be solvent in period 2.
14
For now, we only consider equilibria in which the government repays its debts in period 2.
Accordingly, we define the lower bound on short-run labour supply n(B1) as the level of short-
run labour supply at or below which the government’s fiscal policy is not well defined because
repayment of the debt is not feasible. Formally, we have:
n(B1) =
f
−1
(
B1−Bˆ1
z1
)
if B1 > Bˆ1,
0 if B1 ≤ Bˆ1.
Since it is the short-run tax rate that matters for labour supply decisions, it will be convenient
to rewrite the government’s constraints in terms of this tax rate. We define the minimum short-run
tax rate τ(n1, B1) as the tax rate in period 1 that, given the inherited debt level B1, the economy’s
tax base y1 = z1f(n1) and the government’s budget constraint (3.6), requires the government to
issue debt up to its borrowing limit B¯2. The tax rate τ(·) is therefore the lowest tax rate in period 1
such that full repayment of the public debt is feasible in period 2. As the borrowing limit depends
on the government’s long-run fiscal capacity, so will the minimum short-run tax rate. Formally,
using the government budget constraint, τ(·) is given by:
τ(n1, B1) =
B1 − Bˆ1
z1f(n1)
, n1 > 0, n1 ≥ n(B1).
Figure 3.3 illustrates the characterisation of the minimum short-run tax rate τ(·). As the
inherited debt level B1 increases, for a given labour supply n1, the tax rate must rise to ensure
14Note that for large enough G1, the threshold Bˆ1 will be negative, meaning that the government must inherit
net claims on foreign wealth in order to be able to afford not to collect any revenue in period 1.
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long-run solvency, so the curve shifts up. If B1 > Bˆ1, positive short-run tax revenue is needed
to ensure long-run solvency, but the higher is the short-run labour supply n1, the lower is the
minimum tax rate. If B1 < Bˆ1, the government can afford to set negative rates τ1 < 0 (i.e. to
subsidize labour), but the higher is the short-run labour supply, the smaller this subsidy has to
be. For B1 = Bˆ1, no short-run revenue is needed to ensure long-run solvency, but the government
cannot afford subsidies, either.
Figure 3.3: Minimum Short-Run Tax Rate τ(n1, B1)
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τ(n1, B1)
B1 > Bˆ1
B1 = Bˆ1
B1 < Bˆ1
n(B1)
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This figure summarizes the constraints on the government’s optimization problem. It displays the minimum short-
run tax rate induced by inherited public debt, labour supply and future fiscal capacity.
Of course, if the inherited level of debt B1 is too high, the government will be unable to raise
enough revenue to remain solvent, and there will be no equilibrium. Clearly, if the required revenue
in period 1 exceeds that which would be raised at the peak of the Laffer curve, repayment will not
be feasible. However, the maximum inherited debt level that can be sustained in equilibrium is
less than this level. The government’s lack of commitment reduces the amount of tax revenue it
can raise in equilibrium.15
Accordingly, we define B¯1 as the upper limit on the amount of inherited debt B1 that the
government can sustain in equilibrium. It is derived as follows. In equilibrium, households’ expec-
tations of the tax rate in period 1 must be correct, and labour supply must be optimal: n1 = n(τ1).
Equilibrium also requires that the tax rate is set optimally given the level of output and the inher-
ited debt level, that is, τ1 = τ(n1, B1). Equilibrium tax revenue in period 1 will therefore be given
by the Laffer curve τ1z1f
(
n(τ1)
)
. Therefore, the maximum inherited debt level B¯1 is such that, by
raising the maximum tax revenue and issuing the maximum amount of debt B¯2, the government
has just enough resources to finance its spending G1 in period 1. It is the highest level of inherited
15If workers were to supply the amount of labour consistent with the peak of the Laffer curve, the government
would optimally choose to raise the tax rate.
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debt B1 that satisfies the following two equations:
R
(
B¯1 +G1 − τ(n1, B¯1)z1f
(
n
(
τ(n1, B¯1)
)))
= B¯2,
τ1 = τ(n1, B¯1).
Borrowing Limit Does Not Bind in Equilibrium
We have now defined all the ingredients necessary to prove that the borrowing limit (3.7) does not
bind in equilibrium. This justifies restricting our attention to interior solutions of the government’s
maximization problem. This point is formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For all B1 < B¯1 and for all n1 > n(B1), we have B(n1, B1) < B¯2 and τ(n1, B1) >
τ(n1, B1). That is, the borrowing limit (3.7) does not bind, and the optimal short-run tax rate is
strictly greater than what is required for long-run solvency.
Proof. Suppose, on the way to a contradiction, that there exist B1 < B¯1 and n1 > n(B1) such that
the optimal debt issuance is B(n1, B1) = B¯2 and the optimal short-run tax rate is τ(n1, B1) =
τ(n1, B1). From (3.9), we have V
′(B¯2) = −∞. Given n1 > n(B1) and our curvature assumptions
on the utility function, for all τ1 < 1 we have u
′((1 − τ1)z1f(n1)) < +∞. The combination
of V ′(·) = −∞ and u′(·) < +∞ violates the government’s first-order condition (3.10). Given
B1 < B¯1 and n1 > n(B1), it is feasible for the government to raise the short-run tax rate to
τ˜ ∈ (τ(n1, B1), 1) and reduce debt issuance to B˜2 < B¯2. Relative to the candidate policy, this
alternative policy produces an arbitrarily large long-run marginal benefit at a strictly finite short-
run marginal cost, and so the candidate policy B(n1, B1) = B¯2 and τ(n1, B1) = τ(n1, B1) cannot
be optimal.
This Lemma tells us that the optimal short-run tax rate τ(n1, B1) will be the interior solution
implicitly defined by the first-order condition (3.10). Since the government’s budget constraint
(3.6) will be satisfied with equality, the debt issuance decision B(n1, B1) will be given by:
B2 = R
(
B1 +G1 − τ(n1, B1)z1f(n1)
)
.
Since households’ decisions depend only on the tax rate τ1, we are interested mainly in the prop-
erties of the tax policy function τ(n1, B1).
Optimal Tax Rate Is Increasing in Inherited Debt
We first show that an increase in B1 induces an increase in the tax rate τ1 for any level of labour
supply n1.
16
16In (n1, τ1) space, this feature is represented by an upward shift of the tax policy function as the inherited debt
stock B1 increases.
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Lemma 2.
dτ(n1, B1)
dB1
=
βR2V ′′(·)
z1f(n1)
(
u′′(·) + βR2V ′′(·)) > 0. (3.12)
Proof. The expression is derived by totally differentiating the government’s first-order condition
(3.10) with respect to B1 and rearranging. Standard assumptions on the curvature of the utility
functions, u′′(·) < 0 and V ′′(·) < 0, guarantee that the expression is positive.
The economic intuition behind this result is straightforward. An increase in the inherited debt
stock B1 means the government is poorer overall. In order to remain solvent, it must raise taxes
in period 1, period 2, or both. Given that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in
both periods, optimality requires the government to spread the pain of an increase in B1 over both
periods, meaning the short-run tax rate τ1 must rise.
Tax Policy Function Is Upward Sloping Whenever Negative
We are mainly interested in the slope of the tax policy function, that is, how the optimal tax rate
responds to changes in labour supply. Taking the total derivative of (3.10) with respect to n1, we
get:
dτ(n1, B1)
dn1
=
f ′(n1)
f(n1)
(
(1− τ1)u′′(·)− τ1βR2V ′′(·)
u′′(·) + βR2V ′′(·)
)
. (3.13)
In general the sign of this expression will be ambiguous, and will depend on the inherited
debt stock B1.
17 However, the expression is unambiguously positive (and therefore the tax policy
function is upward sloping, i.e. countercyclical) whenever the short-run tax rate τ1 is negative:
Lemma 3.
dτ(n1, B1)
dn1
> 0 ∀τ(n1, B1) < 0.
Proof. Totally differentiating the government’s first-order condition (3.10) with respect to n1 and
rearranging yields:
dτ(n1, B1)
dn1
=
f ′(n1)
f(n1)
(
u′′(c1)
u′′(c1) + βR2V ′′(B2)
− τ(n1, B1)
)
.
Since β ≥ 0, u′′(·) < 0 and V ′′(·) < 0, we have
u′′(c1)
u′′(c1) + βR2V ′′(B2)
∈ [0, 1].
Since f(·) > 0 and f ′(·) > 0, the whole expression must be positive whenever τ(n1, B1) < 0.
17In section 3.3.4 below, we provide some economic analysis of this ambiguity by decomposing the government’s
response to a change in labour supply into a tax-base effect and a consumption-smoothing effect.
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3.3.3 Equilibria
Combining the analysis of households’ labour supply function and the government’s tax policy
function, we are now ready to derive conditions under which the equilibrium of the economy is
unique or not, i.e. conditions under which fiscal policy traps can arise.
Unique Equilibrium When Debt Is Low
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3, we can show that there will be a unique equilibrium whenever the
inherited debt stock B1 is sufficiently low.
Proposition 1. Let B∗1 be such that τ (n(0), B
∗
1) = 0. Then for all B1 < B
∗
1 , there will be a
unique equilibrium.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that τ (n(0), B1) < τ (n(0), B
∗
1) = 0 for all B1 < B
∗
1 , that is, the
optimal tax rate will be negative whenever labour supply is n(0) and inherited debt is less than the
threshold value B∗1 . Then from Lemma 3 we know that whenever B1 < B
∗
1 the tax policy function
will be negative valued and upward sloping for all values of labour supply n1 ≤ n(0), and indeed
will continue to slope upwards at least until it cuts the horizontal axis. Before it does so, it will
cut the (downward-sloping) labour supply function exactly once.
Multiple Equilibria When Debt Is High
The government’s budget constraint (3.6) means that if it inherits a sufficiently large stock of debt
B1, it will be forced to collect tax revenue in period 1 in order to stay within its borrowing limit
(3.7). Whenever the inherited debt level B1 is high enough that the government must collect taxes
in period 1 (but not so high that repayment becomes infeasible), the economy will exhibit multiple
equilibria.
Proposition 2. Let Bˆ1 = B¯2/R − G1, where B¯2 is the natural borrowing limit, and let B¯1 be
the highest inherited debt level for which an equilibrium exists. Then for all B1 ∈
(
Bˆ1, B¯1
)
, the
economy exhibits multiple equilibria.
Proof. For all B1 ∈
(
Bˆ1, B¯1
)
, we have τ
(
n(B1), B1
)
= τ
(
n(B1), B1
)
= 1 > n−1
(
n(B1)
)
. That is,
when inherited debt is above the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1 and short-run labour supply is at
its minimum value n(·), the government’s optimal short-run tax rate is 100 percent, because this is
the only feasible choice. We know that 100 percent is higher than the tax rate that would induce
labour supply of n(·) > 0, because labour supply is decreasing in the tax rate and it is optimal not
to work when the tax rate is 100 percent.
For all B1 ∈
(
Bˆ1, B¯1
)
, we have τ
(
n(0), B1
)
> τ
(
n(0), B1
)
> n−1
(
n(0)
)
= 0. This says that,
when inherited debt is above the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1 and labour supply is at the value
that would optimally be chosen if the tax rate were zero, the optimal tax rate is in fact strictly
positive.
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Figure 3.4: Existence of Fiscal Policy Traps
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These two pieces tell us that the optimal tax curve lies above the labour supply curve at two
points: when n1 is at the minimum level consistent with solvency, n(B1), and when n1 is at the
point consistent with zero taxes, n(0). There can’t be an equilibrium to the left of (i.e. with a
lower labour supply than) n(B1), because solvency would be violated whatever fiscal policy the
government chose. We also know that there can’t be an equilibrium to the right of (i.e. with a
higher labour supply than) n(0), because the labour supply curve is negative valued after that
point, and τ(n1, B1) is strictly positive for all n1 whenever B1 > Bˆ1. So if an equilibrium exists,
it must be between n(B1) and n(0). Apart from the special case of tangency (with B1 = B¯1), if
the optimal tax curve crosses below the labour supply curve somewhere to the right of n(B1), it
must cross it again in order to be above it at n(0).
Welfare Ordering of Equilibria
Proposition 3. The equilibria in Proposition 2 with higher labour supply n1 Pareto dominate
those with lower labour supply.
Proof. Since all households are ex ante identical and all equilibria are symmetric, the welfare
ordering of equilibria depends on the utility of the representative household.
All equilibria must lie on the labour supply curve n(τ1), which is downward sloping, so equilibria
featuring higher short-run labour supply n1 must also feature a lower short-run tax rate τ1. The
short-run tax rate τ1 enters into the household budget constraint (3.2), and since labour supply
cannot be negative, a reduction in τ1 expands the household’s choice set, meaning the household
is (weakly) better off in period 1.
All that remains to be shown is that in equilibria with higher short-run labour supply, the
representative household is also better off in period 2. Since V ′(B2) < 0, we need to show that
the government’s optimal debt issuance B2 is lower in equilibria featuring higher short-run labour
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supply n1. To see this, note that optimal fiscal policy must satisfy the first-order condition (3.10):
u′
(
(1− τ1)z1f(n1)
)
= −βV ′(B2).
Consider two equilibria, one “good” and one “bad”, with nG1 > n
B
1 and τ
G
1 < τ
B
1 . Now suppose (on
the way to a contradiction) that the good equilibrium features higher debt issuance: BG2 > B
B
2 .
Then from V ′′(B2) < 0 we have V ′(BG2 ) < V
′(BB2 ), meaning −βV ′(BG2 ) > −βV ′(BB2 ). In order
for the government’s first-order condition to be satisfied in both equilibria, we would therefore need
u′
(
(1 − τG1 )z1f(nG1 )
)
> u′
(
(1 − τB1 )z1f(nB1 )
)
. However, given that output is increasing in labour
supply and u′′(·) < 0, this would require τG1 > τB1 , which cannot be the case because by hypothesis
the good equilibrium features a lower tax rate.
A lower tax rate in period 1 means households are wealthier in period 1. Since substitution
effects dominate income effects, their response is to increase their labour supply, which increases
the government’s tax base. This induces a reduction in the government’s optimal debt issuance,
so households are wealthier in period 2 as well.
3.3.4 Tax-Base and Consumption-Smoothing Effects
In this subsection we provide some economic intuition for our main result that optimal fiscal policy
is procyclical when the burden of inherited debt is large. We do so by providing a decomposition
of the effect of a change in labour supply on the optimal tax rate. We identify two countervailing
effects at play, which we label tax-base and consumption-smoothing effects.
Consider a reduction in period 1 labour supply n1. Ceteris paribus, this reduces period 1 con-
sumption relative to period 2 consumption, thereby providing the government with a consumption-
smoothing motive to reduce the period 1 tax rate relative to the period 2 tax rate. On the other
hand, when the period 1 tax rate is positive, a reduction in period 1 labour supply shrinks the
overall tax base. In order for the government to remain solvent, therefore, the average tax rate
across periods 1 and 2 must rise.
Similarly to how the effect of a price change on demand can be decomposed into a substitution
and an income effect, we can decompose the effect of a change in labour supply on the optimal tax
rate by rewriting the slope of the tax policy function (3.13) as follows:
dτ(n1, B1)
dn1
= (1− τ1) f
′(n1)u′′(·)
f(n1)
(
u′′(·) + βR2V ′′(·)) − τ1z1f ′(n1)dτ(n1, B1)dB1 .
The first term captures the consumption-smoothing effect, which is unambiguously positive
(meaning a reduction in labour supply prompts a reduction in the tax rate i.e. that fiscal policy is
countercyclical). The second term captures the tax-base effect, which operates through the impact
of a change in labour supply on the total fiscal resources available to the government. It is therefore
no accident that the size of the tax-base effect is linked to the effect of a change in the inherited
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debt stock on the optimal tax rate, dτ(n1, B1)/dB1.
The relative strength of the tax-base and consumption-smoothing effects will determine the
cyclicality of the government’s optimal fiscal policy. When the consumption-smoothing effect
dominates, fiscal policy will be countercyclical and the tax policy function will be upward sloping.
Noting that the size of both effects depends on the short-run tax rate τ1, which itself depends
positively on the inherited debt level B1 as per Lemma 2, we can see that the cyclicality of fiscal
policy will depend on the inherited debt level.
However, the effect of inherited debt on the cyclicality of fiscal policy is not guaranteed to be
monotonic in all cases. This potential non-monotonicity means that there may not necessarily
be a cut-off level of debt above which fiscal policy switches from being countercyclical to pro-
cyclical. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 guarantees that fiscal policy will always be countercyclical
over the relevant range of labour supply when inherited debt is below the threshold B∗1 , ensuring
a unique equilibrium. Similarly, Proposition 2 guarantees that there will be multiple equilibria
(which requires that fiscal policy is at least locally procyclical) whenever inherited debt exceeds
the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1.
Note that the sign of the tax-base effect depends on whether the period 1 tax rate is positive
or negative. This provides the intuition behind the result in Lemma 3 that the tax policy function
is upward sloping whenever the tax rate is negative. With a negative tax rate (i.e. a labour
subsidy), a reduction in labour supply actually reduces the fiscal burden on the government. This
reverses the usual sign of the tax-base effect, meaning it reinforces rather than counteracts the
consumption-smoothing effect. With both effects acting in the same countercyclical direction, the
government’s fiscal policy will be unambiguously countercyclical whenever the short-run tax rate
is negative.
3.4 Example with Closed-Form Solutions
In this section we present an analytical example of the class of economies described previously, and
clearly highlight the general result of section 3.3.
We adopt the following specification. In period 1, self-employed households convert labour
effort into output using the following production function:
y1 = z1n
α
1 , α > 0,
where α captures returns to scale. The government inherits a stock of debt B1 owed to foreigners,
chooses a proportional income tax rate τ1 and issues an amount of bonds B2 (again to foreigners)
at the risk-free interest rate R.
Period 2, the long run, is an endowment economy in which the government levies lump-sum
taxes. The per-capita endowment of output is y2, and to economize on notation we normalize
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period 2 government expenditure, G2, to zero.
18
The representative household’s lifetime utility is given by:
U(c1, n1, c2) = u(c1)− g(n1) + βu(c2),
where instantaneous consumption utility is given by
u(ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ , σ ∈ (0, 1)
in both periods, and the disutility from labour effort in period 1 is given by
g(n1) =
n1γ
γ
, γ > 0.
Substituting the budget constraint c1 = (1−τ1)y1 and the production function into the objective
function and solving the household’s first-order condition yields the following expression for optimal
labour supply:
n(τ1) =
(
α ((1− τ1)z1)1−σ
) 1
γ−α(1−σ)
.
The government faces the usual budget constraint (3.6). With lump-sum taxation in period 2,
the natural borrowing limit B¯2 in (3.7) is given by the long-run endowment y2, since long-run
consumption c2 = y2 −B2 cannot be negative. The government’s continuation utility V (B2) from
issuing an amount of debt B2 is simply households’ utility u(y2−B2) of consuming the amount left
over after lump-sum taxes are levied on the endowment to pay off the debt. It follows immediately
that conditions (3.8) and (3.9) on the continuation utility function are satisfied.19
The maximum rollover threshold level of inherited debt, above which the government must
collect revenue in period 1 in order to remain solvent, is given by:
Bˆ1 = B¯2/R−G1 = y2/R−G1. (3.14)
3.4.1 Inherited Debt and the Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy
Solving the government’s optimization problem yields the following tax policy function:
τ(n1, B1) =
(βR)1/σ
R+ (βR)1/σ
− R(Bˆ1 −B1)(
R+ (βR)1/σ
)
z1n1α
. (3.15)
This solution allows us to characterize precisely how the cyclicality of fiscal policy depends on
the inherited level of debt.
18This normalization is innocuous because with lump-sum taxes in period 2, an increase in G2 is equivalent to a
decrease in y2.
19Formally, V ′(B2) = −u′(y2 − B2) = −(y2 − B2)−σ < 0, V ′′(B2) = u′′(y2 − B2) = −σ(y2 − B2)−1−σ < 0 and
limB2→B¯2 V
′(B2) = limB2→y2 u
′(y2 −B2) = limc2→0 c−σ2 = +∞.
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Proposition 4. The cyclicality of fiscal policy depends on the inherited debt level B1 as follows:
dτ(n1, B1)
dn1
=
R(Bˆ1 −B1)α(
R+ (βR)1/σ
)
z1n
1+α
1

> 0 (countercyclical) if B1 < Bˆ1
= 0 (acyclical) if B1 = Bˆ1
< 0 (procyclical) if B1 > Bˆ1.
Accordingly, the equilibrium of the economy is unique if and only if B1 < Bˆ1, and fiscal policy traps
may emerge for high levels of inherited debt B1.
Proof. Differentiation of (3.15) and application of Propositions 1 and 2.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we saw the general result that when public debt is above the
maximum rollover threshold level Bˆ1, the government’s tax policy function must be at least locally
procyclical. Proposition 4 shows that there is a starker relationship between the level of public
debt and the cyclicality of fiscal policy in this particular case. For levels of debt above Bˆ1, fiscal
policy is procyclical for all values of labour supply.
Since for any given value of inherited debt B1 the government’s tax policy function is monotonic,
we can guarantee that there is a unique cutoff value of B1, below which there will be a unique
equilibrium and above which there will be two equilibria.20 The three cases are illustrated in
Figure 3.5. In panel (a), debt is below the threshold Bˆ1 and so the tax policy function is upward
sloping for all values of labour supply. It therefore crosses the labour supply function just once,
ensuring a unique equilibrium. Panel (b) shows that the equilibrium is also unique when inherited
debt is equal to the threshold Bˆ1 and the tax policy function is horizontal. Whenever inherited
debt exceeds this threshold, as in panel (c), the tax policy function is downward sloping for all
values of labour supply and there are two equilibria.
Looking at equation (3.14) we can see that the threshold value of debt does not depend on
contemporaneous parameters, such as productivity z1, but only on future variables, such as fiscal
capacity y2. Although an increase in productivity reduces the optimal tax rate for a given level
of labour supply, it cannot eliminate the possibility of fiscal policy traps. No matter how high is
productivity, if debt is above the maximum rollover threshold then fiscal policy will be procyclical.
This supports the idea that future fiscal capacity is essential in steering the economy away from
fiscal policy traps.
3.5 Robustness
So far, we have constrained the choice set of the government by assuming exogenous government
spending and not allowing the possibility of defaulting on debt. Further, we ruled out the possibil-
ity for households to smooth consumption themselves by accessing international capital markets.
20This is true whenever the tax policy function is monotonic for all values of B1, not just for the particular
example we consider here.
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Figure 3.5: Inherited Debt and the Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy
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These assumptions imposed strong restrictions on the fiscal capacity of the country. These ele-
ments gave rise to the key result of the analysis, namely that the level of inherited debt is decisive
in inducing procyclical fiscal policy and paving the way for a self-fulfilling fiscal crisis. In this
section we relax these assumptions and investigate the robustness of our result.
3.5.1 Endogenous Government Spending
Consider a government with a high inherited level of debt. Facing a low value of labour supply,
would the government rather increase its tax rate or reduce government expenditure?
To endogenize the choice of public expenditure, we assume that households derive instantaneous
utility v(G1) from public expenditure G1 by the government. The next Proposition shows that
the key result of the baseline model still holds, even if the possibility of adjusting government
expenditure provides the government with some “breathing room”: the threshold level of debt
is higher, but above this threshold, fiscal policy is procyclical and there is still the risk of fiscal
policy traps. We adapt the analytical specification introduced in section 3.4 above and assume
that v(G1) =
G1−σ1
1−σ . Formally, given (n1, B1), the government solves:
max
τ1,G1,B2
u
(
(1− τ1)n1
)
+ v(G1) + βu(y2 −B2)
subject to the usual government budget constraint (3.6) and borrowing constraint (3.7).
Note that with endogenous G1, the maximum rollover threshold level of debt becomes:
Bˆ1 = B¯2/R = y2/R,
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because the government has the option of setting G1 = 0.
The solution to the government’s maximization problem gives the following tax policy function:
τ(n1, B1) =
R+ (βR)1/σ
2R+ (βR)1/σ
− R(Bˆ1 −B1)(
2R+ (βR)1/σ
)
z1n1α
. (3.16)
Proposition 5. The cyclicality of fiscal policy depends on the inherited debt level B1 as follows:
dτ(n1, B1)
dn1
=
R(Bˆ1 −B1)α(
2R+ (βR)1/σ
)
z1n
1+α
1

> 0 (countercyclical) if B1 < Bˆ1
= 0 (acyclical) if B1 = Bˆ1
< 0 (procyclical) if B1 > Bˆ1.
Accordingly, the equilibrium of the economy is unique if and only if B1 < Bˆ1, and fiscal policy traps
may emerge for high levels of inherited debt B1.
Proof. Differentiation of (3.16) and application of Propositions 1 and 2.
Intuitively, whenG1 and c1 are complements, the government will optimally choose to reduceG1
in proportion with c1 when labour supply n1 decreases and the country is poorer. This allows the
government to raise the tax rate by less than in the case with exogenous government expenditure.
Nevertheless, once the government is above its short-run borrowing limit, it will have to raise the
tax rate, preserving the risk of fiscal policy traps.
3.5.2 Allowing for Default on Newly Issued Debt
In our baseline model, we assume that the government is committed to repaying its debts in full in
period 2. This commitment implies the limit B¯2 to the amount of debt the government can issue
in period 1 (see equation (3.7)). This debt issuance limit, together with the tax-base effect that
becomes stronger as the government approaches it, causes optimal fiscal policy to be procyclical
when the inherited debt level is high.
We now relax the hard solvency constraint and allow the government to choose strategically in
period 2 whether or not to repay its debts. We show that this does not eliminate the possibility
of self-fulfilling fiscal crises. In fact, the lack of commitment to debt repayement, i.e. the prospect
of default in period 2, tightens the borrowing constraint in period 1. This in turn decreases the
threshold level of debt Bˆ1 above which the economy is susceptible to fiscal policy traps.
Stochastic Long-Run Output and Strategic Default
To develop this idea, we amend the model as follows. Let long-run output y2 be stochastic,
distributed uniformly on
[
y
2
, y¯2
]
. Denote F (·) the cumulative distribution function of y2. As in
section 3.4 above, the government can use lump-sum taxes in period 2 to repay its debt B2, in
which case period 2 consumption will be c2 = y2−B2. If instead the government chooses to default
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in period 2, the economy suffers a proportional output loss δ2, so period 2 consumption becomes
c2 = (1− δ2)y2.
The default cost δ2 can be interpreted as the government’s degree of commitment to repaying
its debts in period 2. The extreme case of δ2 = 1 induces a strong commitment to repay and
captures the hard solvency constraint assumed up to now. At the opposite extreme of δ2 = 0,
default is costless, so the government would always default. Given outstanding bonds B2, it is
optimal for the government to repay its debts in period 2 whenever output y2 satisfies:
y2 −B2 ≥ (1− δ2)y2.
This relation gives the threshold yˆ2(B2), realizations of y2 below which the government defaults
on its bonds B2:
yˆ2(B2) = B2/δ2. (3.17)
Risk-neutral foreign investors anticipate the strategic default decision of the government. Ac-
cordingly, the price schedule q(B2) satisfies the following no-arbitrage condition:
q(B2) =
1− F (yˆ2(B2))
R
, (3.18)
where R is the risk-free interest rate. In this expression, the credit risk associated with the issuance
of bonds B2 is captured by F
(
yˆ2(B2)
)
, the probability that long-run output will be below the
default threshold yˆ2(B2). The possibility of strategic default can lead to indeterminacy in the price
schedule (3.18), as studied in Calvo (1988) and Cooper (2015). As our focus is on the occurrence
of fiscal policy traps rather than self-fulfilling increases in sovereign risk premia, whenever several
prices satisfy the price schedule (3.18) we assume that investors select the “fundamental” outcome
with the lowest risk premium. In this case, the price of debt q(B2) is decreasing in the amount of
bonds B2 issued, reflecting the increased probability of default.
Lack of Commitment to Repay Reduces Borrowing Limit
We are now ready to prove that despite its capacity to default on debt in period 2, the government
may still be susceptible to fiscal policy traps. As in our baseline model, government borrowing
between period 1 and 2 is constrained. This is turn induces a maximum level of inherited debt
Bˆ1 such that the government can roll over its obligations without having to collect tax revenue
in period 1. As in the baseline model, the economy is under the threat of fiscal policy traps
whenever inherited debt B1 is above this threshold. Interestingly, this threshold is increasing in
the commitment parameter δ2. In other words, the less committed a country is to repaying its
debt, the lower is the debt threshold at which it becomes vulnerable to fiscal policy traps.
Proposition 6. Whenever the government can default on its debt in period 2, there is a debt
rollover threshold Bˆ1 above which the country is subject to fiscal policy traps. The threshold is
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increasing in the output loss parameter δ2 (i.e. an increase in commitment increases debt capacity).
Proof. We first demonstrate that there is a maximum amount of revenue that the government can
raise in period 1, and that this amount is decreasing in δ2. The revenue raised in period 1 by
issuing B2 bonds is q(B2)B2, where the price schedule q(B2) satisfies (3.18). Using the default
threshold (3.17), resources from debt issuance are:
q(B2)B2 =
1− F (B2/δ2)
R
B2.
The right-hand side is equal to 0 for B2 = 0 and for B2 = δ2y¯2, and is strictly positive for any
value of B2 in between. Hence the right-hand side reaches a maximum for B2 = B¯2 ∈ (0, δ2y¯2).
The maximum period 1 revenue from debt issuance is therefore q(B¯2)B¯2. Since the price of debt
is strictly increasing in δ2, the revenue collected q(B2)B2 is also increasing in δ2, and so is the
maximum amount that can be collected.
As in (3.11) above, there is a maximum amount of debt Bˆ1 that can be rolled over without
raising any tax revenue in period 1. This threshold is increasing in the maximum amount of revenue
that can be raised by issuing new debt, and therefore in δ2:
Bˆ1 = q(B¯2)B¯2 −G1.
If the stock of inherited debt B1 exceeds the maximum rollover threshold Bˆ1, then as in our
baseline model the government will have to gather revenue in period 1. Indeed, to remain within
this limit the government must set a short-run tax rate at least equal to
τ(n1, B1) =
B1 − Bˆ1
z1f(n1)
.
It follows that, as before, when B1 > Bˆ1 the optimal tax policy function is at least locally pro-
cyclical, and Proposition 2 applies.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As the default cost δ2 falls, investors know that
the government will default in more states of the world in period 2 because it faces a lower penalty
for doing so. This causes them to charge a higher risk premium, thereby reducing the amount of
revenue the government can raise in period 1 by issuing new debt.
Overall, allowing the government to default on its debts in period 2 does not, therefore, eliminate
the possibility of self-fulfilling fiscal crises.
3.5.3 Private Access to International Markets
In our benchmark model, we made the simplifying assumption that households lived hand-to-
mouth and could neither save nor borrow between periods 1 and 2. Here we consider the polar
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opposite case in which households have full access to international capital markets at the risk-free
rate R.21 Allowing households to borrow and save across time allows them to smooth consumption
when taxes change. Are fiscal policy traps still possible in this environment?
Whereas in section 3.4 we modelled period 2 as an endowment economy with lump-sum taxa-
tion, here we model period 2 as a production economy with endogenous labour supply. Under this
set-up, labour taxation in period 2 influences the labour supply decision. This modelling approach
is aimed at avoiding redundancy between public and private intertemporal decisions. Further, we
assume that the government cannot tax saving or consumption directly. As we shall demonstrate
below, when households can privately smooth consumption across time, the combination of an
inelastic short-run tax base and an elastic long-run tax base leads the government to tax the short-
run tax base at 100 percent. Fiscal policy is determinate but the outcome is unambiguously worse,
since households use international markets to avoid taxes, which in turn induces the government
to set the highest tax rate possible.
The timing is as follows. In period 1, households choose their borrowing, denoted a, and their
short-run labour supply n1.
22 Having observed n1 and a, the government then sets a short-run tax
rate τ1 and issues new debt B2. In period 2, households supply labour n2, clear their borrowing
position and consume. The government sets a tax rate τ2 to meet its budget constraint and clear
its debt position. The solution is derived by backward induction.
Period 2 consumption is given by c2 = (1 − τ2)z2f(n2) − Ra. With the disutility of labour
captured by the function g(·), households solve the following problem:
VH(a) = max
n2
u
(
(1− τ2)z2f(n2)−Ra
)− g(n2). (3.19)
Optimal period 2 labour supply n2(τ2, a) is implicitly defined by households’ intratemporal
first-order condition:
(1− τ2)z2f(n2)u′(c2) = g′(n2). (3.20)
The government’s period 2 budget constraint implicitly defines τ2(a,B2):
23
τ2z2f(n2) = B2, (3.21)
where n2 ≡ n2(τ2, a) is given by (3.20).
Now, in period 1, given τ1 and τ2, households solve the following problem:
24
max
n1,a
u
(
(1− τ1)z1f(n1) + a
)− g(n1) + βVH(a),
21We thank Russell Cooper for hinting at this extension.
22Saving is denoted by a negative value of a.
23As in Section 3.5.2, in order to abstract away from other sources of coordination failures, we select the tax rate
on the left-hand side of the Laffer curve in period 2. As above, period 2 government spending is normalized to zero.
24Although the tax rates τ1 and τ2 are determined by aggregate household borrowing and labour supply decisions,
each individual household takes them as given when making its own decisions.
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where VH(a) is the value of the period 2 problem (3.19) when the household has borrowed a. The
household intertemporal first-order condition is therefore given by:
u′
(
(1− τ1)z1f(n1) + a
)
= −βV ′H(a)
u′(c1) = βRu′(c2). (3.22)
Unlike households, the government internalizes the effect of its period 1 choices on the tax rate
in period 2. When the government issues debt B2, its continuation value is given by:
VG(a,B2) = u
((
1− τ2(a,B2)
)
z2f
(
n2
(
τ2(a,B2)
))−Ra)− g(n2(τ2(a,B2))).
The government’s period 1 problem is therefore:
max
τ1
u ((1− τ1)z1f(n1) + a)− g(n1) + βVG(a,B2),
where government debt issuance is given by the budget constraint B2 = R
(
B1 − τ1z1f(n1)
)
. The
government’s intertemporal first-order condition is:
u′((1− τ1)z1f(n1) + a) = −βRdVG(a,B2)
dB2
u′(c1) = βRu′(c2)z2f(n2)
dτ2(a,B2)
dB2
. (3.23)
Comparing the household intratemporal first-order condition (3.22) with that of the government
(3.23), we see that they differ by the term z2f(n2)
dτ2(a,B2)
dB2
, which captures the distortionary
effects of taxation in period 2, internalized by the government. This difference leads to the striking
implication of this extension of our model:
Proposition 7. When households have access to international capital markets and taxation is
distortionary in period 2, there is a unique equilibrium with τ1 = 1, n1 = 0 and a > 0.
Proof. Comparing the household intertemporal first-order condition (3.22) and the government’s
intertemporal first-order condition (3.23), we see that the right-hand side of the latter contains an
additional term z2f(n2)
dτ2(a,B2)
dB2
> 0. This means that only one of these expressions can hold in
equilibrium. Households’ period 2 labour effort n2 is unbounded above and they are committed
to repay their debts Ra in full, so unlike the government they face no borrowing constraints.
This ensures that households’ intertemporal first-order condition holds in equilibrium and the
government’s does not.
If the government’s intertemporal first-order condition does not hold, then the tax rate τ1 it
sets must be one of the corner solutions. Given that the extra term on the right-hand side of
the government’s intertemporal first-order condition is positive, then if the households’ first-order
condition holds, the government wants to increase the term on the left-hand side, u′(c1). Since
u′′(·) < 0, this means the government wants to decrease c1 = (1 − τ1)z1f(n1), which it does by
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setting τ1 as high as possible.
Given τ1 = 1, it is optimal for households to supply n1 = 0. Finally, since u
′(0) = +∞,
intertemporal optimization by households requires a > 0.
In contrast to the baseline model with hand-to-mouth households, the equilibrium outcome
when households have access to perfect private capital markets is characterized by a unique tax
rate in period 1, independent of the level of inherited debt B1. Still, the equilibrium outcome is
unambiguously worse, since no production occurs in period 1 and the whole burden of taxation
and debt repayment is postponed to period 2.
The intuition behind this seemingly perverse result is that households’ access to capital markets
undermines the government’s consumption-smoothing motive for keeping the period 1 tax rate low.
Households then avoid high period 1 taxes by cutting their labour supply, and borrow to preserve
their period 1 consumption level. The implication is that the absence of perfect private capital
markets is beneficial in this environment, because it partially compensates for the government’s
inability to commit not to tax the inelastic short-run tax base excessively.
3.6 Conclusion
The recent rise (and subsequent fall) of sovereign debt spreads in the euro area periphery has
prompted renewed interest in multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling crises. Yet it was not only
countries facing increased borrowing costs that pursued contractionary fiscal policies during the
Great Recession.
In this paper we have proposed a potential explanation for why governments might pursue
procyclical fiscal policies despite not facing increased sovereign risk premia. When the inherited
stock of public debt is sufficiently high, concerns about the burden of future taxes may overwhelm
concerns about preserving consumption in the face of a decline in output, making even optimal
fiscal policy procyclical. This procyclicality unleashes the possibility of a different kind of crisis,
fuelled not by self-fulfilling fears of higher sovereign spreads but by self-fulfilling fears of a decline
in output.
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